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This dissertation examines the evolving interactions of nature and humans 
during the major military campaigns in the northern theatre of the American War for 
Independence (1775 – 1783) as local people, local environments, and military personnel 
from outside the region interacted with one another in complex ways.  Examining the 
American Revolution at the convergence of environmental, military, and borderlands 
history, it elucidates the agency of nature and culture in shaping how three military 
campaigns in the “wilderness” unfolded. The invasion of Canada in 1775, the 
expedition from Quebec to Albany in 1777, and the invasion of Iroquoia in 1779 are the 
interconnected comparative case studies that inform this project. As human and non-
human actors alike utilized the chaos of war to further distinct goals and purposes, the 
levels of assistance or resistance that each provided to the large British and Continental 
	  	  
forces that arrived from outside of the bioregion directly influenced the geopolitical and 
martial outcomes of campaigns.  
The study argues that as European-style war machines groped forward, in 
unfamiliar territories, and navigated both ecological and cultural landscapes that the 
Northeast Borderlands exerted substantial causal force.  This contiguous bioregion 
stretched from the District of Maine and Quebec in the east through northern New York 
and northwestern Pennsylvania, and from Montreal to Iroquoia and beyond during the 
latter half of the eighteenth century. South of this borderlands was the emergent Euro-
American imperial power of the thirteen colonies that would become the United States, 
and to its north were the British colonies of Nova Scotia and Quebec. The Northeastern 
Borderlands was a mostly autonomous region in between colonial settlements that 
deployed military force as a principal means to expand. This dissertation examines the 
intertwined relationships among varied cultural and environmental landscapes in a 
large bioregion, on the one hand, and the process of waging war on the other. Careful 
attention to the distinct human ecology of the Northeastern Borderlands, its causal 
significance helps to transcend nationalistic interpretations of history that still 
dominates popular and scholarly understanding of the past, in general, and of the 
American Revolution, in particular.  
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Chapter 1  
Towards an Environmental History of the American Revolution 
The pages that follow present a story about the human ecology of the 
Northeastern Borderlands as a bioregion penetrated by relatively large-scale warfare in 
the late-eighteenth century.1 It examines the evolving interactions of nature and 
humans during the major military campaigns in the northern theatre of the American 
War for Independence (1775 – 1783) as local people, local environments, and military 
personnel interacted with one another.  Examining the American Revolution at the 
convergence of environmental, military, and borderlands history, this dissertation 
elucidates the agency of nature and culture in shaping how three military campaigns in 
the “wilderness” unfolded. The invasion of Canada in 1775, the expedition from Quebec 
to Albany in 1777, and the invasion of Iroquoia in 1779 are the comparative case studies 
for this project. As human and non-human actors alike utilized the chaos of warfare to 
further their own goals to survive and thrive, the levels of assistance or resistance they 
presented to the British and Continental forces that arrived largely from outside the 
bioregion directly influenced the geopolitical successes and failures of the military 
campaigns. Thus, this is also a story of how European-style war machines groped 
forward, in unfamiliar territories, to navigate both the wilderness landscape and 
cultural landscape of the Northeast Borderlands.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  William Cronon, “A Place for Stories:  Nature, History, and Narrative,” The Journal of 
American History (March, 1992): 1347-1376, highlights the narrative value of 
environmental history. 
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Scholarly and popular understanding of the eighteenth-century wilderness are 
plagued by persistent images of seventeenth-century Puritans struggling to survive in 
the inhospitable environments where they first established their communities.  
Historian Perry Miller first recognized this in his influential 1953 essay “Errand into the 
Wilderness,” explaining that the Puritan’s self-understanding to complete the 
Reformation of Christianity elevated the peril of their venture with a wild landscape as 
an essential foil for their actions. Their knowledge of this natural landscape and its 
indigenous inhabitants was woefully limited, a great part of their mission, as noted by 
John Winthrop in 1630, was to forge a city upon a hill as a beacon to others that 
transformed the wilderness into lasting godly civilization.2 The wilderness for these 
individuals was a place to be feared and conquered. It was a place of supreme conflict 
between good and evil, civilization and savagery, an Edenic garden and the realm of 
Satan, a conceptualization that persists, if in more secular form, to the present.3  
According to environmental historian Roderick Nash, this fear of peril in the 
wilderness was challenged by a utilitarian understanding of the environment in the 
nineteenth century where trees were measured in board feet and acreage understood in 
terms of land for cattle to be pastured. In response to this increasingly market-based 
vision of the landscape, urban elites, following the lead of visual artists like Thomas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Perry Miller, “Errand into the Wilderness,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(January, 1953): 13-15. 
3 Ibid., 3. 
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Cole, began to value and romanticize the wilderness in the mid-nineteenth century.4 
However, this dissertation argues that the simplistic historical progression of 
wilderness perception from fear, to utility, to romance, and then to conservation and 
preservation makes Euro-Americans complex relationship to nature in the Northeastern 
Borderlands too linear and unidirectional. By analyzing the written documentation left 
by soldiers during the American Revolution, this dissertation unearths a complex 
relationship between eighteenth-century individuals, almost all of them European or 
American-born men, and the natural world that transcended lines of class and urban-
rural residence.  Whether a soldier was an artisanal wig maker from Providence, Rhode 
Island, a farmer from Sherman Valley, Pennsylvania, or a merchant from New Haven, 
Connecticut, he simultaneously felt, in the face of wilderness travel, competing 
emotions of trepidation, awe, failure, invigoration, and accomplishment.5 Late-
eighteenth century understandings of the wilderness existed in multiple planes of 
awareness with both positive and negative connotations.  
As the British and Continental armies navigated the northeastern wilderness, 
their senses of fear, utility, and appreciation shaped their interactions with local 
indigenous, French, and provincial populations who resided within the bioregion of the 
Northeastern Borderlands.  The way in which local people perceived, assisted, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For more on the progressive continuum of American understanding of nature see 
Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2002). 
5 The soldiers referenced are Captain Simeon Thayer, Private George Morison, and 
Colonel Benedict Arnold.  For more information on these individuals and other diarist 
during the Invasion of Canada in 1775, see Appendix A.	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resisted, military interlopers entering their communities, and the way military 
personnel and local people negotiated with one another, was inextricably linked to the 
human ecology of the bioregion. These mutually constituted human and ecological 
relationships reshaped the war effort in the region and transformed the nature of 
cultural exchange therein.  
As the War for Independence commenced, the borderlands was characterized by 
fluid identities and loyalties among indigenous and relatively sparse colonial settler 
populations with the British and Continental armies suddenly arriving with often sharp 
political, economic, and social demands.  When these military forces struggled to 
master the cultural and environmental landscapes of the Northeastern Borderlands, 
they were often desperate to forge an accommodation, but over time this was largely 
replaced by external coercion. Eventually, negotiations broke down and scorched-earth 
campaigns designed to remove opposing local and regional cultures and ecological 
regimes characterized the exchanges in the altered wilderness.  The geopolitical context 
of the war as a conflict between empire and colonies created the new nation of the 
United States and also created an international boundary between British North 
America and the United States that attempted to delineate a sharper border than had 
existed prior to the war. The three campaigns examined here mark a diplomatic, 
political, and social hardening of the region into separate geopolitical spheres, well 
before John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens negotiated the 
Treaty of Paris in 1783. 
 
	  	   5	  
Defining a Borderlands 
As the historian C. Vann Woodward has argued, “to limit the subject of historical 
study within national boundaries is always to invite the charge of narrow perspective 
and historical nationalism.”6 In no subject area in American history is this truer for than 
the American Revolution.  The conflict created a new political state, and historians of 
the event immediately set forth to create a new national narrative of American 
exceptionalism. Recently, scholars such as Maya Jasanoff and Elizabeth Mancke have 
shown that embracing a transnational, comparative, or borderlands approach to the 
study of the America Revolution can greatly enrich our understanding of this pivotal 
era that had more than just national consequences.7  Introducing a transnational 
methodology to the field of medical and environmental history in Pox Americana: The 
Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82, Elizabeth A. Fenn adroitly demonstrates that the 
natural world has “no respect for boundaries of race, class, and nationality” as she 
examined how smallpox ravaged almost all of the North-American continent during the 
War for Independence from Mesoamerica to the far northwest.8  These studies suggest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 C. Vann Woodward, The Comparative Approach to American History (New York: Basic 
Books, 1968), 3. 
7 Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalism in the Revolutionary World (New York:  
Vintage Books, 2011); Elizabeth Mancke, The Faultlines of Empire:  Political Differentiation 
in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, CA. 1760-1830 (New York:  Routledge, 2005). Another 
work of note is an anthology edited by Jerry Banister and Liam Riordan, The Loyal 
Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012). 
8 Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-1782 (New York:  
Hill and Wang, 2001), 3. 
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the fertile ground for scholarship that transcends a history of the American Revolution 
contained within strict geopolitical units.  
In a landmark article on the field of transnational history, Jeremy Adelman and 
Stephen Aron defined a borderlands as a region that exists between two imperial 
powers with contested boundary lines.9 The focus of this dissertation is the Northeast 
Borderlands: a contiguous bioregion stretching in the east from the District of Maine 
and Quebec through western Pennsylvania and New York and into Iroquoia and 
Montreal. South of this borderlands in the mid-and-late eighteenth century were the 
nascent Euro-American imperial power of the Thirteen Colonies, and to its north were 
the British colonies of Nova Scotia and Quebec.  Although borderlands has been an 
especially fertile analytical construct in the US and Mexican southwest, the intercolonial 
and intercultural makeup of the northeast was (and remains) a vital borderlands in 
North America.  Those who lived in the region exploited their unique situation to 
maintain fluid identities and fluid allegiances to best advance the interests of the 
community or the individual as more important than distant geopolitical powers that 
they engaged with selectively at any given time and in response to specific local 
conditions. 
This dissertation does not limit borderlands peoples to indigenous residents 
stuck in between colonial powers, as Adelman and Aron tend to. It argues that French-
Canadians, Acadians, and English-speaking settlers as well as indigenous people living 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-
States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 104, No. 3 (June, 1999): 816.	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within the Northeast Borderlands were able to utilize the War for Independence as a 
means to exercise autonomy and maximize their political and economic potential 
during the conflict by declaring and altering their relationships with one another and 
with external actors that made new demands upon the region. This fluidity remained a 
common characteristic of negotiation in the region as local people interfaced with 
British regulars, Continental soldiers, German mercenaries, and patriot and loyal 
militias. In navigating the Northeastern Borderlands, military personnel, by the same 
token, devised measures of accommodation with residents socially, culturally, 
religiously, economically, and environmentally.10  This borderland region existed on 
many levels as local agents assisted or resisted military interlopers forging new 
opportunities to improve their own lives and their own communities.   
This dissertation combines military and environmental history to highlight how 
natural and local actors held little interest in the demands and boundaries established 
by distant imperial, colonial, and national diplomacy and politics. Instead, the interfaces 
between soldiers, colonists, indigenous people, and the non-human world during the 
American Revolution reshaped geopolitics as they adapted to the unique circumstances 
of borderlands warfare that crisscrossed the boundary lines connecting and separating 
New England, Canada, New York, and Iroquoia. 
Utilizing this transnational approach, the Northeastern Borderlands is best 
viewed as a bioregion with a unique human ecology. Historian Carolyn Merchant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, eds., New England and the Maritime Provinces:  
Connections and Comparisons (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 10. The 
editors highlight how borderlands concepts shaped the essays in their anthology. 
	  	   8	  
defines bioregionalism as “an idea that people and other living and non-living things in 
a particular region…are interdependent” and “live as much as possible within the 
resources and ecological constraints of that place.”11 This interdependency in the 
northeast created particular relationships between human beings and their natural, 
social, built, and hybrid environments. Similarly, Dan Flores argues that focusing on 
bioregionalism shows “the close linkage between ecological locale and human culture” 
highlighting “the variety of ways humans not only alter environments but also adapt to 
them.”12 This approach accentuates the place of the non-human environment to shape 
human experiences and actions. Looking at the War for Independence through the lens 
of bioregionalism and human ecology can fruitfully transcend national boundaries to 
probe the multi-causal relationship among warfare, the environment, and human 
society to refashion geopolitics and military operations. 
The Northeastern Borderlands is unique human ecological bioregion. It was a 
geopolitical area contested by Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples and, increasingly, 
during the eighteenth century by French and British imperial powers until the end of 
the Seven Years’ War expelled French authorities from most of the northeast. Shortly 
afterwards, a new imperial, and American, power sought hegemony in the region. 
Throughout, indigenous residents and local colonists negotiated their lives in this space 
at a considerable distance from the power of Euro-American states. The sparse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Carolyn Merchant, American Environmental History: An Introduction (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 218. 
12	  Dan Flores, The Natural West: Environmental History in the Great Plains and Rocky 
Mountains (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 95. 
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population of this large region allowed those living within it to exercise autonomy and 
sovereignty with varying degrees of success over time. Ecologically, the region is bound 
by mountainous terrain and rich alluvial soils where residents wrested a variety of 
grains from their fields and fruit from their orchards. The region is well-watered 
receiving approximately 42 inches of rainfall annually, and intersected with riparian 
passages inland from the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of St. Lawrence. Large tracts of 
uncolonized space lay between Euro-American settlements and fortifications with no, 
or only rudimentary, colonial communications and infrastructure linking them.  
Located in Between: A History of War and Environment Studies 
The union of war and environment studies has emerged from an insightful 
article published in the Environmental History Review in 1995 entitled, “The Impact of 
World War II on the Land.”13  Author, Ferenc Szasz, argued that despite the devastation 
wrought by the war on the built environment, human culture, and human society, 
military historians had claimed  “that even the cataclysmic events of 1939 - 1945 
involved no permanent alteration to the natural environment” as battlefields returned 
to farmland and post-war urban landscapes bustled with renewed activity.14  This 
traditional view did not take into account the use of chemical weapons, biological 
weapons, and radioactive weapons by both the Axis and the Allies, which Szasz argued 
“did alter the natural environment at a number of locations,” including manufacturing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ferenc M. Szasz, “The Impact of World War II on the Land:  Gruinard Island, 
Scotland, and Trinity Site, New Mexico as Case Studies,” Environmental History Review, 
Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1995): 15-30.   
14 Ibid., 15-16.  
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sites where weapons were produced, arsenals where weapons were stockpiled, and 
laboratories where experiments took place.15  Due to the nature of these chemical, 
biological, and radioactive agents, it seems unlikely that the sites of their production, 
storage, and experimentation can ever return to their pre-war condition. 
Following this article, all remained quiet on the hybrid war and environment 
front as military and environmental historians pursued interesting and provocative 
work each in their respective fields.  In military history, analyses transcended the 
traditional focus on great generals and battle history to explore issues of race, class, 
culture, and gender.  In environmental history, a much newer subfield, historians 
adopted methods from historical geography and focused on the entangled relationship 
between the natural non-human world, human systems of production, and human 
perceptions of the natural world—in short, how humans affect nature, how nature 
affects humans, and how humans think about it all.  This does not mean that the 
environment did not play some role in the analysis of military history. Indeed, military 
historians have attended to weather, terrain, and natural resource struggles since 
Herodotus; however, as a leader in the new field, Richard P. Tucker, notes that 
traditional “interest lies almost exclusively with the human drama; they see nature as 
context, but not as consequence, of mass violence.”16 At the same time, he goes on to 
explain that environmental historians, for their part, “rarely” focused “on the dynamics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 16.  
16 Richard P. Tucker, “War and the Environment,” in A Companion to Global Environmental 
History, eds. J.R. McNeill and Erin Stewart Mauldin (Malden, MA:  Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 319. 
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of mass violence or the structures of military operations.”17  The practitioners of the two 
fields held different interests, practiced different methodologies, and interfaced 
infrequently in print or in person. 
Overcoming this divide, Edmund Russell published a trail-blazing monograph 
for the field of war and environment history, War and Nature in 2001.18  This book 
skillfully challenged traditional scholarship written by military, environmental, science 
and technology, and cultural historians by transcending the nature/culture divide.  He 
argued that American control over the natural environment “coevolved” during times 
of war.19  In other words, as human beings fought one another, they developed 
chemicals which killed insects and as human beings began fighting insects, they 
developed chemicals which killed human beings.  This laid the foundation for war and 
environment studies by highlighting the dialectical relationship between human 
violence and the natural world.  Russell bridged the two fields, creating a common 
language and providing common themes to be explored and tested. 
Russell’s methodology combined the theoretical construct of war and society 
studies—which looks at how military action affects society and how society affects the 
military—with the theoretical construct of environmental history—which looks at how 
human culture effects the environment and how the environment effects human 
culture.  This combination creates its own theoretical construct to look at how warfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 319. 
18 Edmund Russell, War and Nature:  Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from 
World War I to Silent Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
19 Ibid., 2.  
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changes the environment and how the environment changes warfare.   The timing for 
Russell’s publication could not have been more perfect.  In that same year, the United 
Nations declared November 6 for annual recognition as an International Day for 
Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict.20 
 Richard Tucker and Edmund Russell co-edited a valuable anthology in 2004 
aptly titled Natural Enemy, Natural Ally, as a play on the dialectic between the non-
human environment and warfare.  Though three of the authors in the collection 
researched topics outside of the temporal focus of World War I and World War II—the 
topic of Tucker, Szasz, and Russell’s work—the additional two-thirds of the collection 
focused on these two twentieth-century conflicts.21  This was not missed by the editors 
in their introductory remarks, but modern warfare in the twentieth century remains a 
notable limitation of the subfield of war and environment studies. 
This collection stressed the core them of how war shaped the environment and 
the environment shaped war. Further, it reflected “intellectually…merging [the] two 
prime fields” of war and environment studies including a “preliminary survey” of 
possible topics for research as well as “fruitful types of sources and methods” for 
advancing this analysis.22  A valuable intellectual borderlands between military and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Richard P. Tucker and Edmund Russell, eds., Natural Enemy, Natural Ally:  Towards an 
Environmental History of Warfare (Corvallis, OR:  Oregon University Press, 2004), 2. 
21 Tucker and Russell, Natural Enemy, Natural Ally. The three non-World War articles 
are:  Stewart Gordon, “War, the Military, and the Environment:  Central India, 1560 – 
1820;” Roger S. Levine, “’African Warfare in All Its Ferocity’:  Changing Military 
Landscapes and Precolonial and Colonial Conflict in Southern Africa;” and Mark Feige, 
“Gettysburg and the Organic Nature of the American Civil War.”  
22 Tucker and Russell, Natural Enemy, Natural Ally, 2-3. 
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environmental history has begun to be created where historians could find 
commonality and engagement. 
Several key themes ran throughout the collection’s chapters.  The most prevalent 
was an interest in how warfare wreaks havoc on the landscapes where battles and 
bombings take place, or, in other words, the environmental collateral damage caused 
through the human action of battle.  The authors explored not only the environmental 
degradation caused by the weapons of war but also the devastation caused by feeding 
the war machine. Supplying the army with natural resources to wage war resulted in a 
reorganization of local and peripheral landscapes.  Additionally, they argue, it is often 
the superior access or control of resources that determined the victors of a battle, a 
campaign season, or an entire war.  A final theme running through the papers was the 
relationship between the environment, warfare, and disease.  Here the authors 
discussed how diseases and their vectors become a Natural Enemy causing the military 
and the nation state to focus not only on fighting their human opponents but also the 
non-human world around their forces. The themes and temporal scope of this 
anthology guided the direction of war and environment studies for almost a decade. 
From 2004 to 2011 the journal Environmental History published several articles on 
a variety of topics concerning the two world wars.  In 2004, Rauno Lahtinen and Timo 
Vurisalo wrote about urban agriculture in Finland during World War I and World War 
II; in 2006 Chris Pearson discussed the gathering of wood for fuel in Vichy, France; in 
2010 Connie Y. Chiang examined the environmental context of the internment of 
Japanese-Americans; and in 2011 Matt Evenden published an article regarding the 
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global ecological footprint of aluminum production.23 During this nascent stage of the 
subfield of war and environment studies several monographs were also published on 
the two world wars. Chris Pearson published two books relating to his work on Vichy 
France; Judith A. Bennett’s monograph, titled Natives and Exotics, looked at the 
environment of the South Pacific and how American soldiers stationed there affected 
the fragile ecosystems of the Pacific islands.24  
The Cold War also gained popularity as a topic in the study of war and the 
environment.  During the last decade, a half-dozen articles emerged mostly in the 
journal Environmental History.  Jacob Hamblin published articles in 2002, 2008, and 2010 
regarding the intersections of the environment and geopolitics during the 1960s and 
1970s covering topics such as radioactive wastes, marine pollution, and 
environmentalism within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).25  In 2007, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Rauno Lahtinen and Timo Vurisalo, “’It’s War and Everyone Can Do as They Please!’:  
An Environmental History of a Finnish City in Wartime,” Environmental History 9 
(October, 2004):  679-700; Chris Pearson, “’The Age of Wood’:  Fuel and Fighting in 
French Forests, 1940 – 1944,” Environmental History 11 (October, 2006):  775 – 803; 
Connie Y. Chiang, “Imprisoned Nature:  Toward an Environmental History of the 
World War II Japanese American Incarceration,” Environmental History 15 (April, 2010): 
236 -267; Matt Eveden, “Aluminum, Commodity Chains, and the Environmental 
History of the Second World War,” Environmental History 16 (April, 2011): 69 – 93. 
24 Chris Pearson, Scarred Landscapes:  War and Nature in Vichy France (London:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); Chris Pearson, Mobilizing Nature:  The Environmental History of War 
and Militarization in Modern France (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2012); 
Judith A. Bennett, Natives and Exotics:  World War II and Environment in the Southern 
Pacific (Honolulu:  University of Hawaii Press, 2009). 
25 Jacob Darwin Hamblin, “Environmental Diplomacy in the Cold War:  the Disposal of 
Radioactive Wastes at Sea during the 1960s,” The International History Review 24 (June, 
2002): 348 – 375; Jacob Darwin Hamblin, “Gods and Devils in the Details:  Marine 
Pollution, Radioactive Waste and an Environmental Regime circa 1972,” Diplomatic 
History 32 (2008):  539 – 560; Jacob Darwin Hamblin, “Environmentalism for the Atlantic 
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Mark Fiege wrote about the interface between the scientists of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in New Mexico and the natural world.  Through strolling, hiking, and 
climbing through the environment with one another, nuclear physicists became 
mentally rejuvenated by their environment allowing them to think more deeply about 
protons, neutrons, and electrons.  He argued that his article elucidated “unexpected 
environmental features of the atomic project,” which help us to better understand the 
sense of wonder with which scientists engage in their work.26  Historian Andrew Jenks 
melded the study of World War II and the Cold War in his 2007 article “Model City 
USA” that looked at the legacy of environmental, political, and social costs of achieving 
victory during these two conflicts.  This case study of the Lake Ontario Ordinance 
Works site in New York, a nuclear weapons waste management facility, highlights how 
the ideology of “patriotic sacrifice” in the United States coalesced with political 
organizations devoted to secrecy, abrogating any concerns for public safety and 
welfare.27    
Two books of note, one monograph and one anthology, deserve mention as well.  
In 2011, David Biggs, published, Quagmire, a riveting look at the intersections between 
hydrology, Euro-American imperialism, engineering, and warfare in the Vietnamese 
Mekong Delta from the pre-colonial past to the post-war present.  Though the failings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Alliance: NATO’s Experiment with the Challenges of Modern Society,” Environmental 
History 12 (January, 2010):  54- 75.  
26 Mark Fiege, “The Atomic Scientists, the Sense of Wonder, and the Bomb,” 
Environmental History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July, 2007): 578. 
27 Andrew Jenks, “Model City USA:  The Environmental Cost of Victory in World War 
II and the Cold War,” Environmental History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July, 2007): 552.  
	  	   16	  
the colonial powers to “modernize” Vietnam is an oft-told tale, by looking at the 
environment of the Mekong Delta over the longue dureé, Biggs makes clear that the 
shortcomings of colonial projects in Vietnam stem not only from the colonizers’ 
unwillingness to understand the aspirations, knowledge, and capabilities of those being 
colonized, but also from their unwillingness to adapt to, and understand, local 
environmental conditions.28   
John McNeill and Corinna Unger co-edited Environmental Histories of the Cold War 
in 2013.  This collection contains chapters on the environmental geopolitics of the Cold 
War, the impact of nuclear weapons testing on Earth and its atmosphere, the creation of 
megaproject dams to contain communism, climate and weather control, chemical 
warfare in Vietnam, and how the various actors in the Cold War degraded their 
environments for the war effort.  McNeill and Unger argue in their introduction that 
this project came together to challenge the conventional historiography of the Cold War 
in order to “acknowledge that the Cold War was fought on Earth in the biosphere with 
[environmental] repercussions that will last perhaps a hundred thousand years.”29  
Viewing the first decade of the emerging field of war and environment studies it 
becomes clear that despite the rich scholarship being produced by the engagement of 
military and environmental history regarding the two world wars and the Cold War, 
scant attention has been paid to how the natural world and human conflict were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 David Biggs, Quagmire:  Nation-Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta (Seattle:  The 
University of Washington Press, 2011). 
29 J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., Environmental Histories of the Cold War 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3. 
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intertwined prior to the twentieth century.  An exception to this was Lisa Brady’s 2005 
article “The Wilderness of War:  Nature and Strategy in the American Civil War,” 
which looked at key battles during the United States Civil War—Vicksburg, the 
Shenandoah Valley campaign, and Sherman’s infamous march to the sea—as revealing 
an overall Union strategy to disrupt the Confederacy’s ability to make their 
agroecosystems support massive wartime mobilization.30    
Brady’s effort prompted an explosion of scholarship regarding the Civil War and 
the environment just as Edmund Russell’s foundational book, War and Nature, turned a 
decade old.  She published a monograph expanding upon her article entitled, War upon 
the Land in 2012.31  Megan Kate Nelson, Jim Downs, and Andrew Bell also published 
foundational works of Civil War and environment studies in 2012.  Nelson’s work 
explores how destruction of urban landscapes and wilderness, as well as human 
bodies—both from death and amputation—affected the variety of people living in 
America—white, black, male, female, northerner, southerner, citizen, soldier.  She 
argues that the environmental ruins, both urban and wild, led to rebuilding and rebirth 
in the United States. However, much harder to ignore or remedy were the disabled men 
who reconfigured America’s conception of humanity and death during the late 
nineteenth century.32   Downs examined the role of disease during the Civil War. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Lisa Brady, “The Wilderness of War:  Nature and Strategy in the American Civil 
War,” Environmental History 10 (July 2005): 421 – 447. 
31 Lisa Brady, War upon the Land:  Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern 
Landscapes during the American Civil War (Athens, GA:  The University of Georgia Press, 
2012). 
32 Megan Kate Nelson, Ruin Nation:  Destruction and the American Civil War (Athens, GA:  
The University of Georgia Press, 2012). 
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However, instead of looking at soldiers, he focused on how disease affected the newly 
emancipated African American populace.  The war created a refugee crisis in Union 
camps where disease thrived due to a lack of basic sanitation.33   Bell looked to 
mosquitoes and microorganisms to highlight the importance of three things: diseases in 
warfare; how diseases “affected the timing and success of certain key military 
operations;” and how environmental factors have agency in warfare.34  In 2013 
Katheryn Shively Meier published Nature’s Civil War to highlight the effect of the 
natural world on both the mental and physical health of soldiers.  She argued that 
environmental history offers military historians insights into issues of morale and how 
soldiers understood both their own health as well as the environment.35  A recent 
anthology, The Blue, the Gray, and the Green, which contains essays by Brady, Nelson, 
and Meier, argues that folding environmental history into military history “can tell us 
many things we didn’t already know before and can also allow us to reassess some 
things we thought we knew.  As its contributions to other fields suggest, environmental 
history can locate and turn over new stones in the Civil War field as well as reposition 
some older ones.”36 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Jim Downs, Sick from Freedom:  African-American Illness and Suffering during the Civil 
War and Reconstruction (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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35Katheryn Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War:  Common Soldiers and the Environment in 
1862 Virginia (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 2013).  
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Towards an Environmental History of the War for American Independence 
Despite the recent turn toward the nineteenth century, and the American Civil 
War in particular, few war and environment scholars of the United States have 
ventured into topics prior to the mid-nineteenth century.  The focus of this dissertation, 
the American War for Independence and its interwoven relationship with 
bioregionalism and human ecology, remains largely overlooked. However, as argued in 
The Blue, the Gray, and the Green, in regard to the Civil War, combining military and 
environmental history with the study of a particular military conflict allows us to learn 
new things from well-trodden sources and campaigns. It challenges us to reassess 
standing narratives, suggests new interpretive questions to be answered, and recasts 
old ideas into a new analytical framework.   
Three works of note regarding the environmental history of the American 
Revolution are important touchstones for this dissertation. The first, already mentioned 
above, is Elizabeth Fenn’s Pox Americana, which shows that “in a New World 
environment where acquired immunity was rare, Variola was a virus of empire. It made 
winners and losers, at once serving the conquerors and determining who they would 
be.”37 The second, J.R. McNeill’s Mosquito Empires, contains a chapter on how mosquitos 
as vectors of disease—specifically yellow fever and malaria—prevailed as a historical 
agent through their “pursuit of human blood,” during the combined Franco-American 
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fighting forces’ siege of the British army at Yorktown in 1781.38  His overall study of 
numerous case studies across the Greater Caribbean bioregion argues that “viruses, 
plasmodia, mosquitoes, monkeys, swamps—as well as humankind” shaped geopolitical 
history in the long colonial era from the early-seventeenth to the late-nineteenth century 
in a causal and dynamic manner.39 Finally, David C. Hsiung published an article 
entitled “Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment” that argues that “battles 
proved to be the exception rather than the norm” for soldiers serving during the War 
for Independence. 40  Instead struggles over food, fuel, and livestock remained the 
primary preoccupation for the American and British forces.  Hsiung highlights “the 
environmental context” from which these supplies were procured and argues that the 
War for Independence was “a human endeavor as dependent on the environment as 
farming and fishing.”41   
These works provide an excellent baseline for starting to explore the intersections 
among warfare, the environment, and culture during the American Revolution. Fenn 
and McNeill’s transnational approaches highlight the value of looking at North 
America as a bioregion with specific environmental and cultural conditions that fueled 
the outbreak of disease. They both point to the agency of the natural world upon 
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40 David C. Hsiung, “Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment in the War for 
Independence, 1775-1776,” The New England Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 2007): 
615. Hsiung also builds upon this work in his contribution to Patrick Spero and Michael 
Zuckerman, eds., The American Revolution Reborn (Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016). 
41 Hsiung, “Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment,” 617. 
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geopolitics of the era and illuminate how human and non-human actors alike created 
history in interaction with one another. Hsuing’s case study of the siege of Boston notes 
that during the War for Independence natural commodities and circumstances 
demanded the close attention officers and soldiers far more than battles that proved the 
exceptions rather than the rule for conducting early modern military campaign. Overall, 
these historians elucidate that warfare, geopolitics, and the environment are 
inextricably entwined. 
Scant attention to the American Revolution, despite the quality of the 
aforementioned authors, is a not entirely surprising feature of the subfield of war and 
environment studies.  This stems from historiographical trends in military history, 
environmental history, and early American history.  In the field of military history, 
scholars have ignored a focus on forested, wilderness, or wooded landscapes—those 
that are ripest for environmental analysis during the American Revolution—in favor of 
“jungle, desert, or urban” landscapes.  In fact, most military training manuals advise 
commanders to “bypass” such regions to “maintain the momentum of the advance” 
whenever possible.42 The field of military history in regards to the American 
Revolution, too, as historian John Grenier notes, avoids “military operations on the 
frontier“ and borderlands.43 In U.S. environmental history, a preponderance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Andrew Clayton, Warfare in the Woods and Forests (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2012), xii-xv.  
43 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146. For works that perpetuate this 
narrative, see Don Higginbotham, The War for American Independence: Military Attitudes, 
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scholarship has focused on the twentieth century and particularly on the trans-
Mississippi West.44  This temporal and spatial focus excludes the eighteenth century 
and the struggle for American independence from the British empire.  This neglect is 
evidenced in Peter C. Mancall’s sweeping historiographical essay on the environmental 
history of early America in the William and Mary Quarterly. Mancall never mentions the 
American Revolution as a current or possible future venue of study in the joining of 
environmental and early American scholarship.45 This is further substantiated by a 2016 
anthology, The Revolution Reborn, designed to highlight new insights from emergent 
scholarly specialists. In it, only David Hsuing’s chapter engages with the natural world 
by showing how the quest for saltpeter “challenged Americans’ knowledge of science 
and the environment.”46  
In analyzing the field of war and environment studies—from its continued focus 
on the two world wars to its incorporation of the American Civil War—a second pattern 
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emerges:  a preponderance of war and environment scholarship primarily focuses on 
battles, military officers, or diseases.  This drum-and-bugle renaissance is surprising 
considering that the field of military history incorporated social history over three 
decades ago.  Paul Sutter, an environmental historian of the southern United States, 
argues that this focus on traditional military history topics is an “odd way to begin 
what is supposed to be [the] cutting-edge historiographical maneuver” that war and 
environment studies promises.47  Sutter, as well as other historians, contend that 
inattention to social history by environmental historians studying warfare is a major 
hurdle that needs to be overcome.  This dissertation aspires to leap this hurdle by 
focusing not primarily on battles and generals, but instead on the lived experiences of 
officers and soldiers interfacing with the unique human ecology of the Northeastern 
Borderlands during the American Revolution, and it shifts the gaze of war and 
environment studies away from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the late-
eighteenth century.  By shifting the temporal, spatial, and topical focus of war and 
environment studies, this dissertation sows the seeds for future harvests in the field. 
The Northern Theatre of the American Revolution 
 This dissertation examines the experiences of soldiers, citizens, subjects, and 
indigenous people as they lived and served in the Northeast Borderlands during the 
American War for Independence. The chapters investigate three major wilderness 
campaigns that were among the most important large-scale military operations of the 
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war: the invasion of Quebec by the Continental army through the District of Maine in 
1775; the British expedition to New York from Montreal in 1777; and the invasion of 
Iroquoia by the Continental army in 1779. Focusing on the human ecology of the 
northeast reveals that these three campaigns were not disparate events held together 
simply by the geography of the region. Viewing the smaller incidences leading up to 
and following these campaigns sew the northern theatre of the war together 
strategically, tactically, environmentally, and transnationally.  These include the 
breaking of the siege of Quebec in 1776, the Battle of Oriskany in 1777, and the 
destruction of the borderland communities of Cherry Valley and Wyoming in 1778, 
among others.  
Throughout these varied events, military leaders sought to gain assistance from 
the indigenous and colonial populations and to control access to valuable agricultural 
and natural resources. Despite the best devised geopolitical and military planning of the 
British and Continental armies, human and environmental actors in the northeast 
bioregion took advantage of the disorder of war to survive and thrive autonomously of 
imperial and colonial structures. This unique human-ecological bioregion reshaped the 
war effort and altered the borderlands as soldiers, citizens, subjects, indigenous people, 
and non-human entities made history alongside and in combination with one another.    
 The opening chapter has highlighted the historiographic context for the project, 
defined the Northeast Borderlands as a bioregion with a unique human ecology, and 
closes with a chapter overview about the scope of the dissertation.  In doing so it places 
itself into the broader context of the literature regarding environmental history, military 
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history, and early American history and notes its own most important contributions to 
those fields. Chapter two examines the Continental army as it travelled from the plains 
of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to the gates of the fortress at Quebec. It follows the 
soldiers as they navigated through the wilderness of the District of Maine and into the 
bucolic countryside of La Nouvelle-Beauce in Canada. Chapter three looks at the 
political turmoil in La Beauce and the agency of local people in resisting British 
authority, as they assisted the Continental army on their mission to Quebec for their 
own political, economic, and social gains. Chapters four and five explore the siege of 
Quebec, the southern retreat of the Continental army through the borderlands, and the 
pursuing campaign into New York by General John Burgoyne, which ended famously 
in the British army’s surrender at Saratoga in 1777. The main focus of chapter six is the 
ensuing campaign into Iroquoia, where General George Washington commanded his 
subordinates to “pay them in their own coin,”  resulting in massive destruction of the 
agroecosystems of the Seneca in an effort to remove them, and the Iroqouis, generally, 
from their lands and to force them on the British as imperial wards at Niagara.48 The 
final chapter offers a conclusion that assesses what the combination of military, 
environmental, and borderlands history elucidates in regards to the so-called 
“wilderness” campaigns of the northern theatre of the American Revolution. It points to 
ways that the methodology of this study can be expanded both temporally and 
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geographically by scholars interested in the intersections of warfare, geopolitics, and 
human ecology.  
 This dissertation relies heavily on the written documentation left by soldiers, 
officers, politicians, and diplomats, as well as their loved ones, during the American 
War for Independence.  These diaries, letters, and military reports repeatedly comment 
on the wilderness landscape and reveal how the natural world structured military, 
diplomatic, and human relations.  Comparisons between officers’ and common soldiers’ 
assessments are particularly valuable for bringing to light how status differences 
informed views of the environmental and cultural borderlands in both the British and 
Continental armies. Most participants understood that their military service was 
uniquely important, and they expected it to be extraordinary. Thus, they generated 
unusually rich documentation that has not heretofore been analyzed from the 
perspectives of borderlands and environmental history.49 
 Soldiers also wrote about their wartime experiences to try and gain a sense of 
control over what was happening to them. Historian of the Seven Years’ War, Fred 
Anderson, argues that the vivid descriptions of battle often allowed soldiers to “sort out 
events, to arrange in sequences and categories the chaotic occurrences of combat.”50 
Though this dissertation largely eschews the battles of the northern theatre of the 
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American Revolution, if one replaces narrow attention to battle and combat with an 
assessment about observations of the natural world and the local inhabitants of the 
borderlands, the insight becomes even more valuable. Soldiers did write about their 
experiences to sort out and to understand the chaotic occurrences of navigating the 
environmental and cultural bioregion of the northeast. The wealth of documents from 
the northern theatre exist in large part because soldiers wrote about their experiences to 
gain control over, and navigate, the natural world and to calculate how best to negotiate 
the human ecology of the borderlands. Indeed, as theorist Michel Foucault argues, “the 
history of power over nature is a history of…strategies of control, and modes of 
mapping, tabulation, recordation, classification, demarcation, and ordering.”51 This 
dissertation reveals how recording wartime experiences in the Northeastern 
Borderlands was a means to gain control over a natural and cultural bioregion.  
 No sources are ever purely objective; in fact, it is the subjective qualities of this 
evidence that most richly informs the analysis in this dissertation. The way that people 
document their lives and the lives of others—what they chose to dwell on, and what 
they chose to neglect—often is as reveling as the actual information that they recorded. 
One critique of a portion of the primary sources included in this dissertation is that 
many were published for monetary gain. Thus, it is argued that authors had potential 
profits in mind when writing their diaries, letters, and reports.  In some cases, the 
original manuscripts no longer exist, and in others it appears that published memoirs 
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were plagiarized anthologies of the diary entries and letters of fellow soldiers. Where 
possible, original manuscript evidence was used, and the information contained in 
published sources was crosschecked and reinforced with non-published materials. 
Careful reading of these sources through the lens of war and environment 
studies clearly demonstrates that these writers had a probing interest about wilderness, 
had a relationship with other individuals and the environment, and that they 
negotiated the borderlands in a manner that often acknowledged nature’s causal force 
in the bioregion that curtailed human agency in these campaigns. These sources capture 
multiple aspects of the human experience during the eighteenth century that remains 
obscured in the standard political, diplomatic, military, and economic histories of the 
American Revolution. Highlighting the environmental and transnational context of the 
Northeastern Borderlands demonstrates how the natural world exerted agency upon 
military events, how armies negotiated with local people, how local people negotiated 
with armies, and how individuals experienced and comprehended the non-human 
world that surrounded them. By understanding these variegated relationships among 
human and non-human actors we can expand our understanding of the experiences 
and significance of the American Revolution.
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Chapter 2:  
‘Where there was no Signs of any Human Being’:  
Navigating the Northeast Wilderness during the March to Quebec, 17751 
During the autumn of 1775, in the midst of the wilderness situated between the 
Eastern Country of Massachusetts and Quebec, William Humphrey, Lieutenant in the 
Continental Army, scratched in his journal that “the work of Nature may at one place 
please the eye and displease.”2  Humphrey volunteered to serve on a secret mission to 
invade Canada under the command of then Colonel Benedict Arnold through the wilds 
beyond the Eastern Country (present day Maine).  This short diary entry challenges a 
major trope in the literature that stresses the bravery and leadership of Arnold.  In a feat 
comparable to Hannibal crossing the Alps in 218 BCE, he supposedly urged his men 
against all odds through the privations of the wilderness to the gates of Quebec.  
Humphrey’s passage—as well as many others discussed below— complicates this 
narrative by suggesting that nature, despite causing starvation and death among the 
soldiers, could also be a source of pleasure.  This chapter adds nuance to our 
understanding of the invasion of Canada in 1775, eighteenth-century ideas of the 
natural world, and warfare in general. Further, it changes our understanding of 
wilderness and the American national narrative. And finally, it serves as a baseline for 
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further discussion of the environmental history of the War for Independence. The 
complex feelings towards the wilderness expressed by the men of Arnold’s expedition 
mirrored the writings of other soldiers, British and American, serving in the Northeast 
Borderlands during war. 
Soldiers and officers like Humphrey often wrote field journals and diaries while 
on tour because they expected their experiences to be extraordinary and thus worth 
recording.3  The war diaries of the men in Arnold’s expedition described not only the 
events and occurrences of battle but also, as Humphrey shows, the non-human 
environment.  Much like early American naturalists, Arnold’s soldiers took notice of 
interesting and unique aspects of the natural world while on campaign, and were so 
impressed by what they saw that they took time to observe and record their thoughts 
and reflections as well.  What function did this record serve?  Although simple 
fascination with the woods of the Eastern Country may have been a factor in recording 
the character of the environment, it was also aimed at imposing order on the unfamiliar 
landscape and allowing the expedition to understand and thus gain power over the 
natural world in order to successfully navigate through the wilderness.  As theorist 
Michel Foucault argues “the history of power over nature is a history of… strategies of 
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control, and modes of mapping, tabulation, recordation, classification, demarcation, and 
ordering;” the recording of the environment was a means to gain power over the 
wilderness.4   
The recording of nature has a long tradition in the Americas, beginning first with 
the naturalist-explorers of the sixteenth century. In his monograph, Narrating Discovery, 
literary scholar Bruce Greenfield argued that early American explorers reported “on 
what they themselves actually saw and experienced.”  When they created narratives of 
their adventures, “they told their stories from the observer’s point of view” and 
“organized their narratives around a journey.”5  Environmental historian Richard Judd, 
in his survey of natural history and conservation in early America, The Untilled Garden, 
noted that the writings of these first explorers “incorporated sight, sound, smell, touch, 
and even taste into the…assessment of nature.”6   Further, environmental historian 
William Cronon argued in his field-defining monograph, Changes in the Land, that 
explorers of early America catalogued the natural world as they came in contact with it 
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1790 – 1855 (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1992), 71. The organization of 
soldier narratives around a journey is less present in field diaries, however, it is almost 
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for the purpose of harvesting its resources in the future.7  The writings of the men on 
the expedition to Quebec in 1775 incorporated all of these means of recording nature—
observation as a journey; a full-bodied experience; and utilitarian exercise.  
This chapter argues that the American soldiers on the March to Quebec—and in 
a broader sense, all soldiers in intimate contact with unfamiliar landscapes—can be 
viewed as both amateur naturalists and explorers who observe, interact with, and 
interpret nature.  The soldiers blended two traditions:  that of soldiers’ war diaries 
recording unusual experiences during their martial missions, and of explorers 
explaining, studying, and commodifying the natural world.  Furthermore, this chapter 
argues that the soldiers’ relationship with the wilderness beyond the Eastern Country 
cut across the military hierarchy, transcending rank, age, and societal class.   
These sources challenge the standing narrative about wilderness, first advanced 
in 1967 by environmental historian Roderick Nash in Wilderness and the American Mind, 
in two important ways.  The first is the assertion that the appreciation for the natural 
world originated with urban elites during the nineteenth century.  The second is that 
those who experience wilderness by living or laboring within it are unable to appreciate 
the aesthetic and spiritual qualities in nature.8  The diarists on Arnold’s March to 
Quebec came from diverse locations (see Appendix A), including wooded backcountry, 
long-settled farming communities, and bustling urban seaports.  They held a variety of 
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occupations ranging from physician to farmer. Dr. Isaac Senter came from the largest 
community of Newport, Rhode Island with a population of 6,716 while John Joseph 
Henry, a gunsmith after the war, travelled from the farming community of Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania, with a population of 297 to join the Continental army.  This well-
documented military campaign provides an exceptionally broad lens focused on 
eighteenth-century perceptions of the environment, and it allows environmental history 
to enrich a long-standing military history narrative.9 
A Plan is Hatched  
By the time the War for American Independence commenced, Benedict Arnold, a 
well-respected merchant in New Haven, Connecticut, had amassed a dedicated 
entourage of revolutionaries.  In the winter of 1774, Arnold and over sixty men 
established a local militia company. Given his standing in the community and his 
reputation as a resolute proponent of the rights of American colonists, the men of the 
company elected him as their captain. When word of the conflict between the British 
and patriots at Lexington and Concord reached New Haven, Arnold assembled his 
militia company and they set forth to join the revolutionaries in Massachusetts. Once 
there, Arnold utilized his social network through both patriot and Masonic channels to 
obtain a commission as a colonel in the Massachusetts Army.  He aimed primarily to 
embark on a mission to capture Fort Ticonderoga in northern New York and secure the 
artillery stored there by the British. Revolutionary leaders greatly valued this task as 
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there were strong suspicions of a plan by the British to invade the colonies from 
Quebec.10 
During Arnold’s tenure in the Lake Champlain region in May of 1775, he often 
contemplated the threat of invasion from the north. Incoming intelligence reports 
combined with the daily command situation on the ground to fuel these fears.  Arnold, 
proactive in his military strategy, conceived a plan for an attack on Montreal and 
Quebec.  This initial plan had two objectives: to eliminate the British threat in the north, 
and to secure the French and indigenous populace of Quebec as allies.11 
While Arnold seized artillery in the Lake Champlain region, the Second 
Continental Congress created an army of regulars, printed paper currency to support 
this standing army, and designated George Washington as the commander of the 
revolutionary force.  On June 27, 1775, after careful consideration of operational 
strategies devised by Arnold, Congress decided to send an invading force into Canada 
with the intent of capturing the fortifications of Quebec and bringing the rest of the 
territory into the Revolution as the fourteenth rebellious colony.12  However, Congress 
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villain for the United States during the American Revolution.  Recent representative 
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(New York: Pegasus Books, 2018); Nathaniel Philbrick, Valiant Ambition: George 
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Books, 2017); Stephen Brumwell, Turncoat: Benedict Arnold and the Crisis of American 
Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Barry K. Wilson, Benedict Arnold:  
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passed over Arnold and instead selected General Philip Schuyler of New York, an 
influential veteran of the Seven Years’ War, to command the invasion.  Schuyler’s 
political standing and knowledge of Quebec made him the rational and pragmatic 
choice to lead the expedition. Due to declining health, however, Schuyler relinquished 
his command to General Richard Montgomery after the expedition set forth.13 
Arnold, though disappointed not to have been chosen to lead the invasion of 
Canada, did not abandon hope for involvement in the mission.  Instead, he devised a 
plan for a secondary invading force that would set out from the revolutionaries’ 
stronghold at Cambridge, Massachusetts and travel to Canada through the frontier 
wilderness of the Eastern Country of Massachusetts Bay Colony, up the Kennebec River 
and down the Chaudière River in Canada to the capital city of Quebec.  He convinced 
General George Washington that a two-pronged invasion of Canada would force the 
Major-General and Governor of Quebec, Guy Carleton, to abandon either Montreal or 
Quebec.   
In September, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army General George 
Washington informed the Continental Congress that he “detached Col. Arnold, with 
one thousand men, to penetrate into Canada by way of the Kennebeck River, and, if 
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Arnold’s Journal (New York:  The Knickerbocker Press, 1903); Mark R. Anderson, The 
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possible, to make himself master of Quebeck.”14  On September 11, the soldiers 
departed from Washington’s encampment at Cambridge and set out for Newburyport, 
a small harbor town on the Merrimac River in Massachusetts.  Arnold’s expedition set 
sail for the Eastern Country wilderness on September 19, 1775, exactly five months to 
the day after the fighting at Lexington and Concord.     
Arnold and his troops assembled at Fort Western—located in modern-day 
Augusta, Maine—in late September of 1775.  The objective was to reach Canada by 
traveling up the Kennebec River through the wilderness beyond the Eastern Country, 
portaging over the Great Carrying Place to the Dead River, which they would also 
ascend.  From there, they would travel over the Height of Land to the Chaudière River 
which flows into the St. Lawrence River, less than five miles from the fortifications at 
Quebec.15 [See Appendix B] At the time of the expedition, there were only six 
incorporated towns located on the Kennebec River above modern-day Bath.16  The most 
northern of these, Vassalboro, was located approximately twelve miles from Fort 
Western and 240 miles from Quebec via the Kennebec-Chaudière waterway.   Indeed, 
the isolation that the expedition confronted is illustrated by the fact that muskets lost by 
soldiers as they trekked through the wilderness remained undiscovered until more than 
eight decades later in 1858.17     
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1775, American Archives Series 4, Volume 3, 760.  
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Before commencing this journey, Arnold organized his men into four divisions 
and two small scouting parties.  The first scouting party was led by Lieutenant 
Archibald Steele, who was charged with a reconnaissance mission to gain intelligence 
from Wabanaki living between Fort Western and Lac Mégantic—the headwater of the 
Chaudière River.18  The second scouting party, commanded by Lieutenant Nathaniel 
Church, surveyed the land to the Dead River, blazing a path and recording the distance 
so that the main division would know how far to march each day to keep on schedule.19 
The first company, wearing “coarse hunting shirts, animal hide leggings over 
their woolen trousers, short coats and moccasins,” consisted of Captain Daniel Morgan 
and his backwoods riflemen.20 These men were to serve as trailblazers for the 
expedition.  The second and third companies, comprised of infantry, were led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Greene and Major Jonathan Return Meigs, respectively.  
Colonel Roger Enos led the fourth company, which acted as the rear guard and carried 
a preponderance of the expedition’s supplies.21  Arnold sent these companies into the 
wilderness one day’s march apart to prevent the whole expedition from becoming 
ensnared in the obstacles and portages that lay in wait.  Arnold himself traveled in a 
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18 Benedict Arnold to George Washington, Fort Western, September 25, 1775, The Papers 
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(Charlottesville:  University Press of Virginia, 1985), 41. 
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birch-bark canoe paddled by Wabanaki guides to move swiftly from the rear guard to 
the scouting party and back to check on progress and to manage difficulties.22   
 The patriot leadership devised two main goals for the Arnold expedition.  The 
first was to remove the threat of attack on New York and New England posed by the 
British and Mohawk forces to the north by giving control of fortifications such as 
Montreal and Quebec to General George Washington. 23  Additionally, the expedition 
was to gain control of the St. Lawrence waterway, which provided water-based access 
to most of inland Canada.  Secondly, control of Canada would result in a valuable ally 
in the eighty-thousand Canadiens who had a long history of conflict with the British.24  
Arnold argued that control of Quebec and the rest of Canada would also provide 
America with “an inexhaustible granary” and would furthermore, “cut the British from 
the lucrative fur trade.”25  Revolutionary leaders hoped that victory in Quebec would 
give them a decisive advantage in their quest for home rule, whether achieved through 
independence or reconciliation.         
It is important to understand that the expedition did not head out into the 
complete unknown.  Small French and indigenous military parties, throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, utilized the route up the Kennebec River over the 
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Height of Land to the Chaudière River for raiding frontier settlements in southern 
Maine. 26  In fact, Arnold utilized the map and journal of British engineer John 
Montresor who traveled the same route in 1761 during the Seven Years’ War. [See 
Appendix C]  However, prior to Arnold’s expedition, the passage was only traversed 
with small, mobile forces carrying light birch-bark canoes.27   
The armaments and supplies that large European-style forces mobilized became 
cumbersome for the expedition.  The bateaux crafted for the invasion were not light.  
Due to the urgency of the order, they were fabricated out of green wood, which made 
them extraordinarily heavy—estimated to weigh approximately four-hundred pounds 
each—and prone to leaks.28  In addition to portaging unwieldy bateaux, the men also 
transported supplies and implements of war.  For a force of over 1,000 soldiers, this 
required them to “fight their way through with guns and armament, barrels of flour 
and pork, cooking kits, tents, oars, poles, and carpenters’ supplies, including barrels of 
nails.”29  Unlike the small expeditions that successfully navigated this wilderness, 
Arnold’s model rested on the methods of the traditional European war machine. 
Historian Robert Middlekauff criticized that “Arnold’s optimism” was “equaled only 
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by his ignorance of the geography of the Northeast.” 30 Arnold falsely believed that he 
and his soldiers had only one hundred and eighty miles to travel to Quebec, when in 
fact they had over three hundred and fifty, a distance that would take over six weeks to 
traverse.31   At the end of this expedition, the participants were not rewarded with rest 
and relaxation, but instead they fought a battle against one of the most fortified cities in 
the Americas.  Most importantly, however, Arnold and the expeditionary force 
underestimated their vulnerability to the chaos of nature in the poorly charted and 
isolated wilderness beyond the Eastern Country. 
Wilderness and the Eighteenth Century Soldiers’ Mind 
In their diaries, the men of the expedition catalogued flora and fauna to provide 
order to the inchoate landscape they were traveling through and to sharpen their ability 
to obtain food and forage from the wilderness.  They described nature in romantic 
terms, and at the same time viewed it as an obstacle to military success.  Throughout 
their journey, the landscape assumed agency as tension built between the soldiers’ 
fascination with raw nature and their struggle to survive in it.  But to understand why 
they felt compelled to record the natural history of the region, it is necessary to review 
how they defined and redefined wilderness as the expedition progressed.  
Though much is written in the secondary literature about the meaning of 
wilderness during the eighteenth century, this chapter uses the contemporary definition 
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that the soldiers imposed in their diaries.  Colonial Americans perceived wilderness as a 
place of chaos and isolation, yet the expeditioners would be forced to rely upon this 
unfamiliar landscape to overcome any adversities that lay in wait.  Private Simon Fobes, 
upon departing from a settlement just north of Fort Western near Norridgewock Falls in 
early October, recorded that, “this was the last English settlement on our route.  Now 
commenced our march into the wilderness.”32  Private George Morison stated in more 
verbose terms that the soldiers must “exchange the luxuriant and healthful plains of 
Cambridge for the inhospitable and dismal regions of the North—To leave delightful 
fields for barren wildernesses; verdant meadows and enlivening streams for miry 
marshes and stagnant ponds; and the habitants of men, for the haunts of wild beasts.”33  
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Wilderness was an unknown:  an empty vessel the soldiers would fill with meaning as 
they passed through it. 
The officers of the expedition shared this uncertainty of the wilderness regarding 
it as a place where human beings did not reside.  Like the enlisted men, they had no 
point of reference for navigating a landscape so completely apart from civilization and 
its comforts.  By October 30, after the expedition had been in isolation for almost four 
weeks, Lieutenant William Humphrey wrote that his men had “only 4 days provision in 
this wilderness, where there was no signs of any human being.”34  On the same day, 
Captain Simon Thayer noted that he resided “in the midst of a frightful wilderness 
habit’d by ferocious animals of all sorts, without the least sign of human trace.”35  The 
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idea of wilderness as empty of human reference was exemplified in the closing of a 
letter written by Ensign James Knowles to his wife on October 14, 1775.  He listed his 
location as “at new found land on Dead River.”36 This prospect of movement through 
what Puritan minister Michael Wigglesworth described as a “howling wilderness where 
none inhabited but hellish fiends” caused a wave of uncertainty and fear as the troops 
departed the small settlement near Fort Western.37  
Ordering an Inchoate Landscape 
To overcome their misgivings about this amorphous landscape, Arnold and his 
men began to impose order on it by systematically listing the flora and fauna they 
encountered.  Environmental historian William Cronon has argued that explorers 
arriving in the New World catalogued and listed “natural products which were of 
potential use to a European way of life” as a means to understand nature through a 
process of commodification.38  As Cronon explained, “little sense of ecological 
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relationships emerges from such a list.  One could not use it to describe what the forest 
actually looked like or how these trees interacted with one another.  Instead, its purpose 
was to detail resources for the interest of future undertakings.” 39  
Following a similar practice, the diarists of the expedition responded to their 
new environment by listing the commodities that were of value to their way of life.  
This process helped them understand and tame the chaotic wilderness before them.  
Benedict Arnold described the wilderness landscape as “in general fertile and tolerably 
well-wooded with some oak, beech, maple, pine, hemlock &c.”40  The expedition’s 
surveyor, John Pierce, recorded the landscape in his journal as containing “timber on 
the river” which is comprised of “Spruce Birch Pine Beech maypole Elm White Cedar 
Fur &.C.” with the shore “covered in Joint Grass.”41  Major Return Meigs noted that 
“the land we passed this day generally very good…The Woods abound in these Parts 
with, Butternut, Beech, Hemlock, white Pine, red cedar, &c.”42  Lieutenant Humphrey 
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added to this assessment by stating that “the land is, I think, very fine and will produce 
very fine grain of any kind in an abundance.”43   
Common soldiers also discussed the fertility of the soils and productivity of the 
forests and systematically listed the surprisingly large selection of useful flora the 
wilderness contained.  Private Abner Stocking noted that the landscape “appeared to be 
very rich and fertile,” while Private James Melvin quickly scratched in his journal, “the 
woods are cedar and hemlock.”44  John Joseph Henry compared the trees in the Eastern 
Country to those of his home in Pennsylvania, writing:  
the timber trees of this country are in a great measure different from those of our 
own [in Pennsylvania].  Here are neither oaks, hickories, poplars, maples, or 
locusts; but there is a great variety of other kinds of excellent timber, such as the 
white and yellow pines, hemlock, cedar, cypress, and all the species of firs.45   
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Recording this natural history made the landscape of the Eastern Country familiar and 
provided points of reference for the diarists, who related the wilderness to the familiar 
landscapes of their homeland. Further, discussing the prospects of Western agriculture 
in the wilderness became a reference point for comparing the wilds of Maine to more 
civilized landscape increasing its familiarity and the soldiers comfort. This mental 
comparison—sorting the familiar from the unfamiliar—helped the expedition navigate 
the unknown.    
Typically, in the journals, fauna was catalogued differently from flora.  Survival 
in the wilderness dictated a more utilitarian approach to the natural history of animals. 
Fauna were generally recorded only when they were killed for subsistence; there were, 
however, some exceptions.  On October 12, Arnold noted that there had been “plenty of 
Moose and other game on the River.”46  Private Henry observed that “angling for trout 
and chub in the morning and evening made up our stock of fresh food.”  While fishing, 
the men “frequently saw ducks, &c. and many moose deer.”47  Expedition surveyor 
John Pierce described the Kennebec River as containing “Salmon and Trouts—river full 
of Fish—Plenty of Beaver minks and Otter”48 with “Some Fowls – Such as Geese Gulls 
ducks &.C.”49  These passages suggest that the soldiers in the expedition saw the 
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wilderness as lush and providential, and the value they attached to certain elements in 
the otherwise unfamiliar landscape built confidence in the expedition’s ability to 
navigate or even survive in a “howling wilderness.”   
 Once the wilderness was ordered and reference points established, the 
Kennebec-Chaudière corridor could be successfully navigated.  Moreover, the rivers 
upon which the expedition traveled became sources of provisions. By recording the 
natural history of the rivers, the expedition began to anticipate places where fishing 
would be successful; the wilderness became more predictable and reliable.  Soldiers 
found that fishing was the best at the foot of a waterfall.  Private Stocking wrote that “at 
the foot of [Hellgate Falls]” he and his compatriots “found fine fishing for salmon 
trout.”50  As the expedition portaged around larger falls and moved across watersheds, 
they found that small ponds were also fecund fisheries.  Camping next to one of these 
ponds, Captain Simeon Thayer noted in his journal that it was “full of trout, of which 
we caught plenty.”51  Indeed, according to Arnold they “caught a prodigious number of 
very fine salmon trout, nothing being more common than a man’s taking eight or ten 
dozen in one hours’ time, which generally weigh half a pound a piece.”52  These fish, an 
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unexpected bounty from the wilderness of the Eastern Country, were the “tastiest 
trought” that Dr. Isaac Senter had ever consumed.53   
The waterway corridors served also as watering holes for several species of 
game.  The largest, and consequently most prized, was the moose.  Moose were so 
ubiquitous in the beginning portion of the expedition that Private John Joseph Henry 
described his “canoe” having “sunk deep” into the water “by the weight of our 
venison.”54 By October 13, a little over one week after commencing their journey into 
the wilderness, the men of Meigs’ division had “killed 4 Moose, which is excellent 
Meat.”55  The members of the expedition were curious about animal and often described 
them in great detail.  Private George Morison, in a mix of curiosity and utility, described 
the moose as: 
large as a common horse.  The males have horns commonly four feet long and six 
or seven inches broad, edged like a saw.  They are of a dun color, have a head 
much like an ass.  It is said that these animals are a species of the Rein-deer, 
found in the same latitude in the north of Russia.56  
Lieutenant William Humphrey wrote that his men “had killed a moose.  The skin 
appeared to be as big as that of an ox that would weigh 600 wt.  This is the same species 
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as that of the reindeer and would be of the same service to the inhabitants as the 
reindeer is to the Laplanders and the upper Norwegians.”57  The Finnish, Norwegians, 
and Russians historically utilized the reindeer for several purposes.  The most 
important was to supplement their diets with a rich source of protein.  Clothing was 
also procured from their hides and tools crafted from their bones and antlers.  However, 
reindeer were also “employed as draught-animals” in these regions beginning in the 
late-sixteenth century.58  The comparison between the moose of the Eastern Country 
and the reindeer of the Arctic further shows the commodification of the landscape as 
the soldiers imagined these animals as beasts of burden to aid future settlement.     
Smaller game also became standard fare of the expedition.  Captain Simeon 
Thayer noted on October 29, that “this night we had the good fortune to kill a partridge, 
of which we made a good soup and some supper.”59  As provisions began running low, 
Private James Melvin happily recorded that he “shot a small bird called a Sedee, and a 
squirrel, which I lived upon this day.”60  The men also foraged among the flora.  Private 
Henry noted that they “discovered and ate a delicious species of cranberry.”61   
In addition to providing food to supplement the ever-dwindling stores of the 
expedition, the wilderness also supplied medicine and materials to repair clothing and 
watercraft.  On October 25, Captain Henry Dearborn “was Seized with a Violent Head-
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Ach and fever,” and the wilderness bestowed upon him “herbs in the woods” which 
were boiled into a “Tea” for his relief.  He “drank very Hearty of it and the next 
morning felt much Better.”62  Private John Joseph Henry noted in his journal that the 
balsam fir had healing properties as well.  Its sap “was heating and cordial to the 
stomach,” and prevented the men from being “assailed by sickness.”63  These folk 
remedies were specific to the region and were likely provided by local guides of either 
European or Wabanaki descent.  
Upon being mishandled and dropped, one of the canoes of Dearborn’s company 
was split open.  The men hauled the broken canoe up on the riverbank.   
[It] was brought to the fire, and placed in a proper posture for operation.  
The lacerated parts were neatly brought together, and sewed with cedar 
root.  A large ridge of pitch, as is customary in the construction of this 
kind of watercraft, was laid over the seam to make it water-tight.  Over 
the seam a patch of strong bark a foot in width, and of a length sufficient 
to encircle the bottom, even to the gunwales, was sewed down at the 
edges and pitched.64 
After drying near the fire, the canoe was once again ready for use in transporting men 
and provisions through the wilderness.  Nature also supplied the material needed to fix 
shoes.  After wearing out the heel of his shoes, and having the seam burst, Henry had to 
either mend them or go barefoot the rest of the way to Quebec.  He noted, “bark, the 
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only succedaneum for twine or leather in this miserable country, was immediately 
procured, and the shoe bound tightly to the foot.”65  This utilization of the natural 
world to supply the expedition with supplies greatly enhanced the success of their 
invasion of Canada. 
A Wilderness Aesthetic, Christianized Naturalism, and the Eighteenth Century 
Subline 
The wilderness landscape provided the troops with more than just provisions 
and supplies.  It provided a visual aesthetic and piqued their curiosity, distracting them 
from the rigors of the passage and the terrors of isolation.  On October 14, Arnold 
described his surroundings as “very beautiful & noble” with “a high chain of 
mountains encircling the Pond, which is deep, clear & fine water, over which a forked 
mountain [Mount Bigelow] which exceeds the rest in height bear N. west, & covered 
with Snow, in contrast with the others adds greatly to the beauty of the scene.”66  
Arnold’s depiction could have been an attempt to highlight his gentlemanly 
sophistication to his superior, General Washington, who received copies of his journal.  
However, it follows a pattern of appreciation for the natural world in the diaries of both 
the officers and common soldiers.  Private John Joseph Henry and Dr. Isaac Senter 
commented on the mountainous terrain as well.  Henry noted that “several of these 
mountains seemed to stand on insulated bases, and one in particular, formed a most 
beautiful cone, of an immense height.”67  Senter, apparently surprised by the scene 
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before his eyes, wrote that “this was a very beautiful situation for the wilderness, a 
large mountain bordering boldly on the N.W., with more at a greater distance in the 
South, and S.W.”68 
Several days after passing through this mountainous terrain, the expedition 
“Came to an Indian Wig-Wam,” located on a pastoral landscape that was of great 
interest to Captain Henry Dearborn.  He wrote in his journal that “it Stands on a Point 
of Land Beautifully situated, there is a Number of acres of Clear’d Land a Bout it…the 
river is very Still, and good Land on each side of it a Considerable part of the way.”69  
As a wealthy physician, Dearborn was likely considering land speculation and the 
settling of the Eastern Country.  As a native of New Hampshire, he knew firsthand that 
“many New England towns faced a demographic crunch” and “land hunger 
dominated” much of the region during the mid-eighteenth century, causing many 
individuals to relocate to the westward or into the District of Maine.70  In fact, after the 
war, Dearborn became “an avid land speculator…[and] served as Kennebeck Proprietor 
James Bowdoin’s land agent.“71   
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Other soldiers, who would not turn to land speculation after the war, also 
commented on the beauty of the landscape.  After reaching a particularly agreeable 
vista on the journey to Quebec, Private Abner Stocking was captivated by his beautiful 
surroundings.  At sundown his division: 
encamped in a most delightful wood, where I thought I could have spent 
some time agreeably in solitude, in contemplating the works of nature.  
The forest was stripped of its verdure, but still appeared to me beautiful.  I 
thought that though we were in a thick wilderness, uninhabited by human 
beings, yet we were as much in the immediate presence of our divine 
protector, as when in the crowded city.72 
Present in this passage is what historian Perry Miller termed “Christianized 
naturalism.” By finding the works of God in the natural world the expedition gained an 
important frame of reference to combat their fears regarding the dangers of the natural 
and supernatural world lurking in the wilderness. 
Stocking, a privateer from Connecticut, serving as a private in the Continental 
Army, could appreciate the romance—and indeed the divinity—of the natural world 
seeing “sermons in stones.”73  Connecting wildness to religion provided comfort and 
solace in an unknown landscape.  In another passage, Stocking expressed a reaction 
approaching the sublime: “Hell-gate falls” was “of astonishing height, and exhibit an 
awful appearance.”74  Private John Joseph Henry was sailing bateaux across a pond 
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when through an opening in the trees he and the other enlisted soldiers “obtained a full 
view of those hills which were…called the ‘Height of Land.’ It made an impression 
upon us that was really more chilling than the air which surrounded us.”75  This is the 
true essence of the sublime.76 The sublimity of the natural world generated strong 
sensations of awe, terror, danger, and appreciation for the beholder. The grandeur of 
the hills before them inspired feelings of awe of the wilderness and nature’s 
transcendent power.    
Countless other soldiers expressed their awe and reverence of “serpentine” 
streams and rivers, “very fine” and “beautiful” lakes and ponds, the stillness of the 
early morning in the wilderness, “serene…at its dawn,” and the “beautiful meadow[s]” 
and “grove[s] of birch woods.”77  In the spring following the siege of Quebec, Reverend 
Ammi Robbins, on an expedition to reinforce Arnold, commented about how peaceful it 
was to sail on the rivers and lakes he encountered. On April 10, he “sailed on the lake a 
little for diversion” and on May 3, he “had the most pleasant sail [he] ever was in, 
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without the least need of rowing” he found his surroundings to be “the most pleasant 
[he] ever saw.”78   
A Sense of Wonder 
Wilderness was ordered into categories of usefulness and ranked according to its 
aesthetic qualities, but it was also the focus of scientific interest.  Major Meigs mused 
that the rocks along the river were “polished curiously in some places.”79  Pierce, upon 
noticing “heaps of Stones” scattered along several parts of the rivers, asked the 
expedition’s guides about this phenomenon.  They responded, in jest, that they “were 
carried their by ye Salmon and Trouts.”80  A curious rock caught John Joseph Henry’s 
eye as the expedition rowed past, “it was standing in conical form, five feet in 
perpendicular height, scalloped out, down the water’s edge.”  John Getchell, one the 
expeditions guides told him that this is where the Abenaki Indians were harvesting 
their arrowheads.  He questioned the accuracy of this statement at first, but settled on 
the fact that it must be so as no other scientific explanation he could think of made 
sense.81  Upon reaching the Dead River several diarists commented on the unique 
properties of the current.  Private Jeremiah Greenman wrote that the water was “so still 
you cant but jest procive wich way it runs / its black and very deep.”82   
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Like the early American naturalists described in Richard Judd’s The Untilled 
Garden, the soldiers in Arnold’s expedition “used their feelings to give meaning to a 
land that carried no established [Western] cultural associations and where nature itself 
seemed formless and confusing.”  Judd pointed out that “their emotional reactions 
accented the wildness of the landscape but, as they learned to ignore the biting flies and 
let these confusing features sort themselves out, the language of emotion became a way 
of conveying the beauty and majesty of the …wilderness.”83  Similarly, the more time 
Arnold’s men spent in the wilderness, the more comfortable they became with the order 
they imposed on this landscape.  Once they made sense of the land, they were free to 
explore curiosities and find beauty in their isolated condition. 
Wilderness Victorious:  The Defection of Colonel Roger Enos’ Company 
Although the Kennebec-Chaudière wilderness provided food, forage, and 
rejuvenating aesthetics, it was still a major obstacle for the expedition.  Indeed, it 
harbored a wide range of perils.  Historian Justin Smith, one of the first professional 
chroniclers of the expedition, wrote that “the March itself was a campaign, — a 
campaign against the forest and the flood, against fatigue, sickness, and famine.”84  
These were the obstacles that the expedition had to overcome in their passage to 
Quebec.  
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The most prevalent daily obstacle was the lack of potable water, which wreaked 
havoc on the troops’ digestive systems.  Dr. Senter recorded the situation in his journal: 
Many of us were now in a sad plight with the diarrhea.  Our water was of 
the worst quality…quite yellow.  With this we were obliged not only to do 
all our cooking, but use it as our constant drink.  Nor would a little of it 
suffice, as we were obliged to eat our meat [with] exceeding salt.  This 
with our constant fatigue called for large quantities of drink.  No sooner 
had it got down than it was puked up by many of the poor fellows.85    
The water was dangerous for many reasons.  Diarrhea led to dehydration, and this in 
turn compelled the invalid to drink more water, perpetuating the symptoms.  Senter 
also noted that the men in the expedition were suffering from gout due to poor 
nutrition.86    
Having to stop along the way due to malaise or fatigue was problematic.  The 
men marched in column formation through the wilderness to hide their numbers.  If 
one stopped, he lost his place in line and had to join in when there was another break in 
the line or at the end.  If the need for rest was longer, the unfortunate soldier was often 
left behind to catch up later.  In his war pension application, Private Richard Vining 
noted, “I, having occasion to stop, was left by my company and got lost and was in the 
woods alone three days without a mouthful of provisions.”87   
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The harsh autumn weather was also a major obstacle.  The first fatality to occur 
in the wilderness took place during a windstorm on October 10, when “one of the men 
was killed by the falling of a tree.”88  The incident left men wary: “the danger of 
encamping among the trees was thought great,” one wrote.89  In addition to the high 
winds, the troops weathered a heavy rainstorm for three consecutive days from October 
19 to 21.  It is likely this was the result of a late-season hurricane that traveled along the 
east coast to the Eastern Country and “slammed deep into the Maine wilderness.”90  In 
the midst of this storm, Arnold and his men were startled awake one morning at 
approximately four o’clock with the river, having risen “8 feet perpendicular in 9 
hours,” flooding their campsite, ruining clothes, blankets, supplies, a preponderance of 
their food stores.91  It is highly likely that in the wake of this harsh weather and flooding 
fish and wildlife became scarce.92  Hence, by the final days of October, the men in the 
expedition were desperate for provisions.  One soldier noted in his journal that “his 
comrades shot a robin and a ferret” for sustenance.93   
Indeed, the challenges of wilderness travel were too great for some.  Throughout 
the journey, water seeped and splashed into the bateaux and rotted supplies of bread, 
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peas, and salted meat.94  Many of the craft capsized and splintered on the rocks and 
rapids, causing further loss of provisions. Due to the state of the food supplies in the 
forward divisions, Benedict Arnold sent orders to Greene and Enos to send back any 
members to the army whom they felt unable to make the journey, either physically or 
mentally, and then to make haste in coming up with the rest of the army to reorganize 
the stores of provisions.95  On October 24, three days after suffering through the 
hurricane, Colonel Greene and Colonel Enos held a council of war with their senior 
officer to decide whether to ignore Arnold’s orders to send supplies forward or to 
continue forward despite their lack of provisions.  Voting occurred along divisional 
lines with the men of Greene’s division—Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Greene, Major 
Timothy Bigelow, Captain John Topham, Captain Simeon Thayer, Captain Samuel 
Ward—voting to continue forward with the men of Enos’ division—Captain Thomas 
Williams, Captain Samuel McCobb, Captain William Scott, Adjutant Jedediah Hyde, 
and Lieutenant Peters—voting to return to Cambridge.  Enos himself voted to continue 
forward, though many soldiers speculated that this was contrived between him and his 
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officers so that his honor—and perhaps life—would be protected in his likely court 
martial.96  
 Captain Williams gave Major Bigelow “a Barrel of Pork & one of flour…[and] 6 
Barrels more of Provisions.”97   Enos, his officers and enlisted men, as well as 200 
soldiers from a variety of companies, then retreated to Cambridge, choosing self-
preservation over wilderness privation.  This desertion cost Arnold not only 300 healthy 
soldiers but also most of his remaining provisions as well as the expedition’s medicine 
chest.98 
When Roger Enos returned to Cambridge, General George Washington 
immediately placed him under arrest and dispatched a committee to explore the matter 
of his return.  Enough wrongdoing was found and on December 1, 1775, Brigadier-
General John Sullivan presided over the court martial of Colonel Enos.  The Continental 
Army charged Enos with desertion, having left the detachment sent from Cambridge 
under the command of Colonel Benedict Arnold without the permission of his 
commanding officer. He admitted his guilt as to the charge laid before him; however, he 
stated that the “Circumstances of the Case were such as to oblige [me] to do so.” He 
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then presented the testimony of his officers as evidence of his companies’ hardship and 
to uphold his honor as a commander.99 
In their depositions the officers noted that the commanders of Greene’s and 
Enos’ divisions held a council of war to determine the best course of action due their 
extreme “want of Provisions.”  Through their “best Computation” they argued that it 
would take 15 days from their position at the Great Carrying Place to reach the French 
inhabitants and that they did not have enough food stores due to spoilage and loss in 
the wake of the recent hurricane.100  Thus, the commanding officers decided that the 
soldiers of Greene’s division should push forward with four days of provisions and that 
Enos’ division should return to the English settlements, located nearly 100 miles away 
near Fort Western, taking with them three days’ worth of supplies.101   
All those deposed stated that despite the decision made by the council of war, 
Colonel Enos planned to march forward with Greene’s division after sending his own 
soldiers back to Cambridge.  However, his subordinate officers protested exclaiming 
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that “it was absolutely necessary for Col Enos to take the Command” to “preserve the 
Harmony & Order necessary to secure the safe Retreat of the men” as there were 150 
soldiers from other divisions also retreating due to illness and injury with only a 
subaltern to command them.  The court was “Unanimous of Opinion” and ruled that 
under the circumstances laid before them, Enos acted appropriately with all charges 
being dismissed.102   
The diaries of the soldiers that continued forward tell a different story. Captain 
Thayer noted that the council of war resolved that Colonel Enos “should not return 
back.”  With all of the officers in Enos’ division refusing to place themselves in 
“imminent danger,” Greene’s division negotiated for a bateau, four barrels of flour and 
two barrels of pork.  However, when they took the bateau to be filled up with supplies 
they were “deceived, and only received two Barrels of flour.”  Thayer then exclaimed 
that Enos’ took up with his “Effeminate officers” professing that it was “surprising that 
the party returning, professing Christianity, should prove so ill-disposed toward their 
fellow-brethren and soldiers…especially when [they] observe our numerous wants.”103  
Upon the officers of Greene’s division taking leave from those of Enos’, Captain 
Williams wished them success but told them he did not expect to see any of them again 
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due to the scarcity of their provisions and the dangers of the isolated wilderness.  
Colonel Enos, with tears streaming down his face wished the party success but 
surmised this was his last farewell to his fellow compatriots.104   
The Distress of Desertion 
Despite Colonel Enos’ acquittal during the court martial, the soldiers still 
marching through the wilds of Maine gave him no such quarter.  Captain Henry 
Dearborn noted that the retreating companies took with them “more than their part…of 
Provision, and Ammunition” leaving the soldiers “disheartened and discouraged” 
knowing that they no longer had the supplies to retreat nor a fighting force large 
enough to take Quebec.  On the evening of October 27, the soldiers of Dearborn’s 
company said a “General Prayer, that Colo: Enos and all his men, might die by the way, 
or meet with some disaster, Equal to the Cowardly dastardly and unfriendly Sprit they 
discover’d in returning Back without orders.”105  Surgeon Isaac Senter, diagnosed the 
men of Enos’ division with “Hydrophobus” showing their “fear…of proceeding any 
further.”106 Many others chastised Enos’ division for having an advantage over the rest 
of the soldiers as they had “experienced much less fatigue” having been in the rear of 
the detachment where the road they followed had been blazed and beaten down by 
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other soldiers.  “They only followed.”  Further, they had no need for provision 
rationing as they carried the bulk of the supplies.107 
Twenty-four year old Captain Henry Dearborn noted less than a week after the 
defection of Colonel Enos that “some Companies had but one pint of Flour for Each 
Man and no Meat at all.”108  John Joseph Henry, who was sixteen years of age at the 
time of the march, recounted that the men had made “a good fire, but no food.”  He felt 
that “the world had lost its charm.”  Faced with the possibility of starvation in the 
isolation of wilderness, he stated that his “privatations in every way were such as to 
produce a willingness to die.”109  Henry surely was not the only soldier to consider 
taking his own life at this stage of the journey.   
With little to sustain them, the men resorted to boiling, cooking, and eating 
anything they had in their possession.  They consumed hair grease, shoes, cartridge 
boxes, soap, candles, lip balm and what little they now could obtain from the 
wilderness, including a squirrel’s head.110  Dearborn wrote in his journal that Captain 
Goodrich’s company killed his dog and another, and ate them for sustenance.111  Private 
Morison noted that the soldiers “devoured this strange repast with extream voracity, 
not exception the skin feet or entrails.”112  Commenting on the incident, Dr. Isaac Senter 
noted that the “poor animal was instantly devoured, without leaving any vestige of the 
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sacrifice.”113  Another soldier admitted that he ate “part of the hind quarter of a dog for 
supper.”  He added: “we are in a pitiful condition.”114  The officers realized that the 
situation was grave and issued orders for every man to practice self-preservation and 
move onward to the Canadian settlements.  Heeding the call, some began to “steal food 
from their companions.”115  As they left their fallen comrades, the starving called out 
asking the others if they planned to “leave [them] to perish in this wilderness?”  This 
greatly affected Private George Morison who recalled in his journal, “never will that 
heart-piercing interrogatory forsake my memory.” 116 
The distress felt in the wilderness was not limited to men:  at least two female 
camp-followers—seventeen year old Jemima Warner and Susannah Grier—had joined 
the men on their expedition.117  Though camp-followers were not greatly discussed in 
the diaries, Private Abner Stocking recalled with sorrow Jemima Warner and her 
husband:   
My heart was ready to burst and my eyes to overflow with tears when I 
witnessed distress which I could not relieve. The circumstances of a young 
Dutchman, and his wife, who followed him through this fatiguing march, 
particularly excited my sensibility. They appeared to be much interested 
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in each other’s welfare and unwilling to be separated, but the husband, 
exhausted with fatigue and hunger fell a victim to the king of terrors.  His 
affectionate wife tarryed by him until he died, while the rest of the 
company proceeded on their way.  Having no implements with which she 
could bury him she covered him with leaves, and then took his gun and 
other implements and left him with a heavy heart. After traveling 20 miles 
she came up with us.118 
This vignette is incredibly revealing, for it exemplifies what historian James Axtell has 
written about warfare in colonial America:  “in the tangled forests and tumbling rivers 
of eastern America, bulky European war machines broke down.”119  The soldiers of the 
expedition were in such dire straits that they heeded their officers’ call to try to save 
their own lives despite the suffering of those around them.  The loyalty, courage, and 
strength displayed by Jemima Warner exceeded that of her husband’s brothers-in-arms.  
Not only did she remain with him but, without provisions, carried both of their 
remaining gear twenty miles before catching up with the rest of the company.   
 Though her plight was much less severe than Jemima Warner’s, Susannah Grier, 
the wife of Private Joseph Grier, purportedly “a large, virtuous, and respectable 
woman,” commanded the men to “avert their eyes as she hiked up her skirts” while 
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drudging through swamps and streams.120  Private John Henry’s “mind was humbled, 
yet astonished, at the exertions of this good women.”  Neither he, nor his compatriots 
“dared to intimate a disrespectful idea of her,” throughout the long journey.121           
On October 28, Arnold —still ignorant of Enos’ defection—realized the 
expedition’s dire situation, and he pushed forward with a small party hoping to secure 
food and provisions.  He was concerned that the party might be trapped upon reaching 
the settlements “with the wilderness at their backs,” but the only alternative was to let 
his force starve in the wilds between the Eastern Country and Quebec.  From this point 
forward, the success of the mission and the lives of the troops rested in the hands of the 
French and Wabanaki inhabitants of the Beauce region of Quebec. 122    
Soldiers as Amateur Naturalists 
As illustrated by their writings, the soldiers on Arnold’s expedition to Quebec 
should be viewed as amateur naturalists.  Arnold and his men were completely 
engaged with their natural surroundings.  To make the wilderness less imposing and 
more useful to the expedition, the soldiers embarked on a desperate quest to 
understand their surroundings and impose some sense of order and predictability on 
the wilderness landscape.  This made the wilderness more useful and reliable as a 
source of food and less threatening as a gateway to Quebec.  They were interested with 
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the wilderness not just on the level of survival, but on other planes of consciousness as 
well.  Their diaries reveal a near irrepressible sense of curiosity, reverence, and awe not 
unlike the reactions of romantic writers and artists of the coming decades.  This is not to 
say that Continental soldiers were proto-Audubons; however, they were not frightened 
Puritans either.  Instead, they occupied a space in between where their idea about the 
American wilderness was transitioning, as was the nation itself, into enlightenment 
modernity. Here the wilderness became rationalized and ordered through careful 
thought and intimate interaction. 
Clearly, the relationship between expedition members and the wilderness was 
complex.  The men—often simultaneously—felt fear, consternation, intrigue, scrutiny, 
invigoration, and awe towards nature.  As noted at the start of this chapter, Lieutenant 
William Humphrey hinted at this complex and paradoxical relationship in remarking 
that “the work of Nature may at one place please the eye and displease.”123  In spite of 
the privation Private George Morison suffered in the wilderness, he noted, “our 
adventures furnished us with more mirth and jocularity than perhaps are to be found in 
palaces or mansions of the great.”124  Both starvation and spiritual rejuvenation 
occurred simultaneously in wilds of the Eastern Country.  The landscape was 
concurrently aesthetically pleasing and physically draining. 
The soldiers on the expedition perceived their natural surroundings on many 
levels: sensual, aesthetic, and even scientific.  Intriguingly, this relationship with nature 
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extended across the military strata of officers and common soldiers, challenging 
Roderick Nash’s conclusion that “in America the beginnings of appreciation [for the 
natural world] are found among [urban] writers, artists, scientists, vacationers, 
gentlemen-people, in short, [those] who did not face wilderness from the pioneer’s 
perspective.”125  The soldiers of Arnold’s expedition came from varied locations ranging 
from the bucolic countryside to the urban seaport.  Their social status varied greatly as 
well, and all of these men, regardless of rank, held complex views of nature which they 
expressed from, as Nash would call it, a “pioneer’s perspective.”  
This recasts our understanding of the idea of wilderness during the eighteenth 
century and throughout American history. Instead of existing on a progressive linear 
continuum from fear to utility to romance the story of wilderness in the North-
American mind is complicated and exists in multiple spheres of understanding even for 
the same individual at the same time. 
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Chapter 3  
‘News of Provisions Ahead’: Politics,  
Autonomy, and Accommodation  
in a Borderlands Beauce 
 
 In May of 1775, Gabriel Elzear Taschereau, the seigneur for much of La Nouvelle-
Beauce, travelled to Sainte Marie with orders from Guy Carleton, Governor-General of 
Canada, to institute a militia in the parish and to appoint a captain to organize, drill, 
and muster the said militia when needed.1 Carleton devised a strategy to mobilize the 
censitaires of Canada to buttress British soldiers in the colony to ward off an invasion of 
Canada by the Continental Congress or an individual rebellious colony to the south.2  In 
Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce, Monsieur Taschereau met with little antagonisms from the 
local people.  He appointed la sieur Etienne Parant the elder as Captain of the seigneurial 
militia.3  However, not all of the local parishes responded with such outward displays 
of amicability. The censitaires in several parishes, particularly Saint Joseph and Pointe 
Levy protested against the militarization of La Beauce.  The situation came to a head 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A seigneur is a property holding landlord. 
2 Censitaires are seigneurial settlers akin to a class of farming peasants. 
3 Michael P. Gabriel editor, S. Pascale Vergereau-Dewey translator, Quebec during the 
American Invasion, 1775-1776:  The Journals of Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau & Jenkin 
Williams (East Lansing, MI:  Michigan State University Press, 2005), 59. Herein this 
source will be cited as Journals of BTW. This collection consists of the reports of Baby, 
Taschereau, and Williams who received a commission from Guy Carleton to investigate 
how the Continental army was able to navigate and negotiate their way through rural 
Canada to Quebec. Based on these findings, the British placed La Beauce under martial 
law, reorganized the militia, punished community members, and ostracized others. 
Their investigation was conducted during the summer of 1776 after the siege of Quebec 
was broken. 
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when Taschereau imprisoned a settler who refused to serve in the militia.  Afterwards, 
mutiny became the general response to the raising of the militia throughout this rural 
region of Quebec.4 [For a rough sketch of La Beauce see Appendix D] 
 A few months later, three spies from the American colonies under rebellion to 
the south headed into the colony of Canada to gather information about British 
activities.  Three men successfully navigated the St. John River and were suspected to 
be moving through the Chaudière River Basin gathering intelligence as they travelled 
across La Nouvelle-Beauce.  Hearing of this, a government agent, Monsieur Launiére, 
dispatched an order to Captain Parant of Sainte Marie parish to find and arrest these 
three individuals.  Parent, however, was part of a broad network of mutineers—despite 
his militia commission and ostensible complaisance—he took no such action.  He, his 
family, and most of his neighbors sympathized with the rebel cause.  In fact, he knew 
that the three spies were in Sainte-Marie parish and he also knew that they were being 
entertained at the house of his neighbor, Claude Patry.  The question was, how could 
Parant execute the orders he received in his role as a militia captain and still support the 
resistance movement.5 
 He thought about this problem throughout the day and that evening he sent a 
woman from the parish, who spoke English, to warn the spies, as well as Claude Patry, 
that Parant had received orders to arrest them and deliver them to the British army, 
knowing that the men fled during the night, and were not present when he arrived at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Serge Courville, Pierre C. Poulin, and Barry Rodrigue, Histoire de Beauce-Etchemin-
Amiante (Quebec: Institut québécois de recherché sur la culture, 2003) 173. 
5 Gabriel, Journal of BTW, 60. 
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Patry’s house the next morning to arrest them.  Parant then mustered his Lieutenant 
Julien Landry and several French militiamen by the names of Fabien Routier, Antoine 
Marcoux, Louis Parant, Ignace Ferland, and Charles Huard to search for the three men 
up the Chaudière River to the next parish.  Not knowing how much of a head start the 
spies had gotten, and fearing that the militia might catch them, he ordered the men to 
proceed cautiously, to allow plenty of time for the three Americans to slip out of his 
jurisdiction.  Government officials later complained that Etienne Parant allowed 
“unidentified people” safe harbor and passage through Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce several 
more times during the summer of 1775.6   
Most historians have noted that even though habitants across Quebec often 
supported and sympathized with the American rebellion, their support for the rebels’ 
military expeditions during 1775 -1776 remained irregular, hesitant, and dubious.7  
Indeed, the sources show a mixed reaction to the American invaders. Some habitants 
ardently backed the Continental Army, providing assistance in any way that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 60. It is interesting that in the report of Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce in the Journals of 
BTW the rebellious nature of Etienne Parant is blamed on his wife who they say 
corrupted him.  The journals note that at first Captain Parant “showed his zeal and 
affection for the King’s service.” Apparently it was easier for these government officials 
to believe that within one or two months of his militia commission that his wife 
changed his mind instead of realizing that they appointed an individual who was 
radically opposed to British rule in La Beauce. 
7 See, for example, Mark R. Anderson, The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony:  America’s War 
of Liberation in Canada, 1774 – 1776 (Lebanon, NH:  University Press of New England, 
2013); Serge Courville, Pierre C. Poulin, and Barry Rodrigue, Histoire de Beauce-Etchemin-
Amiante (Quebec: Institut Quebecois de recherché sur la culture, 2003); Thomas A. 
Desjardin, Through a Howling Wilderness:  Benedict Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775 (New 
York:  St. Marin’s Press, 2006); L’Abbé Verreau, Invasion du Canada:  Collection de 
Memoirs, Recueillis et Annots (Montreal: Eusebe Senecal, 1873). 
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could, while others wished to remain neutral in the war between English-speaking 
peoples, lending support to the invading force for financial gain. Finally, some decided 
their best interest lay in remaining loyal to the British king.8  Much like indigenous 
people throughout eastern North America, the French and Wabanaki inhabitants of La 
Beauce made a variety of choices based on local circumstances and generally sought 
neutrality until forced to do otherwise.9  The primacy of local factors that historian Greg 
Rogers has found decisive for a slightly early period in the northern borderlands 
remained true in La Beauce during the American Revolution. It led military and 
political officials as well as soldiers, local people, and traders, to operate within a 
different culture of power. This petite politique aimed to take advantage of the fluidity of 
people, resources, and information through intercultural diplomacy during the day-to-
day business of colonial and military operations that recognized no lasting national or 
tribal allegiances or authority much of the time.10 In fact, loyalty itself remained fluid 
and inward looking within these rural communities.  
The fluidity of identity and authority in La Beauce meant that the actions of 
Parant and his fellow Beaucerons highlight an oft-neglected aspect of the Revolutionary 
War in Canada. In La Beauce, the colonial population played a decisive role during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8This is evidenced in the Journals of Baby, Tashereau, and Williams.  
9 For more on the political autonomy of a variety of indigenous groups during the 
American Revolution, see Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country:  
Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1995).  
10 Greg Rogers, “Petite Politique: The British, French, Iroquois, and Everyday power in 
the Lake Ontario Borderlands, 1724-1760” Doctoral Dissertation. University of Maine. 
2016. v. 
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invasion of 1775 that was both an imperial struggle between the rebellious colonies of 
America and a local struggle between Les Beaucerons and the power structure of the 
seigneurial system being adapted to British rule in the region.  In the classic formulation 
of J. Franklin Jameson, the political struggle raised questions of both “home rule” an 
“who should rule at home.11  
The habitants aided the Continental Army in a variety of ways.  They provided 
provisions and shelter, supplied critical intelligence, gave directions and transported 
soldiers, and they created artillery ramparts and enlisted in the American army as 
soldiers.  On a less material level, they travelled through the countryside to arouse the 
public spirit by setting parish bells ringing and reading letters from General George 
Washington outside of their churches. Through coercion, shame, community pressure, 
and at times imprisonment, they also impeded efforts from royalists who supported the 
British and their militarization of La Beauce.12   
The scholarly literature surrounding the events of 1775 and 1776 in La Beauce 
tends to ignore the perspective of the habitants in favor of a narrow focus on the 
Continental Army.  In fact, historians who discuss the invasion of Canada in 1775 
typically limit their narratives to the marches and actions of the expeditions under 
Colonel Benedict Arnold or General Richard Montgomery.  Thus, the viewpoint of the 
soldiers (and especially their officers) have overshadowed that of the French-speaking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement 
(Princeton University Press, 1926), 22. 
12 The term royalist was used by the British and Les Beaucerons to describe those loyal to 
the British crown.   
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inhabitants. In a preponderance of the scholarship La Beauce does not appear until 
Benedict Arnold first staggered out of the wilderness and into Beauce-Sartigan (St. 
George) desperate for succor for at the end of October 1775.13  This chapter counters that 
traditional framework by emphasizing the political situation in La Nouvelle-Beauce 
prior to the arrival of Arnold and his men. It highlights the variety of ways that 
habitants participated in the invasion of Canada and emphasizes the region as a 
borderland with a multitude of loyalties and allegiances in spite of British political and 
military control of the colony.  This chapter also focuses on the habitant—or seigneurial 
peasant—population of the colony, as they are often neglected in favor of English 
speakers and the economic and religious elites of the seigneurial system. 
Perhaps most importantly, this chapter argues that notwithstanding local 
political willingness to defy the British, Les Beaucerons and Arnold’s expedition could 
not have reached a state of accommodation with one another if that military force was 
seen as an invading body.  Thus, the significance of how the wilderness transformed the 
Continental soldiers from a band of vociferous patriots into impoverished and self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Works focusing on the invasion of Canada, 1775 specifically or the topic of Canada 
during the American Revolution more widely typically focus on the march of Benedict 
Arnold through the wilds beyond the Eastern Country of Massachusetts.  Those that 
focus on the borderlands interface include Mark R. Anderson, The Battle for the 
Fourteenth Colony:  America’s War of Liberation in Canada, 1774 – 1776 (Lebanon, NH:  
University Press of New England, 2013); John Codman, Arnold’s Expedition to Quebec 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1901); Thomas A. Desjardin, Through A Howling 
Wilderness:  Benedict Arnold’s March to Quebec, 1775 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006); 
Gustave Lanctot, Canada & the American Revolution, translated by Margaret M. Cameron 
(London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1967); Justin Harvey Smith, Arnold’s March from 
Cambridge to Quebec: A Critical Study (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1903).   
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effacing men, was a critical catalyst in helping human actors to overcome the powerful 
cultural divisions of religion, language, and uncertain political allegiances.  
Rural Canada: A Rebellious Landscape 
 
Historians’ assessment of La Beauce in this period typically begin their narratives 
by highlighting changes throughout British North America with the outbreak of armed 
conflict in Lexington and Concord in April of 1775.  However, according to Canadian 
historian, S.D. Clark, the inhabitants living in the frontier regions of Quebec, such as La 
Nouvelle-Beauce, took full advantage of the changes in state power at the end of the 
Seven Years’ War in North America to get out from under the oppressive seigneurial 
system by creating small amounts of political protest at the everyday level far before the 
Americans began their armed conflict across the colonial border.  In fact, habitants in the 
rural regions of Canada began to carve out local political autonomy even before the 
British took official political control of colony in 1763.14 
For example, Provincial Governor James Murray noted that the clergy who had 
dominion over the frontier regions of Quebec during France’s rule were losing their 
control over the habitant populace.  He wrote that “their influence over the people was 
and is still very great, but though we have been so short a time in the Country, a 
difference is to be perceived, they do not submit so tamley to the Yoke…they every day 
take an opportunity to dispute the tythes with their Cures.”15  Not only did the habitants 
dismiss clerical authority, they also refused to express pubic reverence for those of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1959). 
15 Ibid., 49. 
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higher social stratum.  Quebec Lieutenant-Governor Cramahe wrote to the Secretary of 
State Lord Hillsborough in 1772 stating that “ the Canadian Noblesse often alledge…the 
middling and lower sort of People daily lose of that Deference and Respect they used 
formerly, upon all occasions to shew their Superiors.”16  This social divide widened 
when elites of Canadien society fell in line with the British ruling class and the habitants 
increasingly went their own way. 
The British, in an attempt to buttress the power of French elites who complained 
of an unruly rural populace, restored French civil law in the Quebec Act of 1774, 
restoring the tithe to bolster the Catholic Church and the corvee to confirm the power of 
the seigniorial system.17  This angered many of the habitants who had carved out niches 
of autonomy from the traditional elites of New France, in some instances minimalizing 
the tithes they paid and the amount of corvee owed to their feudal landlords.  
Attempting to stoke the flames of radicalization of the habitants, during the autumn of 
1774, the Continental Congress sent an address to the residents of Quebec titled, L’appel 
du Congrès aux Canadiens seeking common ground in the American struggle against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Cramahe to Hillsborough, Quebec, July 25, 1772, Quoted in Victor Coffin, “The 
Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution: A Study in English-American 
Colonial History” Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin, 1896): 286. 
17 For more on the Quebec Act restoring French civil law and reactions to it, see Cory 
Biad, Neoliberalism and National Culture: State-Building and Legitimacy in Canada and 
Quebec (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 57; Roberto Toniatti and Jens Woelk, 
Regional Autonomy, Cultural Diversity and Differentiated Territorial Government (New 
York: Routledge, 2014); Walter R. Borneman, American Spring: Lexington, Concord, and 
the Road to Revolution (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014). A corvee is the 
system of unpaid labor that the habitants were required to give their seigneurs as part of 
their social obligation for being tenants on their land. 
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British hegemony in North America. Contested local control spurred by knowledge that 
other colonies were rebelling combined with other factors to fuel a mutinous mood 
among some. 
When Governor-General Guy Carleton ordered the creation of a French-
Canadian militia he once again impinged on habitant autonomy.  The locals, presumably 
still upset by some of the provisions of the Quebec Act, protested against this and 
argued that the British and seigneurs had no right to impose military service on their 
tenants.  It was then that Gabriel Taschereau imprisoned one of his tenants for refusing 
to serve in the militia, which infuriated the local populace even more.  One parish, 
Saint-Joseph-de-Beauce, “unanimously revolted and refused to acknowledge the King’s 
authority, despite the good counsel of their priest.”  Although the habitants in La Beauce 
eventually capitulated to their seigneurs, they often removed government appointed 
militia captains in favor of individuals in the community who frequently did not 
enforce British martial law.18  In one example, the government demanded the arrest of 
suspected Canadien and American spies in La Beauce, but militia captains refused, either 
directly or through subterfuge.   
When Taschereau arrived at St. Joseph to institute a militia an angry crowd 
gathered, then dispersed, refusing to hear the seigneur speak. Two members of the 
community, Bazil Vachon dit Pomarlau and Giguerre traveled to Ste. Marie to convince 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For more on the structure of the militia, see Allan Greer, The Patriots and the People: 
The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 
100-107. Here Greer discusses that the local community had no official capacity in the 
selection of militia officers, however, they would resist orders, form protests, and 
petition superiors for the removal of those they did not approve of. 
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the bailiff, Ignace Ferland, to entice the local residents to side against British authority 
in their small towns. However, the bailiff refused.19  Vachon and Giguerre returned to 
St. Joseph where they were offered commissions as officers in the local militia by the 
British.  When they refused, they were ordered by the local priest to accept them.  
Standing firm Vachon and Giguerre rebuffed the proposition and spoke in favor of the 
American rebels.20 
Actions such as these greatly worried Carleton. The military hostilities at Salem, 
followed by armed fighting at Lexington and Concord, raised the possibility of rebellion 
anywhere and everywhere. Carleton exchanged letters with several colonial governors 
and officials through the summer and fall of 1775 articulating his growing anxiety 
regarding the restlessness of the habitants.21  The fear and apprehension he showed 
highlights the nature of ideological diffusion during the eighteenth century.  
Revolutionary rhetoric and fears of armed resistance played on the minds of 
government officials and permeated porous colonial boundaries.  The vast expanses of 
unpoliceable wilderness situated between the rebellious colonies and Canada combined 
with informal inter-colonial social networks and shared colonial wariness of efforts to 
make the empire more efficient helped to make La Beauce a fertile ground for 
radicalism during the summer of 1775. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Gabriel, Journal of BTW, 63. 
20 Ibid., 63. 
21 Sir Guy Carleton Papers, Film 57, Collections of the David Library for the American 
Revolution. 
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By autumn of 1775, the British, having learned of Colonel Benedict Arnold’s 
orders to capture Quebec, attempted to coerce the militia at Pointe Lévy to take up 
arms. In an act of defiance, Pointe Lévy sent envoys into the neighboring parishes of La 
Nouvelle-Beauce to join them in opposing the British government.22  A mass of armed 
habitants from the parishes between La Nouvelle-Beauce and Quebec marched to Pointe 
Lévy as a show of resistance against the British government, intended on preventing the 
mobilization of those who had been called upon to serve.23  Going one step further, 
once the Continental Army reached Pointe Lévy during the autumn of 1775, the militia 
captain, Joseph Lambert, accepted an officer’s commission at the same rank in the 
service of the rebel forces, which he renewed at year’s end.    
Spies ranged through La Beauce and other regions of Canada fueling Carleton’s 
fears regarding the susceptibility of his population to rebellious ideas.  At the end of 
June, Carleton wrote to the commander-in-chief of the British military in North 
America, Thomas Gage, lamenting that Canada, especially the rural parts situated 
further from British power, was largely under the pernicious influence of “the Rebels” 
who sought to “poison the Minds of these poor People.” Carleton enclosed several 
pieces of propaganda that the American agents had dispatched throughout the 
countryside.24  It was challenging to govern a relatively new British colony where 
allegiances and identities as loyal subject, active rebel, or something in between were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Gabriel, Journal of BTW, 67. 
23 Ibid., 58-9. 
24 Thomas Gage Papers, Guy Carleton to Thomas Gage, Montreal, June 28, 1775; Series 
II, Subseries I, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. 
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unreliable and amorphous.  Indeed, the habitants of La Beauce seemed to harbor and 
aide the very individuals causing Governor-General Carleton great consternation.  
Other military officers noticed the unrest amongst the censitaires.  While serving 
as Captain of the British militia in Quebec, Thomas Ainslie kept a journal of his 
experiences.25  During the summer of 1775, he noted that the Continental Congress sent 
many agents into the Canadian countryside to spread revolutionary fervor to the 
“Canadian Peasants.”  As with Carleton, he conveyed his fears that rebellious 
Americans would corrupt the French populace. Through their speeches and printed 
tracts, the Americans “had poison’d” the habitants “minds.”  Ainslie identified this 
activity specifically in La Beauce, which he called the “Parishes below Quebec.”  In a 
mix of fear and wonder he observed that “Arm’d strangers…disappear’d suddenly” 
and that nobody in the British armed service “knew their business.”  However, many of 
the officers and soldiers “conjectur’d that they came to learn the sentiments of the 
Country People. & the state of Quebec” likely for either a future military invasion or to 
incite a total insurrection in the seignuries of the colony.26 
The observations of Carleton and Ainslie reveal a palpable fear washing through 
the British military and government during the summer months of 1775. Despite 
attempts to militarize La Beauce the British had little control over who crossed the 
porous border between the colony of Canada and the rebellious colonies to the south.  
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The way Ainslie despaired over the rebels’ ability to appear and disappear suddenly 
does not point to the stealth or covertness in which these individuals moved, but 
instead reflects how individuals in La Beauce, such as Etienne Parant and an unnamed 
female neighbor, aided and abetted revolutionaries in Canada.  Indeed, it was not the 
prowess of these agents of the Continental Congress that allowed them to slip through 
the fingertips of British officials’ time after time, but rather it was the agency of the 
habitants throughout the Canadian countryside who concealed them.  If the allegiances 
and identities of those in La Beauce remained rigid and loyal to the British during 1775, 
it is unlikely that these spies would have been able to penetrate either the territories or 
the minds of the censitaires of the region. 
The apparent ubiquity of the American interlopers in the frontier and rural 
regions of Canada caused British officials to project their anxieties onto the landscape of 
the colony.  As word of the suspected spies proliferated, these regions themselves began 
to take on a frightful visage.  It was clear to men like Carleton and Ainslie that much of 
the colony beyond the influence of the major British strongholds was friendly—or at the 
very least neutral—to the emissaries of the American Revolution. In his journal, Ainslie 
appeared alarmed at the ease which spies traversed the border.  To him every “hunter” 
or “woodsmen” of the northeast could enter and exit Canada with the greatest of ease 
and at their every whim.  The frontier nature of the territories of Canada which abutted 
the border with the colonies to the south became a major liability as operatives of 
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revolution could emerge from, or disperse into, the wilderness at any time.27 Three 
main watercourses—The St. Lawrence River, the St. John and Madawaska River 
corridor, and the Kennebec-Chaudière corridor—left the Beauce region vulnerable to 
infiltration.  Ainslie worried that any one of these three riverine landscapes, with their 
carrying places and densely wooded cover, could bring spies, soldiers, and implements 
of war to the doorstep of Quebec.  Further elevating this concern was the fact that the St. 
Lawrence River and the Kennebec-Chaudière watercourse were “well known to the 
back settlers in Massachusetts & in N. Hampshire.”28   The military endeavor launched 
by the Continental Army during the autumn of 1775 from Cambridge through the 
Kennebec-Chaudière corridor corroborated these fears and forced the British to prepare 
for a full-scale invasion by the Continental army.   
Les Bostonnais Arrive in La Nouvelle-Beauce 
On the evening of October 30, Colonel Benedict Arnold and a small foraging 
party arrived at the first Canadian settlement of Beauce-Sartigan beyond the undefined 
geopolitical boundary between the rebellious colony of Massachusetts and Quebec.  
This small envoy from the Continental Army narrowly escaped starvation in the wilds 
of Maine and now had the difficult task of navigating through the cultural borderlands 
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wilderness landscapes posed a very tangible threat to the lives of those in close 
proximity.  Having hostile individuals coming in and out of these regions, usually 
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operating within these landscapes.   
28 Ainslie Journal in Blockade of Quebec, 12. 
	  	  
	  
84	  
of Quebec.   In 1775, La Nouvelle-Beauce had the characteristics of a borderland 
between two competing imperial powers—British and American—each with their own 
vision for the fate of the colony of Canada.  One defining aspect of this region as a 
borderland was that La Beauce was not initially settled by either of these Anglo-
imperial powers as frontier societies; it began its colonial experience within the French 
proprietary system of seigneurial grants and inhabited by the Wabanaki and Canadiens.  
This feudal landholding structure was one of the few socio-political remnants of New 
France in Quebec.29 
Despite rebellious tendencies by Les Beaucerons against the British and their 
moderate support for the American cause, significant social and cultural divides 
separated the soldiers of Arnold’s expedition and the Canadien and Wabanaki residents 
of the region that needed to be negotiated.  Foremost, the expedition was comprised of 
invading soldiers, while the makeup of the local populace included a preponderance of 
civilians with weak commitments to the largely defunct British militia.  Culturally, the 
Canadiens consisted of French-speaking Catholics, the Wabanaki were Algonquian 
speakers of both indigenous and Catholic faiths, and the revolutionaries, were 
overwhelmingly English-speaking Protestants.  Thus, if the expedition from 
Massachusetts was to have success in this region, and Les Beaucerons were to not be 
treated as a conquered and invaded people, these two groups would have to bridge 
major differences and develop a sense of trust and accommodation with one another.   
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This process of accommodation began with Colonel Benedict Arnold relating a 
message to the Canadiens from General George Washington requesting assistance for the 
soldiers of the Continental Army as follows: 
Friends, and Bretheren, 
 
The unnatural Contest between the English Colonies and Great-Britain, 
has now risen to such a Height, that Arms alone must decide it. The 
Colonies, confiding in the Justice of their Cause, and the Purity of their 
Intentions, have reluctantly appealed to that Being, in whose Hands are all 
human Events. He has hitherto smiled upon their virtuous Efforts—The 
Hand of Tyranny has been arrested in its Ravages, and the British Arms 
which have shone with so much Splendor in every Part of the Globe, are 
now tarnished with Disgrace and Disappointment.—Generals of 
approved Experience, who boasted of subduing this great Continent, find 
themselves circumscribed within the Limits of a single City and its 
Suburbs, suffering all the Shame and Distress of a Siege. While the 
trueborn Sons of America, animated by the genuine Principles of Liberty 
and Love of their Country, with increasing Union, Firmness and 
Discipline repel every Attack, and despise every Danger. 
Above all, we rejoice, that our Enemies have been deceived with Regard 
to you—They have perswaded themselves, they have even dared to say, 
that the Canadians were not capable of distinguishing between the 
Blessings of Liberty, and the Wretchedness of Slavery; that gratifying the 
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Vanity of a little Circle of Nobility—would blind the Eyes of the People of 
Canada.—By such Artifices they hoped to bend you to their Views, but 
they have been deceived, instead of finding in you that Poverty of Soul, 
and Baseness of Spirit, they see with a Chagrin equal to our Joy, that you 
are enlightned, generous, and virtuous—that you will not renounce your 
own Rights, or serve as Instruments to deprive your Fellow Subjects of 
theirs.—Come then, my Brethren, unite with us in an indissoluble Union, 
let us run together to the same Goal.—We have taken up Arms in Defence 
of our Liberty, our Property, our Wives, and our Children, we are 
determined to preserve them, or die. We look forward with Pleasure to 
that Day not far remote (we hope) when the Inhabitants of America shall 
have one Sentiment, and the full Enjoyment of the Blessings of a free 
Government. 
Incited by these Motives, and encouraged by the Advice of many Friends 
of Liberty among you, the Grand American Congress have sent an Army 
into your Province, under the Command of General Schuyler; not to 
plunder, but to protect you; to animate, and bring forth into Action those 
Sentiments of Freedom you have disclosed, and which the Tools of 
Despotism would extinguish through the whole Creation.—To co-operate 
with this Design, and to frustrate those cruel and perfidious Schemes, 
which would deluge our Frontiers with the Blood of Women and 
Children; I have detached Colonel Arnold into your Country, with a Part 
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of the Army under my Command—I have enjoined upon him, and I am 
certain that he will consider himself, and act as in the Country of his 
Patrons, and best Friends. Necessaries and Accommodations of every 
Kind which you may furnish, he will thankfully receive, and render the 
full Value.—I invite you therefore as Friends and Brethren, to provide him 
with such Supplies as your Country affords; and I pledge myself not only 
for your Safety and Security, but for ample Compensation. Let no Man 
desert his Habitation—Let no one flee as before an Enemy. The Cause of 
America, and of Liberty, is the Cause of every virtuous American Citizen; 
whatever may be his Religion or his Descent, the United Colonies know 
no Distinction but such as Slavery, Corruption and arbitrary Domination 
may create. Come then, ye generous Citizens, range yourselves under the 
Standard of general Liberty—against which all the Force and Artifice of 
Tyranny will never be able to prevail.30 
In this widely distributed broadside, General Washington emphasized security, by 
assuring the Canadiens that British power in the United Colonies of America was largely 
limited to the port city of Boston which remained under siege.  Washington appealed to 
the French for material assistance for the invasion of Canada by assuring local people 
that the Continental army arrived in their communities as a protecting and liberating 
force rather than an invading one.  Further, in their mission to protect the habitants 
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Washington prohibited plunder and required the expedition to pay fair value for what 
the habitants could spare.  On an ideological level, he complimented the Canadien 
populace for shrewdly understanding that the British appealed only to the elites of their 
communities—seigneurs and parish priests—and celebrated the habitants’ ability to 
understand the differences between just and unjust systems of government without the 
guidance of the nobility.  In closing, Washington invited the people of La Nouvelle-
Beauce to join in the universal cause of self-government which knew nothing of the 
boundaries of religion or descent.  
 Exiting the wilderness void of supplies, with ragged clothing, and in an 
emaciated state, the soldiers of the expedition did not look like an invading force to Les 
Beaucerons.  In fact, in this deleterious state, it is doubtful that the French and Wabanaki 
inhabitants viewed them as a protecting force either.  The wilderness beyond the 
Eastern Country, thus played a causal role in transforming a spirited and jingoistic 
detachment of 1,000 soldiers into a motley band of 600 malnourished and dehydrated 
stragglers begging for basic assistance to survive.   
It is not surprising that despite differences in language and culture that the 
inhabitants of the region obliged request for assistance from the leadership of the 
Continental army, considering their dire situation and the political tension between the 
British and Les Beaucerons.  Receiving a kind welcome from a sympathetic population, 
Benedict Arnold procured supplies for his men, including oxen, sheep, coarse oatmeal, 
two horses, and five hundred pounds of flour, which were sent back into the wilderness 
under the supervision of Lieutenant Nathaniel Church with the aide of eight 
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Frenchmen.31  Despite Washington’s friendly letter, neither the people of the United 
Colonies nor the residents of La Beauce had a change of heart concerning the faith, 
culture or societies of their respective ‘other.’  Instead, American patriots adopted a 
pragmatic approach towards the Canadiens, understanding that the landscape and 
people of Canada could play an instrumental role in achieving independence from the 
British. Inhabitants of La Beauce were similarly pragmatic in accepting the terms of 
Washington’s letter as a first step in the process of accommodation between the two 
distinct groups.32 
As part of this pragmatic approach, General Washington understood that verbal 
abuse by the Continental army against the habitants would rapidly disseminate 
throughout the larger Catholic community in both Canada and the nascent United 
States, hindering the invasion of Canada and perhaps the entire war effort. In view of 
this, Washington issued strict orders to Colonel Arnold prohibiting the use of any anti-
Catholic rhetoric by his soldiers with punishment administered for every single 
infraction.33  Indeed, Catholic historian Charles Metzger argues that Benedict Arnold 
“seized every occasion to proclaim that the Americans would respect the persons, 
property, and religion of the Canadians.”34  These measures were aimed at winning the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Arnold in ed. Roberts, March to Quebec, 80.  
32 Martin, Benedict Arnold Revolutionary Hero, 111. 
33 Gustave Lancetot, Canada & the American Revolution 1774-1783, translated by Margaret 
M. Cameron (Toronto:  Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1967), 98. 
34 Charles H. Metzger, Catholics and the American Revolution:  A study in Religious Climate 
(Chicago:  Loyola University Press, 1962), 50-1. 
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propaganda war by persuading the local French-speaking populace that they were 
allied in a common struggle against the British crown.   
‘News of Provisions Ahead’ 
Although Arnold’s laborious journey through the wilderness had ended, it was 
during the final days in the wilds of Maine, as October turned to November, that his 
men experienced their most extreme deprivation.35  Provisions dwindled at a rapid rate, 
as throughout the journey rain and river water caused food to spoil. Wildlife became 
scarce in the wake of a hurricane which occurred from October 19 to 21.  These 
circumstances combined with the defection of Colonel Roger Enos and the rear guard 
on October 24, costing the expedition over three hundred fit soldiers and most of the 
remaining food stores.  By the end of October, foodstuffs of any kind became extremely 
scant.   
On November 2, Captain Henry Dearborn marched only four miles before he 
met Lieutenant Church and the Frenchmen sent back by Arnold into the wilderness 
with food and supplies to bring the rest of the soldiers into La Nouvelle-Beauce.  This 
surreal sight, he wrote, “Caus’d the Tears to Start from my Eyes.”36  Shortly after, when 
the men of the rifle company arrived, their reactions were similar; many noted that it 
was the most joyful sight they had seen in their entire lives.  Others stared at one 
another in disbelief “doubting our senses.”37  Those who had the strength cheered a 
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37 Morison in ed. Roberts, March to Quebec, 529. 
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“feeble huzza of joy.”38  Almost immediately, the Frenchmen killed the livestock and 
prepared the meat for the soldiers’ fire.  However, most of the soldiers, in their 
famished condition, refused to wait, and consumed their bounty straight from the 
butcher’s blade.39  As word began to trickle back through the line, Samuel Barney 
scrawled in his diary that on this date he and his comrades ate all of their remaining 
food stores after hearing “news of provisions ahead.”40 
The boost in morale was best described by Private George Morison, who 
exclaimed that “this sudden change was like a transition from death to life.”41  They ate 
small rations of beef and coarse oatmeal, and felt as though they had “feasted 
sumptuously.”42  While the soldiers divided their rations and ate their new provisions, 
several indigenous women came to their relief in canoes with small cakes which were 
“sold to the soldiers for a shilling each, and quickly devoured.”43  Furthermore, the 
Frenchmen continued upriver to rescue those who had fallen and were incapacitated 
due to famine and fatigue.  Private Morison noted that the French “gave them bread 
and saved them from death, [and] placed them on horses” to be brought up with the 
others at camp.44  After being delivered from a state of starvation by the habitant and 
Wabanaki inhabitants of La Beauce the Continental soldiers quickly abandoned their 
prejudices. 
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39 Desjardin, Through a Howling Wilderness, 104. 
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41 Morison in ed. Roberts, March to Quebec, 529. 
42 Stocking in ed. Roberts, March to Quebec, 556. 
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 Meanwhile, back in the French settlements, more men began to trickle out of 
their wilderness prison, arriving in scattered and dispersed groups “out of a blinding 
snowstorm.”45  Private James Melvin came to the first house he had seen since 
departing Norridgewock several weeks earlier and purchased boiled rice from the 
Wabanaki inhabitants of the residence.46  Unfamiliar with the cordial relationship 
between the French and the indigenous peoples of the region, the troops were surprised 
by their close living proximity.  They came out of the wilderness expecting parishes 
“full of French settlers.”  Instead, in several of the first communities the Wabanaki 
populace far outnumbered the French.47 
After crossing into Quebec, one soldier, seemingly in disbelief, noted that “the 
people are all French and Indians, but they are exceedingly kind to us.”48 The 
hospitality surprised several of the men in the expedition.  Their own ministers had 
condemned the Catholics as controlled by Satan himself through his Anti-Christ pawn, 
the Pope.  The colonists also were suspicious of the influence of Jesuit missionaries over 
the indigenous populace. Additionally, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, the French 
colonists in Quebec were backward due to the social, economic, and cultural constraints 
of feudal French traditions that had little use for representative government. 49  The 
surprisingly warm reception suggests three things: an appreciation for the expedition’s 
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successful navigation of the wilderness, political ambitions in aiding the Continental 
army against the British, and their religious responsibility and humane concerns for the 
physical needs of the individuals of the march.  The mix of motives depended on the 
identity and loyalty of the individual assisting the soldiers. 
As his emaciated soldiers emerged from the wilderness, Arnold and his small 
detachment moved further into La Beauce and continued to receive a welcome 
reception.  On November 1, John Pierce, engineer and surveyor for the march, recorded 
that he “dined with the Indians” and “Slept between two Frenchmen in a French 
house.”50  He also purchased twenty pounds of butter for the troops.  Pierce and Arnold 
both noted that the inhabitants were “very friendly;” they were “Treated very Kindly 
this Night,” though Pierce did feel that it was “very odd to hear them at their 
Devotion.”51  Although the habitants supplied the army with provisions and greeted 
them with great hospitality, religion remained a point of suspicion as the soldiers 
traversed La Beauce. 
By November 3, the remainder of the expedition had entered the mixed frontier 
villages, and they, too, were greeted warmly.  News also reached the rebellious colonies 
in America on this day that “Col. Arnold … was safe arrived in Canada, and met with a 
cordial reception from the Canadians.”52  This marked a turning point in the expedition, 
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as the remaining force was committed to invading Quebec, having finally completed 
the trek through the wilderness beyond the Eastern Country.   
Les Beaucerons immediately began feeding emaciated soldiers and administering 
aid to those who were ill.53  The habitants in St. Joseph parish warmly accepted the 
Continental soldiers into their community, providing assistance and victuals “most 
willingly.”  They also offered material assistance to the war effort by providing the rebel 
army with canoes and guides for their journey down the Chaudière.54 Abner Stocking 
recalled that the French “seemed moved with pity for us and to greatly admire our 
patriotism and resolution, in encountering such hardships for the good of our 
country.”55  This theme was recounted in the journals of others as well, and is the key to 
understanding how the expedition successfully navigated the borderland region of La 
Beauce.  Their suffering in the wilderness of Maine allowed the Canadien and Wabanaki 
populace of the region to view them not as an invading force, but instead, as honorable 
and courageous individuals in need of care and human compassion.   
The inhabitants of La Beauce aided the expedition by not only providing food 
and transportation but also by traveling into the wilderness to help stragglers and those 
who were too famished to continue.  The compassion of Les Beaucerons surprised the 
Protestant Yankees, largely from New England and the Mid-Atlantic colonies, when the 
habitants came upon a member of the expedition who perished before breaking free of 
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his wilderness prison. With disbelief the soldiers of the expedition saw the French treat 
his remains with the care and ritual they would give one of their own.  “This real 
Catholicism toward the remains of one we loved, made a deep and wide breach upon” 
sixteen-year-old John Henry’s deep-seated prejudices against Catholic people.56  The 
robust assistance of the inhabitants of La Beauce was essential to the expedition’s 
success in reaching the fortifications of Quebec. 
Others were similarly moved by the cordiality of the French and Wabanaki of La 
Beauce, even those who had also served in the Seven Years 
War in North America, which had ended just over a decade earlier.  In fact, it was 
probable that some of the French and Wabanaki individuals who greeted Arnold’s men 
so warmly had also served in the prior conflict.57   
One historian claimed that “the need of succor for the exhausted troops and so 
charitable the response of the peasant that the religious issue was immediately and 
automatically voided.”58  Although the writings of several of the expedition members 
proves this to be exaggerated, the hospitable reception and tender care provided by the 
Canadiens certainly bridged a significant cultural boundary.  Indeed, the agony inflicted 
on the members of the expedition by the wilderness caused the rebel soldiers (as well as 
their caregivers) to be more receptive to the other.   
This accommodation also included notable material mutual self-interest as the 
expedition restored their provisions by purchasing bread, milk, eggs, potatoes, turkeys 
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and even luxury items such as sugar, rum, and brandy. They gorged themselves on 
potatoes, beef, bread, and vegetables.  John Joseph Henry described one man as 
attempting to “defy death for the mere enjoyment of present gratification.” 
Unfortunately, this soldier “died two days later.”59  For some, the nourishment 
provided by the French became a double-edged sword after being so long without food.   
As the expedition moved further into the territory of La Beauce toward the 
parishes of Gilbert and Sainte Marie, and as the soldiers’ hunger subsided, some 
became suspicious of the good will of the habitants in providing provisions and 
transportation services.  Captain Henry Dearborn commented that “the Inhabitants 
appear to be very kind, but ask a very Great price for their Victuals.”60  Private Abner 
Stocking echoed these sentiments, stating that because the French were “knowing [of] 
our need of their articles, some of them would extort from us an extravagant price.”61  
Several other soldiers made similar observations in their journals, and historians have 
often highlighted such comments in order to show that the habitants did not support the 
expedition but rather took advantage of them, suggesting that money was the 
underlying motivation for French and Wabanaki hospitality. In an oft-cited Canadian 
history textbook, for example, the authors noted that if “American soldiers were willing 
to pay good prices for supplies, the habitants sympathized with them.”62 Historian 
James Kirby Martin, in his biography of Arnold, contended that “although the habitants 
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enthusiastically welcomed Les Bostonnais, as they called the soldiers, they also charged 
dearly for whatever supplies the detachment needed.”  However, “Arnold did not 
complain; he was anxious to gain the habitant’s confidence and allegiance.”63  
Arnold in fact did not criticize Les Beaucerons; he merely recorded that “we have 
been very kindly received by the inhabitants who appear very friendly, and willing to 
supply us with provisions.”64  As a merchant who often traded with people in Quebec, 
Arnold likely realized that the inhabitants in the hinterland had very limited food stores 
and supplies of provisions, which typically would have to last them until the following 
year’s harvest. With winter approaching, the Canadiens would not have had enough 
food in their stores to feed both their families and communities for the winter as well as 
Arnold’s starving force.  They charged heavily inflated rates because it would take a 
large, possibly community-wide trip to an urban trading center to re-stock their 
supplies.  Indeed, the soldiers in Arnold’s force had made similar complaints in their 
diaries about the frontier American settlers on the upper Kennebec.65  This is further 
evidenced by the report that Etienne Parent travelled during the winter to Riviére-du-
Sud to buy wheat seeds. While he was there he spread the rumor that another 
“Bostonnais Party” was going to be coming through the La Beauce into Canada soon 
and he must “promptly return” to Sainte-Marie parish. The habitants of La Beauce 
frequently travelled outside of their own parishes to restock provisions and purchase 
seeds for the upcoming year.  
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 In sum, the Canadiens did not price gouge the expeditionary force because they 
were English, but rather they sought a fair trade price for their goods considering the 
season.  Historian David Nye points out that a “round trip” to market to buy or sell 
goods “in the late colonial period was extremely time-consuming and expensive.”66  
Arnold’s knowledge of this showed a level of sophistication in navigating this cultural 
landscape.   
Natanis and Wabanaki Fluidity during the Invasion of Canada 
Unbeknownst to the expeditioners of the Continental Army, they were under 
surveillance.  They were being watched as they travelled through the communities of 
the lower Kennebec River, they were being watched as they suffered abuse by an 
unforgiving wilderness, and they were being watched as they approached La Beauce.  
One of the individuals watching Arnold’s expedition most intently was a 
Norridgewock Indian named Natanis. 
Half a century before Arnold’s expedition through the Eastern Country of 
Massachusetts, the Norridgewock Indians of the upper-Kennebec River suffered greatly 
due to the imperial antagonisms between the British and the French over the 
indigenous homeland.  A Jesuit priest, Father Sebastien Rale, learned the language of 
the Abenaki when he first arrived in New France and was stationed in the Chaudière 
River basin.  After a brief stint in the Illinois country, he transferred to Maine in 1694, 
setting up and devoting his life to a Catholic missionary village the indigenous 
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residents called Nanrantsouak or Norridgewock. Rale gained prominence in the 
indigenous community at Norridgewock, even getting the permission to speak in the 
tribal council and other decision making meetings.  For the English settlers of the 
District of Maine, his successful missionary work and general rapport with the Abenaki 
Indians “personified the sinister influence of Catholicism in the dawnland.”67  
Fearing for the safety of their own religion and settlements, the English raided 
Norridgewock in 1705 with 275 men intent on capturing or killing Rale.  Though the 
priest escaped, the military set his church ablaze.  In 1720 the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
placed a 100-pound bounty for the capture of Rale.  Taking up the offer, Colonel 
Thomas Westbrook invaded Norridgewock with 100 men.  The priest once again 
escaped with his life; however, Colonel Westbrook seized his papers, pillaged his 
church, and stole his Abenaki dictionary.  Unhappy with the results of this mission, 
Westbrook led another raid once again the following year.  In 1724 Rale’s luck at 
evading the English ran out when Johnson Harmon and Jeremiah Moulton led a force 
of 1,100 men that included rival indigenous peoples.68  The village of Norridgewock 
was completely destroyed and Rale was killed along with thirty Norridgewock 
including women and children.  The remaining 150 indigenous residents took flight, 
returning to a horrendous sight the following day.  The English and their allies riddled 
the body of Father Rale with “hundreds of bullets” and shattered his skull with “blows 
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from a hatchet.”  The attackers then proceeded to break his legs and filled his “mouth 
and the eyes…with mud.”69  The Norridgewock tribe, with heavy hearts, retreated from 
their home, many taking shelter in Canada and some in the Chaudière River basin 
where Rale began his missionary work in New France.70 
With raging warfare and subsequent treaties—which often contained one-sided 
and deceptive stipulations—Massachusetts Governor William Shirley met with 
delegates from the Norridgewock and Penobscot Indians living within the political 
confines of the District of Maine to “secure their ratification” of two treaties, Dummer’s 
Treaty (1729) and the Treaty of Falmouth (1749).  In the two meetings he ordered, 
Shirley wanted the indigenous residents to explain the turmoil between English settlers 
and members of their tribal nations occurring along the borderlands frontier.  At the 
close of the meetings Shirley reminded the tribal councilors that the number of 
indigenous peoples in the region do “not now consist of more than one third part,” than 
they did before the decades of armed conflict with the English.71  As ethno historian 
Colin G. Callaway argues this “thinly veiled threat…illustrated the relative positions 
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from which the English and Abenakis were negotiating” by the outbreak of the 
American Revolution.72 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Norridgewock and Penobscot tribes, both 
located in the borderland region of the District of Maine, would be amiable toward the 
Continental Congress and Continental Army as they shared enmity toward the British.  
During the summer of 1775, as Les Beaucerons grew restless about the militarization of 
rural Canada, Penobscot Chiefs Joseph Orono and John Neptune, alongside a 
delegation of Penobscot Indians, travelled to Watertown, Massachusetts, to ratify a 
resolve of friendship with the patriot forces and to request that encroachments into their 
lands be addressed. In return for their agreement of amicability, the Provincial 
Congress of Massachusetts resolved to “strictly forbid any person or persons 
whatsoever from trespassing or making waste upon any of the lands and territories or 
possessions” of the Penobscot Indians.73  
Reuben Colburn was a key local figure hired by George Washington to craft the 
bateaux to be used by the Arnold expedition and gather intelligence about the 
Continental army’s proposed route through the Maine wilderness. In turn, he hired 
Dennis Getchell and Samuel Berry to scout the route.  Thirty miles up the Dead River, 
the scouting party encountered Natanis.  They reported to Colburn that “he positively 
declared that if we proceeded any farther he would give information of…our Designs” 
to “Gov. Charlton.”  The men encamped and took the night to mull over whether or not 
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it was wise to proceed further.  On the following day, September 8, they continued 30 
miles further up river to gather as much intelligence as possible.  Their “Indian Pilot” 
refused to venture onward with them, opting instead to stay at their encampment.  
While the two men explored onward, their pilot conversed with an “Indian Squaw” 
who warned him that all the young Norridgewock Indians that lived in the region of 
the Dead River were away negotiating “Commission from Charlton.”  She further 
revealed that a “great Number of Mohawk,” strong allies of the British, were stationed 
in Beauce-Sartigan. Last, had Natanis not warned the scouting party through his threat 
of reporting them to Governor Carleton that they “would have destroyed [them] had if 
[they] had proceeded.”74  Thus, Natanis’s actions and the information delivered by the 
unnamed Norridgewock supported the invasion of Canada by arranging safe passage 
and preventing the scouting party from falling into harm’s way. 
As the Continental army entered the wilderness beyond the Eastern Country 
during the autumn of 1775, the solitude, isolation, and the chaos of raw nature caused 
them to look with suspicion upon any indigenous person not employed as their own 
guides.  After reading intelligence reports describing Natanis as a possible spy for 
Governor Carleton, Benedict Arnold instructed his scouting party—against the orders 
of George Washington to protect the French and indigenous people they happened 
upon—to capture and, if need be, to kill Natanis if he were encountered while 
performing reconnaissance of the rivers and routes to be travelled by the rest of the 
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army.75  The other soldiers spared him no quarter in their diaries.  Upon approaching 
Natanis’s cabin, which was situated along the Dead River, Captain Simeon Thayer 
noted that he “came to an Indian hut where on Sataness dwell’d, both as rougeish and 
malicious as ever existed.”76  Clearly, the intelligence reports of Natanis weighed 
heavily on the minds of the Continental soldiers as they traversed the wilderness.  
Surrounded by unfamiliar terrain in what they viewed as a chaotic landscape, they 
understood that an ambuscade by a handful of indigenous people would have posed a 
major threat to the expedition.  Wilderness and the indigenous peoples’ place within it 
certainly shaped the thoughts of the soldiers when they assessed the figure of Natanis. 
Despite their disdain for Natanis, the soldiers were impressed by a small “Indian 
house” on a “Point of Land Beautifully situated” along the shore of the Dead River.77 
The river in the immediate vicinity of his home was “very deep and Still,” likely an 
excellent spot to catch salmon and trout.78  They also noted that he labored greatly in 
clearing “a Number of acres” of land around his cabin for agricultural and security 
purposes.79 The soldiers were also rescued either directly or indirectly by Natanis when 
confusion set in as the scouting party travelled up the Dead River. It became unclear 
which route should be taken to best link up with the Chaudière at a fork in the river.  
Suddenly one of the soldiers discovered a large stake on the shore of the river that had 
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been split open at the top.  In this seam, the soldier, much to his delight, found a birch 
bark map that contained “a very perfect delineation of the streams” and watercourses 
upstream of their location.  The map also contained marks that “denoted the hunting 
camps” or “real-abodes” of the indigenous people living in the area.80  In a sense, seeing 
where Natanis lived and the ‘civilized’ nature of his cabin—which seemed far too 
domesticated for the wilderness—combined with their utilization of the sophisticated 
birch bark map—crafted presumably by Natanis himself or another Norridgewock 
Indian—to commence the process of softening their views toward him.  In plain terms, 
it humanized the perceived enemy.    
The shifting of Natanis’s identity from enemy to ally was completed as the 
soldiers made their way from the wilds of the District of Maine into La Beauce.  It was 
during these darkest days of the march, as the troops poured into Beauce-Sartigan in an 
emaciated state that Natanis revealed himself to the entirety of Arnold’s expeditionary 
force.  Lieutenant Archibald Steele reported that when he first arrived in Sartigan with 
Benedict Arnold, Natanis greeted him in “an abrupt but friendly manner,” shook his 
hand, and “intimat[ed] previous knowledge of him.”81  When the scouting party, 
including John Joseph Henry, arrived, Natanis informed them that he kept close watch 
on the expedition from the moment the first division arrived at the Dead River until 
they found the course that would lead them directly to La Beauce.82  The men of the 
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scouting party asked Natanis why he did not make his presence known and introduce 
himself to the expedition.  He retorted, “you would have killed me.”83  
Most of the Canadiens and Wabanaki living in rural Canada presumed that the 
indigenous-controlled wilderness of the District of Maine was impenetrable by such a 
large force.  Shortly after his arrival in La Beauce, Arnold and several enlisted men and 
officers joined in a ceremonial meeting with the Wabanaki who had gathered.  One 
soldier noted that they were “joined by about seventy or eighty Indians, all finely 
ornamented in their way with broaches, bracelets, and other trinkets, and their faces 
painted.”84  The Wabanaki addressed Arnold as the Dark Eagle, and they agreed to join 
forces with him.  One of their leaders exclaimed “that the brave men who had come 
through the woods must have pleased the Great Father and must therefore conquer 
their foes”—the British.85  This conference bridged a cultural divide between invaders 
and inhabitants, as the French and indigenous peoples living in La Beauce developed a 
sense of trust and friendship towards Arnold and his new enlistees.  Arnold offered 
those who would enlist wages and provisions.  As a result of the ceremony and 
monetary compensation, the expedition gained over fifty new members, including “40 
St. Francis Abenaki and ten Penobscot Indians.”86   
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Natanis and eighteen other Norridgewock Indians also joined with Arnold 
during the Siege of Quebec.  The Penobscot and Norridgewock Nations were important 
early allies of the nascent United Colonies. A few decades later a Penobscot Indian 
named Sowanocket filed a Revolutionary War veterans’ pension application, stating 
that he “acted as a guide and pioneer to the army under the command of Gen Arnold in 
their march through the wilderness to Quebec and remained with the American army 
till after the assault upon that city.”  He was stationed outside the walls of Quebec until 
mid-January when he was discharged.87  For all of the suspicion surrounding Natanis, 
he served with valor during the Siege of Quebec and was wounded by a musket ball 
through his wrist.  He was captured by Governor Carleton, and upon his eventual 
release returned to his cabin on the Dead River.88   
John Marsh and a Cosmopolitan Beauce 
John Marsh illustrates the cosmopolitan nature of Beauce society during the 
eighteenth century as a person born in Bellingham, Massachusettsm and then a resident 
of the Maine-Quebec borderlands. He first “resided and hunted” with the Penobscot 
Indians of the Eastern Country in 1751.  It took him several years to become fluent in 
the languages and to the lifestyle of his new region, but, once he became “perfectly 
acquaint ted with their Language,” he left the District of Maine, presumably in the 
company of several Penobscot Indians, and relocated to La Beauce where he earned a 
“very comfortable and advantageous” living trading goods with the French, Wabanaki, 
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and few English inhabitants in this rural region of Canada.  Marsh would likely have 
been present during the reading of the letter from George Washington to the 
inhabitants of the region, and he certainly witnessed the hustle and bustle taking place 
in his parish as the Continental army staggered out of the wilderness in early 
November 1775.  He also witnessed Benedict Arnold’s efforts to massage relations with 
the French and Wabanaki, hoping to convince them to join his forces.  The combined 
effect of these spectacles “Compeled” Marsh to a have a great “regard to his [home] 
Country,” and he was convinced by the “Solicitation and even Command of said 
General [Arnold], to again Quit a Regular life and business and take upon…the 
disagreeable way of savage living” in the Continental army “to serve as a linguister 
during the Blockade the City of Quebec.”89 Arnold and his officers certainly valued 
Marsh’s skilled navigation of the linguistic borderlands with his knowledge of English, 
Wabanki, and French. 
The cosmopolitan nature of La Beauce contributed to its political unrest there. A 
close examination of census data and government reports shows that along with French 
Canadians many Acadians had taken refuge in the region.  Marsh’s petition also shows 
that there were New Englanders and Penobscot Indians trading on the frontier of 
Quebec as well.  In addition, the diaries of American soldiers emphasize the diversity of 
the indigenous groups. La Beauce in 1775 was a populace comprised of French 
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Canadians, Penobscot Indians, various other Wabanaki nations, Anglo-Americans, and 
Acadians, all of them with political reasons to resent the British. 
News of Continentals Ahead 
The individuals making up this cosmopolitan Beauce society reacted in a variety 
of ways to the news of the Continental army arriving in their communities.  Upon 
hearing of the rebels at Saint Joseph parish, Jacques Ducharme and Gervais Houle set 
forth from Pointe Lévy to Sainte Marie with an invitation from the habitants living there, 
letting them know that the Continental army would be received with open arms.  Also 
contained in their message was intelligence to Colonel Arnold that the British 
government desired the militia to take up arms and fight against the Continental army 
to prevent their crossing the St. Lawrence River.  Fearing that this request would either 
fall on deaf ears or that the parish militia would be defeated, the British army sent a 
small detachment to confiscate all of the canoes in Pointe Lévy to prevent the 
Americans from traversing the St. Lawrence River.90 
Ducharme and Houle arrived in Sainte-Marie one Sunday before mass and went 
straight to Claude Patry’s house near the church.  A crowd of rebel sympathizers, 
including Etienne Parant, gathered at Patry’s.  Hearing the report of the two men from 
Pointe Lévy, Captain Parant dispatched his son, Jacques, and another militiaman, 
Joseph Gagnon, to deliver the invitation and intelligence to St. Joseph parish alerting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Gabriel, Journals of BTW, 61. 
	  	  
	  
109	  
them of Les Bostonnais’ good will and that of the habitants of Ste. Marie and Pointe 
Lévy.91 
Dispatches were sent from the Continental army into La Beauce.  The habitants of 
Ste. Marie anxiously gathered around the houses surrounding the church both before 
and after mass on November 2, All Souls’ Day, to hear Captain Parant and le sieur 
Dumergue announce the intentions of the military force from the United Colonies who 
would be arriving within the borders of their small communities within days.92 Militia 
Ensign Louis Paré read these manifestoes in front of the congregation at St. Joseph. 
Upon arriving at Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce, several officers—and presumably 
Arnold—gathered at Claude Patry’s home.  Etienne Parant quickly showed his 
sympathy for the cause of the Continental army.  He exclaimed, with a bit of 
braggadocio, that when rebel spies travelled through La Beauce during the past 
summer that he did everything in his power to assure their safe passage.  After good 
victuals and good conversation, Parant opened his home up for several officers to spend 
the night.93 Fraternizing with the leaders of the Continental army allowed the habitants 
to negotiate the borderlands on their own terms building friendships and securing local 
patrons for their victuals. 
This suggests that the accommodation between revolutionaries and French 
habitants did center solely on material matters of trade and transportation.  The 
American soldiers also interacted with the inhabitants on a social level as well.  Indeed, 
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in his pension application Josiah Sabin noted that Arnold had left camp in Quebec to go 
“women hunting beyond the line.”94   On November 4, Dr. Isaac Senter and another 
expedition member, for example, “visited an old peasant’s house, where was a merry 
old woman at her loom, and two or three fine young girls.”95  Upon learning that her 
guests were Americans, the old woman “sung a French song to the tune of Yankee 
Doodle Dandy.  [We] laughed heartily” and “made ourselves very happy,” Senter’s 
companion noted.96  Canadien women graced the pages of Moses Kimball’s and Private 
Caleb Haskell’s diaries as well.  On the following evening, November 5, Kimball 
recorded that they “stop’d at a clever old Frenchman’s house where they gave us rum & 
bread & butter, as much as we wanted. There was two pretty girls at the same house.  
Stayed till the next day.”97  Haskell wrote that he was “put up at a house where we 
were kindly received.  Here we found a woman who could speak English.”98  None of 
the soldiers mentioned having a sexual encounter with a Canadien but it could have 
occurred. Unquestionably the soldiers were happy for an opportunity for 
companionship after six weeks in the “howling wilderness” between Fort Western and 
the Chaudière River valley. Drinking and mixed gender sociability between the 
inhabitants of La Beauce and expeditionary members again demonstrates that their 
relationship transcended strictly monetary considerations.  
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As Arnold’s expedition continued on toward Quebec, several men were left 
behind due to illness or injury. John Joseph Henry, for example, came down with a high 
fever and became gravely ill from eating too much after his arduous journey through 
the Eastern Country wilderness.  Arnold gave him two silver dollars and called for a 
French inhabitant to come across with his canoe and pick up Henry.  He carried the ill 
soldier into his house, and Henry slept for two days, unable to eat anything.  On the 
third day of his convalescence, Henry was able to rise out of bed, and his hostess, the 
habitant’s wife, set a place for him at the breakfast table.  Ready to set back out on the 
trail, Henry offered the peasant man the two silver dollars that Arnold had given him. 
The man refused with “disdain in his countenance, intimating to me that he had merely 
obeyed the dictates of religion and humanity.”  The man then insisted on transporting 
Henry forty miles to aid him in catching up with the expedition.  When offered the two 
dollars again, the man refused, stating that Henry may need them for food, lodging, or 
supplies before he was able to meet up with the rest of his detachment.99  Interestingly, 
when Henry had first entered the villages of La Beauce he “expected there could be 
little other than barbarity.”  However, he “found civilized men, in a comfortable state, 
enjoying all the benefits arising from the institutions of a civil society.”100  The 
generosity of this humble Canadien family was illustrative of the relationship that had 
formed between Arnold, his men, and local habitants.  
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Military Support from Les Beaucerons 
As the Continental army approached the fortifications of Quebec, Arnold’s 
Beauceron allies assisted with crucial reconnaissance work. In a November 8 letter to 
General Richard Montgomery, who took command of the western prong of the Invasion 
of Canada when General Schuyler became ill, Arnold reported that the habitants had 
alerted him to the presence of “two frigates and several small armed vessels lying 
before Quebec, and a large ship or two lately arrived from Boston.”101  This clearly 
provided both General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold with sensitive intelligence 
about the military situation at Quebec before their arrival.  Les Beaucerons also created 
signal fires to alert the army crossing the St. Lawrence River of the movements of 
British ships.102 
 In addition to military intelligence, Arnold engaged habitant militia leaders in St. 
Henry parish to perform work at a wage of two shillings per day for the construction of 
200 ladders and to have them delivered to Pointe Levy.103  He also hired them to craft 
shoes for those who had lost or ate theirs on the trek through the wilderness. The 
residents of Sainte Croix constructed 30 carts at Arnold’s orders for the transportation 
of flour that the habitants seized from St. Nicolas’s mill to be delivered to Sault-de-la-
Chaudière.”104   
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Others committed themselves to the Continental army by taking up arms.  
Several Canadien militiamen, despite obtaining commissions from Guy Carleton to 
protect Canada, also accepted officer commissions from Benedict Arnold.105  Ignace 
Couture was exhilarated to hear that the rebels were on the doorstep of his parish of 
Pointe Lévy.  He immediately set out through the neighboring parishes of the 
countryside to obtain stores of provisions.  Once he secured those victuals he travelled 
into La Beauce to greet Arnold and the rest of the Continental army.106   The habitants at 
Pointe Lévy supported the rebel army in a variety of ways.  Jean Amelin and Joseph 
Couture crafted the parts for a battery while other residents collectively manufactured 
two thousand fascines for the construction of the same battery at a rate of 48 pounds per 
100.107  Abetting the Continental army did not end with material support; seventeen 
Beaucerons joined Arnold’s army from Pointe Lévy for the rate of 48 pounds per 
month.108 
The Siege of Quebec 
 The stores of provisions at Pointe Lévy—first amassed by Ignace Couture then 
supplemented by the quartermasters of the Continental army with supplies from the 
various parishes throughout La Beauce—were transported to the expedition’s 
headquarters by the habitants of the town.109  Habitants from other parishes contributed 
to the rebels’ food stores during their siege outside the walls of Quebec.  For example, 
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Les Beaucerons living in St. Charles and St. Vallier, who usually attended the gathering 
in Pointe Lévy during the autumn of 1775, sold provisions to the rebels.110  Habitants 
also ransacked the estates of their seigneurs in acts of defiance. Not only did they steal 
and auction off material goods, they also delivered wheat seized from seigneurie mills to 
the Continental army, often without accepting remuneration.111  
Careful negotiations and economic, social, military, and cultural accommodation 
by the Continental army, the habitants, and the indigenous populace in La Nouvelle-
Beauce, carried Benedict Arnold’s expeditionary force to the Plains of Abraham outside 
the fortifications of Quebec on December 5, 1775.  Despite their reinvigorated 
condition—approximately one month after being delivered from the wilderness—the 
soldiers were once again in dire condition. Reduced to a force of just over 600 soldiers 
because of the defection of Colonel Enos, Arnold’s division combined forces with 
General Richard Montgomery’s 500 troops who arrived from their success at St. Johns 
and Montreal.  These 1,100 Continental soldiers, still suffering from the effects of 
exhaustion and starvation and facing winter conditions, were lodged in cramped 
quarters in an unsanitary army camp.   
Historian Elizabeth Fenn argues in Pox Americana that this created ideal 
conditions for the spread of smallpox.112  Worried about the disease debilitating his 
force, Montgomery, the commanding officer of the combined forces, attacked the 
fortress on December 31 under the cover of a blizzard.  The hurried invasion proved 
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disastrous for the Continental soldiers. Social repercussions of this failed assault would 
also be felt by Les Beaucerons. Nature, a detrimental factor in the wilderness march to 
Quebec, again played a role in the strategic decision to attack the city, which cost the 
military commander his life and caused Arnold to be wounded.  The British Regulars 
and Canadian militia killed 30 other soldiers and captured over 400 as prisoners of 
war.113  
From Borderlands to a Bordered Land 
Historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron have contended that frontier 
regions like the Maine-Quebec interface in the eighteenth century were often “the site of 
intense imperial rivalry and of particularly fluid relations between indigenous peoples 
and European interlopers—in other words, these were borderlands.”114  The indigenous 
peoples provided aid to the Americans, thus continuing the borderland narrative of 
playing off one imperial power against the other. Les Beaucerons showed that they had 
limited imperial loyalty and favored assisting the rebels for their communities’ benefit.  
The autonomous decisions of the indigenous and the French residents from southern 
Quebec exemplified this region as a borderland.   
 The Arnold expedition had to cross through both a natural wilderness and a 
geopolitical and a cultural borderland.  In order to successfully navigate this region, 
they had to bridge myriad cultural divides:  French, English, and Wabanaki languages, 
Protestant, Catholic, and indigenous religions, soldier and civilian social roles, and all 
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manner of dynamic political allegiances.  Together, soldiers, indigenous people, and 
habitants crafted ways to transcend these differences.  The revolutionaries skillfully 
navigated the borderlands by practicing restraint toward potential hosts, hiring 
linguistic interpreters such as John Marsh, and paying fair market rates for provisions, 
supplies, and services rendered.  The inhabitants, motivated by suspicion of the British, 
facilitated accommodation through compassion and Christian goodwill, and by socially 
mixing with the revolutionaries over food, drink, and dance. The Wabanaki, at first 
glance, seemed impressed by the courage and fortitude of the men and women of the 
expedition; they held a formal meeting and decided to join Arnold’s ranks against a 
common foe.  Their association with the Penobscot Nation, which allied with the patriot 
war effort, also greatly influenced this decision. 
The wilderness of Maine was an important catalyst for many of these 
negotiations.  The misery and afflictions the expedition suffered in the “howling 
wilderness” earned its members both the pity and admiration of the Canadien and 
indigenous peoples of La Beauce.  Had it not been for the unique properties of this 
wilderness border between Maine and Quebec it is unlikely that Arnold would have 
been so immediately well received by the local populace.  Historian Justin Smith argued 
that “the admiration for the courage and endurance of the Americans, not unmingled 
with awe” with regards to their expedition through this wilderness borderland, 
“contributed to make the natives friendly.”115   
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Indeed, several areas of Maine, Quebec, and the Maritimes were contested 
territories less than two decades before the American Revolution, with claims by 
multiple indigenous groups, the French Empire, and the British.116  If the French and 
Wabanaki people had decided to obey the issuance of martial law by Governor Guy 
Carlton, and had met Arnold and his men with force instead of food, the expedition 
would surely have been decimated as it trickled out of the wilderness.117  However, the 
reaction to General Washington’s written request for food and aid was not automatic by 
any means.  Looking at the western prong of the Quebec campaign, historian Robert 
Hatch has argued that “for the first time, many French Canadians dared to side openly 
with the British” against the western prong of the patriot invasion of Canada through 
Montreal by Montgomery.  Hatch estimated that within days of hearing of the invasion, 
as many as one thousand French farmers went to Montreal to assess the possibility of 
taking up arms.118  This reaction of the habitant populace starkly contrasts with the 
actions of Les Beaucerons and Wabanaki peoples in the borderland region between 
Quebec and Maine. 
It was not a forgone conclusion that the men in Arnold’s expedition would obey 
orders to be respectful of the inhabitants of the Beauce region.  The warm reception 
given to the patriot force by the small French parishes, combined with the agonizing 
trek through the wilderness, changed the patriots’ feelings towards both the society and 
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the culture of the Canadien and Wabanaki peoples.  Historian Thomas Desjardin 
concluded that it “created a warm bond between the Americans and the French 
hosts.”119  That the patriots, Canadiens, and Wabanaki engaged in economic, social, and 
cultural accommodation instead of warfare owed much to the grueling trek through the 
howling wilderness borderland of Maine. 
Repercussions for La Nouvelle-Beauce 
During the summer of 1776, Governor Guy Carleton commissioned a study by 
three individuals, Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau, and Jenkin Williams, to 
investigate how widespread the support for the American rebels was throughout 
Quebec.  Carleton also tasked these men with punishing unfaithful French subjects and 
militia officers, with acknowledging and rewarding the steadfast loyalty of other 
subjects, with establishing militias where they were now defunct, and with 
reorganizing militias with disloyal members in the fifty-six parishes and missions that 
they visited.120  Baby, Tashereau, and Williams punished the habitants primarily by 
restricting their ability to serve in any governmental capacity and publically stripping 
offending militiamen of their military rank.  
It is important to acknowledge that there were consequences for Les Beaucerons 
for their assistance of the Continental soldiers. Yet, the commissioned report by 
Carleton’s agents Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau, and Jenkin Williams deemed most 
of the habitants supported the rebels “sans resistance,” or without any enthusiasm.  The 
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majority had convinced the British to presume that they supported the rebels only due 
to coercion or for monetary gain. Thus, the penalties doled out by the British were mild, 
reflecting the uncertainty of exactly why individuals had supported accommodated the 
Continental army, and reflecting another accommodation accomplished due to the 
autonomy of La Beauce as a borderland region.    
The most common punishments were for a handful of leading individuals to be 
punished as examples. Militia officers were discharged and replaced with loyal subjects, 
some individuals had to apologize to the community and the new militia for their 
actions and banned from holding government positions for life. All Beaucerons needed 
to declare loyalty to the British.  For example, Pierre Poirier, likely of Acadian ancestry, 
and four others from Sainte-Marie-de-Beauce were required to “ask forgiveness from 
the King” in front of the entire community and to apologize to the loyal subjects living 
in the parish for “having scandalized them.”  Joseph Lambert, the militia captain of 
Pointe Levy, was “blamed and denounced…openly” during the British investigation for 
commanding the militia to help the rebels.  Due to being ostracized by the community, 
he refused to be present at his review and was declared unfit to hold any government 
commission. Lambert’s ultimate fate is unknown.  However, a review of birth, death, 
marriage, and baptismal records indicates that there were two Joseph Lamberts living 
in Pointe-Levy in 1775.121  The family of one relocated to the more radical Sainte-Marie-
de-Beauce, while the daughter of the second left Canada for Europe and was married in 
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Belgium.  There was no record of death for either Joseph Lambert in the Beauce region 
of Quebec. Lambert’s case exemplifies how fluidity of identity and allegiance in La 
Beauce became intolerable for the British. 
On October 20, 1793, John Marsh wrote to the Massachusetts legislature to 
defend his claim to an island, named Arumsunkhungan, situated on the Penobscot 
River in the District of Maine. He had resided there beginning in 1777 and purchased it 
from the Penobscot Nation in 1783 for 30 bushels of corn. His ownership of this island 
in central Maine was in question because other English settlers believed that he cheated 
the Penobscot of it. Consequently, Marsh claimed he was obliged to leave the Beauce 
region and was not allowed to return, instead starting a trade business among the 
Yankees of Nova Scotia after the siege of Quebec.  It was there that an Indian agent 
persuaded him to relocate to Arumsunkhungan on the Penobscot River, where in 1783 
he obtained a deed to the island and renamed it after himself.   
Though John Marsh’s story is but one, it is exemplary of many others that reveal 
a cosmopolitan Beauce that was teaming with French Canadians, English Canadians, 
Acadians, Penobscots, St. Francis Indians, and Anglo-American colonists with differing 
identities and allegiances.  Further this story reflects how this region of fluidity and 
exchange was altered by the invasion of Canada.  The British charged those in La 
Beauce with the crime of sedition. Though most consequences were mild, they 
represent a hardening of the still amorphous border between the Eastern Country of 
Massachusetts and British controlled Quebec with a reinstatement of martial law, 
increased British patrols, and a reorganization of the militia around British loyalty.  This 
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kept men like Marsh from resettling in La Beauce after the conflict and was an 
important first step toward a borderland consensus.   
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Chapter 4: They “willingly delivered provisions to the rebels”: 
Local People, Local Resources, and Local  
Environments in Canada, 1776 
British officer John Burgoyne earned his military reputation as a light cavalry 
commander in France and Portugal during the Seven Years’ War.  By the time hostilities 
broke out in Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1775, he had worked his way up to a major-
general in the British army.   He arrived in New England in May, shortly after the civil 
unrest and general mutiny in the North American colonies evolved into an armed 
conflict, and he assisted in garrisoning Boston during its siege by the Continental army.  
Though he had no experience with the environs, the people, or the peculiar situation of 
fighting in the Northeastern Americas, Burgoyne quickly realized that success in the 
northern theatre of the war demanded an ability to harness the human and natural 
resources of the surrounding localities.   
His experience as a British officer in Europe informed him that Britain and 
Ireland did not have the martial resources—neither people nor war material—to quash 
the rebellion in North America.  Instead, he deduced that the British army needed 
reinforcement along the east coast from the foreign mercenaries in the Germanic 
kingdoms. For operations in the interior of northeastern North America, Burgoyne 
mixed British regulars with English provincial and Canadien militiamen and, most 
importantly, “a large levy of Indians” to create a robust fighting force.1  
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Regardless of Burgoyne’s inexperience with the circumstances of the Americas, 
he quickly learned that the thing that aroused the fears of the “rebels” more than any 
other measure was “engaging the Indians” in battle.2   Thus, when Burgoyne planned 
for an expedition from Quebec to Albany in the summer of 1777, he requested that 
Governor-General Guy Carleton recruit 1,000 indigenous warriors and 2,000 French-
Canadian militia3 to join his army of regulars and German mercenaries.4  
Despite General Burgoyne’s clear understanding of the importance of local 
people, local environments, and local circumstances to prevail in the Northeast, the 
pivotal roles of French Canadiens, indigenous people, wilderness landscapes, built 
environments, and social systems in Burgoyne’s invasion of New York from the colony 
of Canada have received short shrift by historians.  This chapter highlights the way 
local people—whether indigenous, Canadien, or from the United Colonies—became key 
players in the struggles of 1776 and 1777 throughout the Lake Champlain borderlands 
of what is now Quebec, New York and Vermont.  This chapter especially highlights 
another essential player in the borderlands that has been ignored even more fully, the 
environment itself.  The rough wilderness expanse between Montreal and Saratoga 
loomed large in the minds of soldiers who served in the campaign. Frequently they 
described their military experience as a war not only against the human enemy of the 
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Continental army, but against a natural one with a militarized landscape full of natural 
obstacles, a struggle to obtain natural resources, and a campaign against diseases. This 
elucidates the fact that the American Revolution—and all warfare in general—pits 
human beings against nature and nature against human beings in profound of ways. 
 Early histories of the Burgoyne campaign revolved around the question of 
explaining its failure.  However, to fully understand this failure, it is important to pick 
up where chapter two ended, with the attack by the Continental army on the garrison of 
Quebec on December 31, 1775. After the British repelled the assault, the environment 
took an prominent role in the subsequent siege of Quebec, the retreat of the Continental 
forces, and the pursuit of the Americans by General Carleton. These actions led directly 
to Burgoyne’s campaign and shaped the ways the natural world became an agent in the 
affairs of 1777.    
 ‘We Being in Want of Wood’: Harvesting Natural Resources during the Siege of 
Quebec5  
Battle, as seen in the first two chapters of this dissertation, was far from the 
dominant experience for most soldiers during the American War for Independence.  
Often, these men—as well as women and children camp followers—in both the British 
and Continental armies lived in reprehensible conditions and struggled to obtain 
adequate housing, food, and supplies. Environmental Historian David C. Hsiung 
argues that in New England, during the first two years of the war in 1775 and 1776, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Jacob Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, February 28, Collections of the David 
Library for the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, January 19. 
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conflict primarily centered on procuring food and fuel from the landscape and denying 
those crucial resources to the opposing side.6  Though it is rather obvious that massive 
amounts of food, clothing, and alcohol were needed to support field armies and 
defensive garrisons, the need for wood is often overlooked when contemplating the 
lives of eighteenth-century soldiers.7  After the ill-fated attempt by General Richard 
Montgomery and Colonel Benedict Arnold to seize the fortress of Quebec, a six-month 
siege of the city ensued where, much like the siege of Boston, the daily lives of soldiers 
revolved around provisioning.  Here, the agency of local people and local 
environment—both built and natural—become apparent as the Continental army 
successfully executed a war for natural resources in the Quebec hinterland. 
 The Continental army, despite losing their offensive against the garrison at 
Quebec, remained fairly well supplied from radicals and other enterprising individuals 
throughout the Canadian countryside.  In General Carleton’s assessment of the invasion 
of Canada, fervently researched by Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau, and Jenkin 
Williams, a great preponderance of the rural parishes surrounding Quebec supplied the 
rebel army with firewood, supplies, carts, and provisions despite their refusal to take 
up arms for the American cause.8  Further, as these habitant agents of resistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 David C. Hsiung, “Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment in the War for 
Independence, 1775-1776,” The New England Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 1 (December, 2007): 
614-654. 
7 J.R. McNeill, “Woods and Warfare in World History,” Environmental History 9 (July, 
2004): 388-410. 
8 For more on habitants providing wood for fuel to the Continental army, see Gabriel, 
Journals of BTW, 4; Ibid., 7. For more on Habitants supplying the Continental army 
during the siege of Quebec in general, see Gabriel, Journals of BTW, 11-12; Ibid., 23-24; 
Ibid., 26; Ibid., 30; Ibid., 32; Ibid., 36; Ibid., 47; Ibid., 78.  For more on habitants providing 
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travelled through the colony procuring goods, they also exaggerated the number of 
soldiers besieging the fortifications at Quebec by several thousand, which likely had the 
effect of making it easier for individuals to part with their material goods not having to 
fear a British reprisal.  Other habitants did not actively seek out their neighbors to 
perform services or provide goods for the Continental army; instead these individuals 
simply brought what their family had in excess to central provision hubs such as Pointe 
Levy, to sell to official or unofficial quartermasters stationed there.9  Thus, there was a 
range of loyalty to the Continental army, or, as it is typically framed in the literature, 
disloyalty to the crown.   
 It seems, however, that much of the provisions freely given or sold to the 
Continental army by the habitants came through looting, theft, or coercion executed by 
Les Beaucerons themselves in the region south of Quebec City.  Many habitants there 
invaded the homesteads, farms, mills, and various storage facilities of priests, seigneurs, 
and other royalists to obtain wheat, flour, wood, rum, and the other supplies necessary 
for waging war in acts of petite resistance against their social betters.10  The charges 
against Isaac Goudrau, an Acadian refugee living in St. Pierre, on the Ile d’Orleans, 
exemplified the acts of rebellion by the habitants of Canada against the elites of British 
colonial Canada.  Francois Baby noted that Goudrau “has been to the rebels’ camp very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
work, carts, or other items of material support, see Gabriel, Journals of BTW, 26; Ibid., 36; 
Ibid., 39; Ibid., 47; Ibid., 52; Ibid., 54. 
9 Gabriel, Journal of BTW, 78. 
10 For more on the looting of clerical or seigneurial property, see Journals of BTW, 13; 
Ibid., 23; Ibid., 27; Ibid., 54; Ibid., 61; Ibid., 64. For more on the acquisition of supplies 
due to coercion, see Journals of BTW, 36; Ibid., 108. 
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often this winter.  He would accompany the Bostonnais to act as their interpreter to 
requisition provisions from Monsr Boisseau’s farm & wheat from the Monsr Dupre’s 
mill and other places.”11  When delivering supplies to the Continental army, some of the 
habitants merely requested remuneration for their work, while others “willingly 
delivered provisions to the rebels’ camp as long as they were paid in [hard] money.”12   
There were, however, habitants who chose not to get involved in the struggle 
between Great Britain and the United Colonies at all during the Siege of Quebec, 
preferring neutrality or loyalty to the new British government.  In Cape St. Ignace, 
unspecified American or Canadien “rebels” assaulted “Ross, a Scot…repeatedly.”  In 
doing so “they seized six cartloads of food from him.”13  Clearly, the habitants of rural 
Canada maintained and exercised a range of options that rarely extended to armed 
service on behalf of the Continental army but also that rarely hurt the rebel army 
economically.  Thus, habitant loyalty in La Beauce was primarily inward looking, 
focusing on the best social or economic situation for their families and their parishes at 
any given time. 
 In obtaining resources for the army, the commanders of the Continental force 
also struggled to maintain viable amounts of hard money as most of the habitants 
refused to accept paper money printed in the United Colonies unless the fortress of 
Quebec fell into the hands of the attacking rebels.14  Thus, currency also became a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gabriel, Journals of BTW, 23. 
12 Ibid., 30. 
13 Ibid., 108. 
14 Captain Thomas Anslie in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 27. 
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resource that needed procurement from the countryside.  In St.-Joseph-de-Beauce a 
resident referred to as Mach—a Beauceron who assisted the rebels throughout their 
journey through La Beauce and during the entirety of their siege of Quebec—coerced, 
likely under the threat of violence, that “Frans Nadau, the parish miller who works for 
La Gorgendiere’s heirs and is a great friend of the rebels, the wheat and money that he 
held for Mr. Taschereau.” The British agents investigating this matter became further 
disgusted by this act as Mach demanded not only money that Nadau held for 
Taschereau from the seigneur’s own enterprises but also hard money that Taschereau 
owed or was holding for other elites of the colony.15 
 To secure their advantage over the British in their ability to harvest natural and 
monetary resources from the countryside, the Continental army disrupted 
communication lines between the various parishes of La Beauce as well as the small 
communities surrounding Quebec.  One Canadien spy stealthily travelled from 
Chamblee to the Isle d’Orleans gaining information.  When he arrived at the gates of 
Quebec, Jacob Danford, a British subject employed in the Board of Ordinance in 
Quebec, noted that man was wrapped in a sheet from head to toe as a form of 
rudimentary camouflage.  When asked about this espionage tactic he explained that 
when encountering Canadien or American patrols he dove into the fluffy snow having 
spread the sheet atop himself.  Once he no longer heard nor saw the Continental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Gabriel, Journals of BTW, 64. It is unclear from the Baby, Taschereau, and Williams 
journals whether or not this individual, who they refer to only as Mach is actually John 
Marsh the interpreter who served Arnold once the campaign reached La Beauce.  Mach 
and Marsh appear to preform similar tasks for the Continental army and remain with 
the army for a similar amount of time.   
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soldiers in his vicinity, he continued on his way.  In addition to reporting that the rebel 
force consisted of 800 soldiers with 100 more on the way, the spy exclaimed that the 
Continental soldiers and militiamen on patrol for the American army were under strict 
orders to prevent the Canadien populace from travelling from one parish to another.16  
The local resistance movement in La Nouvelle-Beauce actively policed their 
communities to sever the local communication of the British.17 
 On the defensive side of the siege, Governor-General Guy Carleton needed 
provisions for not only his army of 1,800 men—comprised of 70 Royal Fusiliers, 230 
Royal Emigrants, 22 artillerymen, 330 British militiamen, 543 Canadien militiamen, 400 
sailors, 50 crewmen from trading ships, 35 marines, and 120 carpenters—but also for 
city residents, including those unable to perform military tasks such as the infirm, 
women, and children.  Multiple officers estimated that on November 30, 1775—
approximately sixteen days after Colonel Benedict Arnold, and the Continental army 
under his direction, arrived on the Plains of Abraham outside the gates of the fortress—
the individuals living within the walls of the city of Quebec numbered 5,000.18  
However, due to strategic planning and the expectation of an impending siege, the 
estimated amount of provisions located in the storehouses of Quebec for the army and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jacob Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, February 28, Collections of the David 
Library for the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, February 28. Thomas Ainslie also 
notes this method of travel with two Canadian spies utilizing “new white blankets” in 
Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 53. 
17 Jacob Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, February 28, Collections of the David 
Library for the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, February 28. 
18 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 16-18. 
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its residents would last for eight months—ideally until June, 1776.19  Contained within 
the walls of Quebec or nearby there also was a mill for fresh flour production and a 
distillery where rum and molasses could be procured.20  Firewood for fuel as well as 
oats and hay for livestock forage, on the other hand, would soon become exceedingly 
scarce.21  
 It is unclear how much firewood Governor Guy Carleton needed to keep his 
soldiers and the residents of Quebec from freezing to death during the brutally cold 
winter months in the Northeast.  However, the average New England household 
burned somewhere between 30 and 40 cords of wood per year between fuel for heat 
and cooking, with a preponderance of this consumption occurring during the six-month 
period between October and March of each year.22 In December of 1775, George 
Washington appealed to the General Assembly of Massachusetts to provide his 
headquarters at Cambridge with 10,000 cords of wood to get the Continental army 
through the frigid winter months.23  Though the estimate is rather imprecise, one can 
assume about two-thirds of the annual wood requirement to fuel a New England home 
being used per person during the siege of Quebec.  A clear and a conservative estimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The siege was broken during the first week of May. 
20 Jacob Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, Collections of the David Library for 
the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, January 24; Ibid., January 29; Ibid., February 
4; Ibid., February 5; Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 
18; Ibid., 22. 
21 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 16-18; Jacob 
Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, February 28, Collections of the David Library 
for the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, January 19. 
22 William Cronon, Changes in the Land:  Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 120. 
23 David C. Hsiung, “Food, Fuel, and the New England Environment,” 645-646. 
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suggests that the amount of wood needed for one household, in times of want, could be 
used by ten to fifteen people.  Thus, without access to the city’s rural hinterland nor 
vessels sailing from Halifax, Boston, or Europe, Governor Carleton and the mixed 
British forces at Quebec needed to procure a minimum of 6,500 to 10,000 cords of wood 
to fuel the garrison of Quebec from November through the beginning of May the siege 
ended.24   
At times the temperatures dropped to dangerous levels that would have been 
colder than current temperatures in the Northeast, due to the Little Ice Age.25  One 
officer complained that it became so cold that “no man after having been exposed to the 
air but ten minutes, could handle his arms to do execution.  Ones senses are benumb’d.”  
The severity of the weather, however, also served as a defensive advantage, and officers 
anticipated a Continental army attack on the city only “ in mild weather.”26  The 
Canadiens also noted that the unusually cold weather and taught their British 
counterparts that it was cold enough to “pierre fendre [break rocks].”27  Garrison duty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For reference a cord of wood is a volume unit of measurement.  A cord is equal to 128 
cubic feet of typically firewood.  This is typically envisioned by a 4-foot by 4-foot by 8-
foot stack of firewood.  10,000 cords of firewood thus would be 1,280,000 cubic feet of 
wood or a stack of firewood approximately four-feet high and covering about three and 
a half city blocks. 
25 The Little Ice Age (circa 1300 – 1850) was a period of global cooling that occurred in 
the wake of the warming that was experienced during the Medieval Period (circa 950-
1250).  There was a spike within this cycle of global cooling that occurred in 1770 and 
was prevalent during the Northern Campaign of the American War for Independence. 
For more on the Little Ice Age, see Brian M. Fagen, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made 
History, 1300-1850 (Tandem, 2001). 
26 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 25. 
27 Ibid., 39. This is a colloquial term which translates to it is so cold that it could split 
rocks.  For more British accounts regarding the severity of the weather during the 
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facing such harsh conditions often weighed heavily on the minds of the British soldiers 
and for many triggered a sense of claustrophobia.  One soldier on guard duty looked 
across the St. Lawrence River into the parish of Pointe Levy to see approximately fifty 
individuals on snowshoes in a supply chain with several of the habitants’ sleighs 
following their trail loaded with provisions, presumably headed for the rebel’s 
headquarters.  He scrawled in his diary “the people all around us seem in motion.”28  
Weather and climate shaped perceptions and the decisions made by officers and private 
soldiers alike who reasonably feared injury or death at the whim of nature.  
 With the besiegeds’ inability to obtain needed resources from the local natural 
environments surrounding Quebec, the British commanders turned to second nature in 
order to harvest fuel wood for the city.29  Upon arriving in Quebec during the Autumn 
of 1776 one officer noted that “this city suffered so much during the long siege, last 
winter…many houses were destroyed for fuel.”30  Quickly, however, the garrison 
consumed all firewood or burnable materials within easy reach.  Thus, during the early 
months of the siege, attention already shifted towards the suburb of St. Roc, dispatching 
both harvesting and covering parties to forage through woodpiles, fence pickets, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
America in a Series of Letters: by an Officer (London: Printed for William Lane, Leadenhall-
Street, 1789), 18. (Herein Thomas Anburey, Travels); James Phinney Baxter, The British 
Invasion from the North. The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne, from Canada, 
1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of the 53rd, or Shopshire Regiment of Foot 
(Albany, NY:  J. Munsell’s Sons, 1887), 182. (Herein Digby Journal) 
28 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 47. 
29 Second nature as defined in Richard W. Judd, Second Nature:  An Environmental 
History New England (Amherst, MA:  University of Massachusetts Press, 2014) is where 
“the porousness of the boundary between the natural and the artificial” diminishes and 
the “dialectic of nature and culture dissolved into an organic whole.” x.   
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other burnable material located there for salvage.31  On one occasion, a militia unit of 
one sergeant, one corporal, and 18 privates received orders to take out “six of the King’s 
slays to bring in wood for the Recollees.”32 Thus, the task of finding wood and bringing 
it into the city rested largely on the British militia.33    
 The Continental army responded to the harvesting of wood in St. Roc by sending 
their own parties into the suburb under the cover of snow and darkness.  During these 
expeditions, the rebels stealthily moved amongst the buildings keeping out of eyeshot 
of the sentries guarding Quebec.  They then would “set fire to a slow match 
communicating with combustibles, creep away again, & and are out of reach before the 
fire blazes.”34  At first, the British sentries and scouts remained uncertain as to the causes 
of the fires in St. Roc.  However, after observing the blazes occurring at approximately 
the same time night after night, they blamed the Continental soldiers.  Despite this 
revelation, however, they remained ignorant of the purpose of these fires for quite some 
time. British officers reasoned that the rebels set the fires due to frustration rising in 
their inability to take Quebec, to gain strategic insights as to the position of sentries, and 
to create strong points to attack and defend from.35  By January 19, however, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Captain Robert Lester Orderly Book in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 206-7. 
32 Ibid., 213. 
33 In Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, Collections of DLAR, Film 390, Reel 1. 
Danford notes throughout his journal that the inhabitants are let out of the gates to 
gather firewood.  On these dates the orderly books and diaries of militia officers not 
that they were allowed outside of the gates, under the protection of armed guards, to 
gather firewood.  Thus, it seems that by inhabitants Danford means militiamen.   
34 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 37. 
35 For more on misunderstanding the blazes in the suburbs of Quebec, see Captain 
Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 36; Ibid., 38 
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resident of Quebec, Jacob Danford noted that “the enemy set fire to some Houses in 
Saint Rocks in order to distress the garrison we being in want of wood.”36  It had become 
clear that due to the frigid weather conditions and the dire need for firewood within the 
city that a preponderance of skirmishes would take place over nature resources. 
By the end of January, the need for wood intensified within the walls of Quebec.  
To ensure the safety and efficiency of those harvesting wood “a brass six pounder on 
wheels” was deployed “to cover the wood cutters.”37 Having exhausted the supply of 
foragable firewood in nearby St. Roc by the beginning of February, the British began to 
harvest their fuel from the St. Johns suburbs.38 The rebels countered by February 7, 
when British Captain Thomas Ainslie noted “last night three houses were burnt in St. 
Johns suburbs, there is a quantity of cord wood there & some hay, the rebels know we 
are in want of both.”39 
 As the competition to harvest firewood from second nature became more 
pressing, the precious commodity became highly regulated.  For example, by 
December, in the British militiamen needed to appeal to their captains in order to prove 
their level of want.  Officers then determined whether or not the individual truly 
needed the resource. Upon the captain’s careful “examination he will grant a Certificate, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Jacob Danford, Diary of the Siege of Quebec, 1775, February 28, Collections of the David 
Library for the American Revolution, Film 390, Reel 1, January 19. 
37 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 39. 
38 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 41. Ainslie noted 
on February 8 that they were beginning to run out of firewood in St. Roc and on the day 
before, February 7 he first discusses the soldiers going into St. Johns suburbs to harvest 
wood for fuel. 
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and those who are so in want” brought the document to one of three officers in charge 
of the firewood stores.40  However, three months later, on March 26, the head of the 
militia amended these orders, instead a commander now needed to appeal directly to 
the quartermaster to allow men to go out and harvest their own fuel wood from beyond 
the walls.41  
 The terminology that the British used in describing their efforts in collecting 
wood for the garrison shows their lack of differentiation between gathering these 
necessary resources from either first nature—directly from the forests and trees—or 
from second nature—from fences, houses, and anything else combustible in the built 
environs surrounding Quebec.  Before shifting their efforts from the St. Roc suburb to 
St. Johns, one officer made sure to note that although “there remains but very little 
wood in St Roc,” due to the collection activities by the soldiers, when the snow “melts 2 
or 3 feet we’ll find a second crop.”42  Referring to this commodity as a crop that existed 
to be harvested tellingly highlights “the porousness of the boundary between the 
natural and the artificial” that prevailed in their minds.43 
Without question the soldiers engaged on both the American and British sides of 
the siege of Quebec experienced severe hardships due to extreme want, weather, and 
lack of wellness. In the face of these deplorable conditions, many soldiers felt that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Orderly book begun by Captain Anthony Vialar of the British Militia the 17th of 
September 1775, and Kept by Him till November 16th when Continued by Captain 
Robert Lester, in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 200-201. 
41 Captain Roger Lester Orderly Book in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 240. 
42 Captain Thomas Ainslie Journal in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 41. 
43 Richard W. Judd, Second Nature:  An Environmental History New England, (Amherst, 
MA:  University of Massachusetts Press, 2014), x. 
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best possible chance of survival lay in the arms of the enemy.  Experiencing the intense 
environmental conditions of winter warfare in the Northeastern Borderlands, one’s 
identity as a Canadien, British militiaman, Continental soldier, or British regular eroded 
as the instinct to preserve oneself became omnipresent.  There were defections on both 
sides.  In fact, the Continental soldiers captured by the British during Arnold and 
Montgomery’s New Year’s Eve attack on Quebec were given to opportunity to serve in 
the Royal émigrés regiment.  At times, these individuals left the garrison and returned 
to the encampment of the Continental army.  Spies, citizens, subjects, and soldiers all 
crisscrossed the siege lines under the cover of snow, wind, and darkness in hopes of 
finding the best means for survival in the face of horrendous living conditions.  For 
many, identity rested most fully upon self-preservation, and rather than as a Briton, 
Canadien, or American.44 
 On April 14, as the sentries overlooked the encampments, militiamen gathered 
resources, officers determined and doled out their orders, and signs of wildlife returned 
to the area around Quebec.  In a diary entry that Jacob Danford must have penned with 
great relief, he chronicled that “this day saw Swallows”: a sign of spring, a sign of better 
living conditions, a sign that the direst need for fuel wood had run its course, and a sign 
that one way or another, the seven-month siege was nearing its close.45 
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‘Tis a Deadly Infection in Yanky Veins’: The Vehemence of Variola during the 
American Retreat 
For those serving in the Northeastern Borderlands, the fear of smallpox 
oftentimes became overwhelming.  This is of little surprise, as the ravages of this 
disease left many soldiers scarred, disfigured, and, at times, even blind.  Those who 
suffered from smallpox had two possible prognoses.  They either died from their illness 
or they wielded the pockmarks of the disease as a symbol of their immunity for the rest 
of their lives.  As noted above, much of the sufferings that occurred during a military 
campaign happened not on the battlefield, but instead in the dense encampments and 
on exhausting marches with little food.  The Continental army’s struggle with smallpox 
was no different, as the disease spread like wildfire through their camps and killed far 
more individuals during the beginning years of the war than did wounds from direct 
combat.  Thus, the struggle against smallpox elucidates the fact that the the 
Revolutionary War was not merely a contest pitting soldiers against one another, but it 
was a contest that pitted human beings against the natural world; in this case, against 
the microbes ever-present in their natural and built environments.46  
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Smallpox is a unique disease in that it can only be transmitted from one human 
host to another, unlike influenza which can be transferred from animal hosts to human 
beings and back again. Under certain circumstances involving susceptible populations 
with a minimal history of exposure to the disease, morbidity rates have ballooned to 
over 85 percent while the mortality rates from confirmed cases neared 39 percent.47  For 
populations that were fatigued and had poor nutrition during epidemics of the disease, 
such as those serving in the military campaigns of the northern theatre of the war, 
smallpox mortality rates climbed as high as 43 percent.48  In Europe, specifically in the 
port cities where many military personal were drawn from, a preponderance of the 
adult population were immune to the disease as they had survived an infection from 
childhood.49  In North America, however, the native-born population in the United 
Colonies had rarely contracted the disease and thus, without inoculation which was 
controversial and banned in much of the Northeast, as well as the southern colonies, the 
individuals serving in the Continental army at the onset of the War for Independence 
were comprised of a population highly susceptible to Variola, the virus that causes 
smallpox.  Thus, the effect and the agency of the disease had an asymmetrical impact 
due to the sharply contrasting immunity between European-born and American-born 
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combatants.50  British officer Thomas Ainslie noted this differential immunity stating 
that “small pox does havock among them…tis a deadly infection in Yanky veins.”51   
Further taking advantage of this differential immunity, Governor Carleton 
endorsed measures to send infected individuals into the encampment of the 
Continental army to frustrate the efforts of those besieging Quebec.52  Lieutenant John 
Shreve suspected Carleton of utilizing such measures.  He wrote, “the British knowing 
the New Englanders were opposed to being inoculated, sent out spies to spread the 
disease in the American camp, which killed more Yankees than they did.”53  Here, 
Carleton utilized the living bodies of infected soldiers, militiamen, and royal subjects of 
Quebec as biological weapons under the guise of individuals seeking refuge from 
British military tyranny. Again borderlands peoples and their wartime struggles played 
a pivotal role in British military successes after breaking the siege. As the Continental 
army welcomed provincials, habitants, and spies into their camps to deliver them from 
the trials and tribulations of living in a militarized landscape, they circulated infectious 
droplets throughout the American encampments.  
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As individuals shared increasingly crowded camps with poor sanitary and 
nutritional conditions, one individual infected with smallpox could quickly trigger an 
epidemic.  Making matters worse, as individuals poured in from New England to 
reinforce the patriots during their retreat from Quebec, a fresh batch of hosts were 
delivered to the insatiable maw of Variola.  As individuals shared tents, played cards, 
got in disputes, and mustered for patrol, they passed back and forth infectious droplets 
expelled from their lungs.54  Soldiers breathing the air, wiping the sweat from their 
brow, or putting the hands up to their face to stifle a cough or sneeze unwittingly 
exposed themselves to the deadly disease.  With an incubation rate of ten to fourteen 
days, smallpox often caught soldiers unaware they were communicable or surrounded 
by infectious individuals.  Those infected by smallpox first began to experience bodily 
aches and pains, a head ache, and general feelings of fatigue, weakness, and malaise, 
none of which was unusual to a soldier serving in the biting cold of the Northeast.  
Approximately four days after catching the disease, individuals began breaking out in 
the characteristic sores and scabs of smallpox until they were covered in a series of 
throbbing raised pustules.  As more and more soldiers became ill, the stench of the pox 
in the camp hospitals would become unbearable as hundreds of soldiers’ pustules 
cracked and oozed.55  For those unfortunate to be losing the war waging inside of their 
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bodies between white blood cells and Variola, while they were waging a war in the 
colony of Canada, death arrived ten to sixteen days after their first symptoms appeared. 
With the Continental army suffering under these abhorrent conditions, Colonel 
Benedict Arnold was replaced in April, with the command eventually assigned to 
General John Thomas by the end of the month.  Upon inspecting the conditions of the 
soldiers bivouacked in front of the gates of Quebec, Thomas realized that the British 
were going to be able to break the siege as soon as shipments of fresh soldiers and 
supplies arrived from Europe once the ice cleared on the St. Lawrence River.  Thomas 
began to prepare the army for an organized retreat; on May 6, however, 200 British 
regulars arrived in the colony of Canada.  Governor-General Carleton stormed out of 
the gates of Quebec with these recently arrived soldiers buttressed by the men of his 
garrison and scattered the Americans through the countryside, abandoning their 
provisions, artillery, and their sick and dying.56  Those infected with smallpox fled along 
with the rest of their companies as best they could, in effect breaking the ordered 
quarantine of the Continental soldiers infected with the disease.  General John Thomas 
contracted the disease as his detachment made its way from the gates of Quebec to Fort 
Ticonderoga during the summer of 1776.  Thomas succumbed to complications on June 
2, 1776 near Chambly during his retreat along the Richelieu River. Just two weeks later, 
the armed forces of the United Colonies had retreated completely from the colony of 
Canada.  
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One week before his death, General Thomas described the abhorrent condition of 
the Continental army in the midst of its disorderly retreat: 
The army here have now for 9 Days been entirely destitute of meal, that 
no contraction is provided, nor have any money to purchase previsions 
were they to be procured in this country.  The want of provisions has 
made it absolutely necessary to order Col. Maxwell…to immediately Joyn 
me here in order to judge truly of my situation.  You will be pleased to 
figure yourselves a retreating army, disheartened by unavoidable 
misfortunes, destitute of almost every necessary to render their lives 
comfortable, or even tolerable, sick, and as they think wholly 
neglected…it will not be possible to keep the army together, but we must 
be unavoidably obliged to abandon a Country of Infinite importance to 
the Safety of the Colonies, and to leave our friends here a prey to those 
whose Mercies are Cruelties.57 
Here we see the pandemonium under which the Continental army, ravaged with 
smallpox, retreated across the borderlands.  Almost immediately their supply 
lines coming in from Les Beaucerons and other habitants of Quebec were 
disrupted, and without hard currency the officers could purchase no relief for 
their emaciated soldiers.  Further, the French populace living in the colony of 
Canada would be left to answer for their past support of the rebels as the British 
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regained control over the parishes and communities south of Quebec.  Indeed, 
Thomas intimated that the French would suffer greatly under British martial 
control.  
The British army and the Continental army dealt with outbreaks of the disease 
much differently from one another. The British method of fighting the war against 
Variola was simply to stand guard until their lines were threatened with an attack from 
the disease and to remove susceptible individuals and inoculate them.  Inoculation 
lowered the death rate for these individuals from fifteen percent if they were to obtain 
the disease naturally in a controlled setting to two percent.58 The Continental army on 
the other hand, with their largely susceptible population of native-born soldiers, had a 
much more complex decision to make.  Both allowing soldiers to contract the disease 
naturally and inoculating them had major concerns and liabilities. Both methods 
typically would remove fighting soldiers from the ranks for thirty days, if not 
permanently.  Inoculating a fighting force as a whole would greatly weaken the army; 
however, inoculating in intervals could be more dangerous as on one unhealed scab on 
one soldier’s body could ignite an epidemic.  Thus, the Continental army’s strategy in 
fighting against smallpox during the early stages of the War for Independence was to 
quarantine individuals once they either self-reported that they were sick or were 
discovered with the disease. This, of course, was greatly problematic as Variola can live 
outside of the human body in cloth tents, blankets, and uniforms for weeks, spreading 
from an infected soldier long after his body has been removed from the area. Further, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Fenn, Pox Americana, 33. 
	  	  
	  
144	  
the retreat through the Canadian countryside by the Continental army after the British 
broke the siege of Quebec, as mentioned above, ended all hopes of quarantining the 
disease.  Thus, smallpox ravaged camps as the microbe came into contact with fresh 
recruits and reinforcements from the United Colonies, creating a powder keg of 
pestilence throughout the ranks of the Continental army. 
In fact, contracting the deadly disease weighed so heavily on the soldiers’ minds 
that those that the British captured during the action of December 31 asked for two 
things almost immediately.  The first thing requested was for permission for Major 
Return Meigs to return to the encampment of the Continental army to retrieve the 
baggage of those who were captured.  The second was to be inoculated for small pox, a 
luxury they did not have serving as officers in the Continental army.  One British officer 
noted the despair of the captured soldiers who “dreading the small pox and 
apprehensive of taking the infection the natural way have requested to be inoculated—
their petition is granted, & they are preparing for that operation.”59 Cleary the 
Continental army officers took note, as did British officer Thomas Ainslie, that Quebec 
“long had that disorder in town.”60  When Meigs and his fellow officers became 
prisoners, the stigma and controversy against inoculation that percolated through the 
United Colonies during the eighteenth century became irrelevant as they chose to gain 
immunity from smallpox in the same way that British soldiers did.  As they regained 
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control over their bodies through the process of inoculation—despite losing control 
over their freedom—the boundary lines between colonies, empires, militaries, and 
allegiances eroded. 
 As the Continental soldiers retreated through the countryside in a famished and 
weary state, the morbidity and mortality rates of the disease likely increased, and with 
those healthy soldiers being surrounded at all times by death and pestilence smallpox 
effected not only the physical wellbeing of susceptible individuals but also the mental 
wellbeing of those who were spared the physical ravages of the disease. There was 
tremendous fear of smallpox, and soldiers felt that Variola had its own agency, through 
providence or some other means, to actively campaign against military forces or to 
specifically target individuals. Captain Zachariah Beal wrote to his wife, Abagail 
Goodwin Beal, while encamped at near Fort Ticonderoga, to review his experience in 
the army since May 1776.  He described their grim situation as the Continental army 
retreated through the countryside:  
att Sorell 45 miles father into Canada att which Place we Emedately 
Encamped & to my great Surprise I found our Cetuation truly Maloncoley 
& Distressing the Enemey in our front the Pestul[ance] on our Right hand 
& on our Left & to Complete our Distr[ess]…not a farthing of hard money 
to help our Selves with…Could Buy nothing of the Inhabetance, in these 
Circomstancess we tarred 5 Days when we ware ordered to march Back to 
St Johns…Still Suronded with the small Pox our Men Seemed to Look 
Quite Dejected we now began to anocalate which I Ded Among the Rest 
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hopping to Remain att that Place till we had got over it But 5 Days put an 
End to our Rest for that time…But alas humain abillitys now fale us 
though we ware favourd with one of The greatest, the aforementioned 
Contagious infecttion now began to Spread over us Like a Sweeping 
Torant & being Distitute of Every Nessicery Propper for that Disorder, 
Rendered our Situation truly maloncoley indeed…Soon thosands of men, 
Sick with out the Lest Convenuancy or nesciery of Life Except There Tents 
& alowence of Pork & flower.61 
Within this broken prose, one gains a sense of the agency assigned to diseases by 
those serving in the Northeast Borderlands.  Here smallpox flanked the 
Continental army, pursued the soldiers tirelessly, executed a decisive charge, 
inflicted blows amongst their forces and, ultimately, crushed the morale of those 
serving.   
 Beal continued, stating that during the retreat he suffered “unmerited 
fatague” as they had to bury many of those dying from smallpox along the way.  
The arrived at Crown Point which he first described as “a very Plesant Situation” 
however, smallpox soon undermined any rejuvenation this new landscape 
provided. He decried that in “a few Days Changed itt to the most Dismall & 
Loathsom Place I Ever Saw, the Small Pox att the hath in genriall our men So 
Disvigured That itt was Difficult to Know them Even of our own Compnys by 
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there Looks.”  Those healthy enough rushed the sick to Fort George where 
Captain Beal “found more than 2 thousand men under the Doct Care, another 
Sean Which I forbare Discribing.”  He stayed at Fort George for three weeks and 
during that time he assisted in the burying of “8 or 9 men aday.” Grateful of 
surviving a bout with small pox himself he told his wife that he was “a Living 
moniment of [D]istinguishing Marcy while many of our frinds & acquaintance 
are gone to there Silant graves.” Abagail, or as Zachariah called her, Nabby, also 
received a dire warning from Captain Beal cautioning her to “Derst not 
Embrace” his letter “for [I] fear of Sending you the Small Pox.”62  Here one gains 
a sense of the effect that the combination of sickness, fatigue, and marching 
imparted on the Continental army.  Also, if Beal was correct in his calculation, 
there were 2,000 soldiers suffering from the disease at the hospital in Fort George 
alone.  In three weeks’ time, Beal himself witnessed nearly 180 soldiers dying 
from the disease or related complications. 
Thus, the major sufferers of small pox were native-born individuals of North 
America who had either not been previously exposed to small pox by natural means or 
through inoculation.  For the Continental army, this was a preponderance of the 
soldiers and officers enlisted in the fighting force.  For the British, by contrast, those 
susceptible to the disease were typically confined to American-born individuals, such as 
loyalists, defectors from the Continental army, indigenous allies, or African Americans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Zachariah Beal to Abagail Goodwin Beal, Camp Near Mount Independence, 
September 28, 1776, Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society, 1981.009 (m), 
The Zachariah Beal Correspondence. 
	  	  
	  
148	  
serving in the British lines.  In the colony of Canada during the spring of 1776, the 
numbers of foreign-born soldiers in the British army far outnumbered the small 
percentage of Americans.  Thus, the effects of small pox on the British army was 
infinitesimal compared to the severity with which it ripped through the lines of the 
Continental army.  The effects and agency of small pox suffered by these soldiers was 
greatly exacerbated by the chaos of military endeavors, the high density of individuals 
in military camps and military hospitals, and the rush of new recruits and 
reinforcements into the Northeast Borderlands.  Both small pox and the British army 
drove the American forces from the gates of Quebec back into the United Colonies 
during the retreat from Canada. The Continental army might have won the war for 
natural resources during the siege of Quebec in 1775-1776, but their British antagonists 
had a more decisive ally in smallpox.  
Burgoyne’s Plans to Quash the Rebellion, 1777 
John Burgoyne arrived in Canada on June 1, 1776 to reinforce Governor-General 
Guy Carleton as his second in command to ward off the Continental army’s invasion of 
Canada.  With Burgoyne came massive reinforcements from Europe.  The paltry 900 
soldiers that defended Quebec against the rebel insurgence during the winter of 1775 
through 1776 swelled to over 12,000 trained soldiers. Approximately 8,000 of these 
troops were British regulars, while the remaining 4,000 were German auxiliaries 
principally hailing from the Electorate of Brunswick.63  A preponderance of these troops 
came when the Continental army’s designs on Quebec reached their nadir in the spring 
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of 1776. General Carleton, with smallpox as his ally, had already broken the siege 
against Quebec and had forced the Continental army’s retreat back towards Fort 
Ticonderoga.   
Despite Carlton’s success in breaking the long siege, and the disruption of the 
habitant supply lines to the American forces, the problem of provisioning the British 
army did not end after they marched out of the gates of Quebec. Logistically, it was 
hard to count on local people to supply the British army with the goods needed to 
execute the war.  This inability to harness the power of local people and local 
environments put the British at a distinct disadvantage, especially as the Continental 
army had superior networks in most of colonial North America. 
To successfully mount his southern expedition from Quebec through the 
borderland wilderness towards Albany, New York, General John Burgoyne needed to 
find provisions for twenty-thousand troops for a six-month campaign.  In addition, 
Governor Guy Carleton estimated that the number indigenous people, Canadiens, 
carpenters, sailors, and camp followers further increased the required supplies by thirty 
percent.64 For example, the final plan for Burgoyne’s expedition of 1777 included 2,000 
Canadian militiamen.65  The trans-Atlantic endeavor to provision the army was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Memorandum of General Carleton Relative to the Next Campaign Communicated to 
Lieut. General Burgoyne to be Laid before Government, Burgoyne and the Saratoga 
Campaign: His Papers, ed. Douglas R. Cubbison (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2012), 163. 
65 John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada as Laid Before the House of 
Commons by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne and Verified by Evidence with a Collection of 
Authentic Documents and an Addition of many Circumstances which were Prevented from 
Appearing before the House by the Prorogation of Parliament, Written and Collected by Himself 
	  	  
	  
150	  
impressive. The Secretary of War’s office sent shoes—as well as the materials to fix 
them—clothing, bales, casks, and camp equipment to Governor-General Carleton at 
Quebec to disperse to the soldiers stationed throughout the province and to accompany 
Brigadier-General John Burgoyne on his march to New York.66 
 German officers complained vociferously about the cost of procuring goods in 
the Americas. Whether through the British Quartermaster or from local people, the cost 
basic supplies, according to Captain Pausch, “costs 5/6 more here than in Hanau.”67  
The German officers felt as this created undue expense and hardship on them to have to 
pay so dearly for boots and leather goods.  Luxury items such as wine came at an even 
higher markup, with “a bottle of the poorest red wine…[costing] 36 kreutzers, and a 
bottle of Madeira 1 piastre!”68  
In addition to obtaining provisions and supplies for an estimated 26,000 soldiers, 
officers, camp followers, Canadien and provincial militiamen, and indigenous guides, 
scouts, and allies, Carleton and Burgoyne needed to find laborers to transport all of the 
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war material from the various British storehouses in Quebec through the wilderness 
landscape all the way to Albany.  This required the requisition of horses, oxen, drivers, 
unskilled laborers, as well as wagons, carts, carriages, and the necessary tools for 
repairs and logistical maneuvers, to speak nothing of the corn, hay, and other forage 
needed to keep the animals of the supply train thriving for several months.  The army 
itself did not perform this labor; instead the transportation of cannons, provisions, 
baggage, and food store typically fell to the local habitant populace of the colony of 
Canada through the seigneurial system of corvee labor.69  Indeed, one of the benefits of 
the Quebec Act of 1774, was the continuation of the seigneurial system which allowed 
seigneurs to compel the tenants on their land to perform labor for them.70 
 Despite the ability of the British army to exact labor from the habitants, several 
officers noted that to have their company’s baggage, clothing, and provisions 
transported in the small two-wheeled carts of the Canadiens that they had to rent the 
cart and pay a driver out of their own pockets.  The habitants charged a rate of one 
shilling per hour for this service.  The officers grumbled in their diaries that this should 
be reimbursed by the King; at the current rate of expenditure the officers would either 
have to sacrifice the purchase of some provisions for their soldiers or they be forced to 
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“gird a saddle on his own back and carry his own baggage!”71  The inability of Carleton 
and Burgoyne to wrest material support for the war effort from the colonial populace 
would prove increasingly worrisome as the expedition moved forward. 
An Over Estimation of Canadien Support 
Both the British and Continental armies overestimated the support that they 
would receive from the inhabitants of Canada.  For the United Colonists this was due in 
part to the warm welcome that the Arnold expedition had received in La Beauce in 
1775, the Continental Congress overestimated the amount of assistance which would be 
given to the detachment of 5,300 soldiers under the Command of General John Sullivan 
sent to continue the attack on Canada in 1776.  The retreating army from Quebec under 
the command of Arnold and the reinforcements under Sullivan rendezvoused at St. 
Johns and sailed away from the clutches of Guy Carleton across Lake Champlain to 
narrowly escape British forces.  Due partially to a Canadian populace motivated by 
their own political, social, and cultural issues and partially to the ravages of small pox, 
by July of 1776 Guy Carleton successfully removed the Continental from Canada.    
One British officer summarized the situation regarding the frosty relationship 
between the rural inhabitants of the colony of Canada and the British government and 
military quite accurately, writing that “the Canadians are by no means well affected to 
the English Government…I am confident, [the habitants] would assist the Americas, had 
we not such a powerful force in this province.”72  Though the officer later inaccurately 
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blamed the strong desire of the habitants to be back under French law and French rule 
and their inability to understand the English constitution and the British government’s 
benevolence as a result of popish corruption, the officer did understand that power, and 
thus at some level coercion, was at the crux of the decision-making for the rural French 
and indigenous populations as both the Continental army and British army crisscrossed 
their way through the Northeastern Borderlands.  The physical proximity of an army to 
any specific community increased the commitment of the local populace to support that 
army’s cause.73  
Of the estimated 2,000 Canadien militiamen that Governor-General Guy Carleton 
was supposed to requisition for General Burgoyne, he was only able to obtain three 
companies, each consisting of a mere one hundred soldiers, approximately 15 percent of 
the planned amount.  Moreover, Burgoyne was wary about the military prowess of the 
habitants employed for his service. He complained to Secretary of State Lord George 
Germain that that they “afford no promise of use of arms” and that the French peasants 
were “aukward, ignorant, disinclined to the service, and spiritless.” He reasoned that 
this was due, in part, to the local population’s disaffection with their seigneurs, 
especially concerning the actions taken against their social betters during the siege of 
Quebec. However, he also blamed “the poison which emissaries of the rebels have 
thrown into their minds.”74 
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Further, the appropriation of corvee laborers fell short with an insufficient 
number of individuals being employed to repair roads, clear trees, build military 
infrastructure, or transport provisions.  Governor Carleton also attempted to raise 
independent contractors to drive the horses hauling wagons, carriages, and the artillery, 
however, according to General John Burgoyne, they “could not be fully 
supplied…though no expense was spared.”75 Two general characterizations of the 
French-speaking local population seem likely. First, the Canadien populace was 
unwilling to serve the British armed forces despite some social and economic coercion, 
preferring, instead, to remain neutral to avoid the possibility of dire consequences if the 
United Colonists returned the following year.  Second, which is not mutually exclusive 
from the first, is that the habitants were already in a desperate social and economic crisis, 
with armed forces having ravaged their crops, their coins, and their communities for the 
last year. As a result, abled-bodied men, those who typically would be serving as corvee 
laborers or military contractors, needed to stay home rebuild their homes. 
Habitant and Indigenous Levels of Loyalty 
 In the immediate vicinity of Quebec, British officers did take steps to protect 
habitants and their households from pillaging and looting by their armed forces.  Militia 
Captain Robert Lester scratched in his orderly book that when a party of soldiers 
becomes detached from the garrison for any reason that the commanding officers of 
that detachment received strict orders to prevent those under their command from 
“plundering, or doing damage to the Inhabitants.” Any infractions would result in “the 
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men [being] severely punished” and the officer in charge being “obliged to pay for all 
Damages done.”76  However, when the officers desired the habitants and other residents 
in Quebec, its outlying suburbs, as well as Montreal, to celebrate events such as the 
birthday of King George III, each citizen was required to construct a “feu de joi [bonfire]” 
outside of their homes. 77  One German officer noted that “those who did not illuminate 
their windows were in danger of having them broken by stones.”78 Here allegiance to 
the British was coerced and compulsory rather than negotiated and earned.  This is 
further evidence of the fact that the closer the British army was to the French, English, 
and indigenous inhabitants of the Northeastern Borderland, the stronger the affinity 
appeared to be for the crown.  Further increasing the coercive nature of these 
celebrations the British and German soldiers and officers celebrated by firing their 
pistols in the air “from sunset till one o’clock the next morning.”  The officer goes on to 
point out that due to the punishments for not celebrating the King’s birthday were 
effective, “consequently, those houses which were not illuminated were few and 
belonged to those who were too poor to do so, for they certainly were not Rebels.”79  
This passage intimates that those so close to the intimidating presence and military 
might of the British army would not dare rebel against their wishes.  Though it is 
impossible to know how many habitants supported the United Colonies in the presence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Captain Robert Lester Orderly Book in ed. Wurtele, Blockade of Quebec, 263. 
77 Pausch, Journal of Captain Pausch, 128. 
78 Ibid., 128. 
79 Ibid., 128. 
	  	  
	  
156	  
of strong British power, those with rebel sympathies were forced to remain hidden and 
profess their loyalty to the crown despite their true feelings or how they identified. 
 During their retreat through the colony of Canada, the Continental army took 
steps to ensure the British did not enjoy an easy campaign following them through the 
built and natural environments between Quebec and Fort Ticonderoga.  The American 
officers understood that during the six-month blockade on the city of Quebec 
provisions became rather short for the soldiers garrisoning the fortress.  Thus, in an 
effort to exacerbate matters, as they retreated across the French countryside, the 
Continental army denuded the landscape of grain and livestock both to support their 
army and deprive the British of sustenance.80 This also created a situation of scarcity for 
those living in the colony without strong political allegiances.  
 One British officer decried the horrid treatment and “cruelty exercised” by a 
major in the Continental army “over the poor inhabitants” of rural Quebec.  He 
“burn[ed] many of their habitations and small effect, and dr[ove] away their cattle.”81  
As the British marched through the woods they found the cattle that the American 
troops did not slaughter or keep for themselves.  General Burgoyne ordered the soldiers 
to seize the cattle and offer “an adequate price…for such cattle were wanted for the use 
of the [British] troops”82  With two armies attempting to provision themselves from the 
resources of the habitants as the armies travelled back and forth through the countryside 
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from 1775 to 1777 it becomes easy to see how resources were consumed to fuel two 
insatiable war machines.   
As time went on, however, the British military rarely sympathized with the 
plight of the local Canadien populace suffering from martial disruption.  Lieutenant 
Digby wrote that, “the Habitants have no right to complain if the rebels shou’d oppress 
them—why did they suffer them to set foot in the Province.”83  In other words, if the 
Canadien militia would have mustered themselves against the Continental army in the 
autumn of 1775, they could have avoided mistreatment.   
This British attitude against the habitant (as well as indigenous) population 
smacks of hypocrisy.  After the invasion of Canada in 1775 and the failed siege in 1776, 
the British policy towards the local populace seemed to change from a position of 
accommodation to a position of conqueror ruling over conquered peoples.  Lieutenant 
William Digby noted that those Canadiens unwilling to perform corvee labor for a 
variety of reasons “were obliged to work in irons.”84 Imprisoning and temporarily 
enslaving the habitant populace seemed to be one of the strategies of Governor Carleton 
and General John Burgoyne as preparations were made for the campaign season of 
1777.  Further, Lord George Germain, the British Secretary of State, wrote to Governor 
Carleton about this change in action against the local population, stating that even King 
George III felt that several of the “disaffected parishes” and other areas of the colony 
needed a strong British military presence akin to martial law.  Specifically, the 
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leadership in London believed this to be the case in “Quebec, Chaudiere…Point Levi, 
Montreal…Oswegatche, Trois Rivieres, St. John’s, Isle aux Noix, La Prarie, Vergere” to 
“Secure Canada from external attacks.”85 Placing large parts of the colony of Canada 
under martial law, despite the effects on the local populace, the British politicians in 
London and military commanders on the ground hoped to not only ensure their 
hegemony in Canada but also to secure provisional supply lines for the northern theatre 
of the war. 
British troops were stationed in the Abenaki village of St. Francis to enforce 
allegiance. With these soldiers came threats by Governor-General Guy Carleton that, if 
the Abenaki showed any sympathies to the patriot cause or if they aided the 
Continental army in any way, he would burn their village to the ground.  The soldiers 
crisscrossing through their territory and the renewed imperial conflict in North 
America created difficult choices for the indigenous people inhabiting the Northeastern 
Borderlands. Many wished to remain neutral, but Carleton’s martial law and his 
coercion with the threat to their built environment made it clear that the British 
demanded assistance and allegiance instead of neutrality.  Thus, the Abenakis, under 
pressure to fight for the British crown, relocated their community to the upper-
Connecticut River valley.  American General Philip Schuyler directed his subordinates 
to welcome these Abeanki with open arms and to make efforts to get their allegiance.  
In offering protection to these indigenous peoples, the Continental army gained a unit 
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of Abenaki rangers.  Ironically, twenty years after Rogers’ Rangers ravaged the Abenaki 
villages in the region on behalf of the British, individuals from this tribe and rangers 
from New Hampshire fought side-by-side against the British crown.86 
However, some British officers and soldiers became introspective and rethought 
this harsh stance against the Canadien and indigenous populations.  One officer 
questioned whether or not European and Euro-American society was better off than the 
indigenous peoples he encountered throughout his journey.  He noted that: 
The savage never is in want; he lacks in no stores, because the earth and 
waters are reservoirs to supply them.  Fish and game are to be had all the 
year. The savage has no house to secure him from the inclemency of the 
external air, or commodious fire places, his furs answering all these 
purposes.  His labor is but for his own benefit; he sleeps when he is weary, 
and is a stranger to restless nights.  Little does he experience weariness 
that arises from unsatisfied desires, or that uneasiness of mind which 
springs from prejudice or vanity.  As far as I can perceive, the Indian is 
subject to no evils but those inflicted by nature.  In what manner then do 
we enjoy a greater happiness?87 
Though this description of indigenous life in the Northeastern Borderlands lacks the 
nuance and understanding of the rich and vibrant cultures and conflicts that existed 
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before contact and colonization by Europeans, it does show that some soldiers and 
officers reflected upon the situation of the inhabitants of the communities they traveled 
through. 
 Sometimes, however, the armies crisscrossing through Canada interacted 
positively with local people.  Before entering winter quarters, each soldier was issued 
several articles of warm clothing.  In Montreal, General Carleton had ordered long blue-
cloth overalls, blue woolen caps, blue corduroy mitts, durable white corduroy under-
jackets, white woolen overcoats with blue braids, and gray capes with blue wool ribbon.  
This mandatory uniform was paid for by the British army; however, its cost was 
deducted from the soldiers’ pay each month from September through March.  In total, 
each of these uniforms cost 33 shilling and 9 pence.  Assuming that all 12,000 soldiers 
stationed in the colony of Canada were ordered this uniform, a total of 20,250 pounds 
were injected into the Canadian economy.88  Further, as winter turned to spring and the 
British army planned for its invasion of New York, long-sleeved, loose fitting linen 
coveralls were ordered to be made.  These uniforms were adapted to the humidity of 
the summer and also protected the soldiers from mosquitoes and other biting insects 
that were both nuisances and purveyors of diseases.89  Thus, the need for officers to 
procure uniforms for the changing seasons—as well as to protect against the fauna—
bolstered the wartime economy of the region.  
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Hessians and Canadiens 
As the autumn of 1776 turned to winter, the British regulars and German 
Hessians and Brunswickers needed to prepare winter quarters to rest and make 
preparations for the campaign season of 1777.  The German soldiers set up their base of 
winter operations in and around the area between Quebec and Montreal. They ranged 
as far south as Chambly and Montreal and occupied the region between the St. 
Lawrence River and the Richelieu River heavily.90 Thus, General Frederich von 
Riedesel, having his soldiery scattered throughout the farmlands of the Richelieu River 
and St. Lawrence River watersheds, encamped at Three Rivers, approximately halfway 
down the St. Lawrence from Montreal to Quebec.    
At first glance, Hessian officers viewed habitants simply as a class of poor farmers 
who occupied the lowest rung on the social ladder in Quebec.  Thus, they believed that 
they could treat these French-speaking colonists with the same disdain that the lower 
classes of Europe suffered.  The German gentry, who lived amongst the various 
parishes surrounding Quebec and Montreal in between the 1776 and 1777 campaign 
seasons, were surprised to find that in the Northeastern Borderlands those living in 
these small communities far from formal British spheres of power derived a sense of 
independence and threw off the yoke of stratified society. One officer wrote that 
habitants “cannot endure rough treatment, such as knocks and blows; and no one will 
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more bitterly complain of that kind of usage than they.”  He hypothesized that this 
attitude derived from “their finer feelings” as they themselves will tell anyone who 
would listen “that a pauvre Canadien also has…feelings” and if one crosses their 
sensitivities they “will make you the judge of their troubles and sufferings” or “act 
treacherously.”  After several apparent failed attempts at interacting with the habitants, 
he surmised that “they wish to be treated in a courteous manner” and if they 
encountered kindness and fair handling they gladly obeyed any order or request.91 
Living in these rural communities allowed individuals to be fluid with their allegiances 
and assistance to European or American interlopers. This gave them the ability to use 
the war for their own personal and communal interests.  
Despite these mistreatments and conflicts, General Friedrich Riedesel wrote to 
his wife, Friedericke—who was making preparations to accompany the general during 
his tour of duty in North America—that the habitants were respectful and obliging to his 
requests and that they treated him with kindness and affection. Through these letters to 
his wife one sees how the German commander adapted to the culture landscape of the 
Northeast.  He surmised that he did “not believe that our [German] peasants, under 
similar circumstances, would conduct themselves as satisfactorily.”92  Captain Georg 
Pausch noted also that the Canadiens welcomed the German troops in “a polite and 
friendly manner,” However he also found, much like the officers in the Continental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Letter from Canada, by an unnamed German Staff-Officer, Letters of Brunswick and 
Hessian officers during the American Revolution, trans. William L. Stone (Albany, NY:  Joel 
Munsell’s Sons, Publishers, 1891) 
92 General Frederich von Riedesel to Friedericke von Riedesel, La Prairie, June 28, 1776, 
in Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 33. 
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army, that everything the soldiers and officers wanted to purchase from the local 
populace had to both be “well paid for” and also paid for in hard money.93 
Riedesel and Pausch also learned much from a military standpoint from living in 
these Caandien communities.  First, the German officers noted that the American 
soldiers they fought—as well as the Canadien militia that served along side of them—
were “excellent marksmen,” especially at longer distances. Thus while wintering in the 
colony of Canada Riedesel and Pausch drilled their soldiers and artillery in firing with 
precision at long distances.  Further, Riedesel likely also discussed prior military actions 
in the region with both the inhabitants of Canada and the British officers stationed there 
and learned that an army had once invaded as far as Schenectady during the winter on 
snowshoes, and that it was not beyond the capacity of the Continental army to send a 
small force by that means into Canada to harass the Germans troops in their winter 
quarters.  Fearing the worst from these conversations, Riedesel outfitted his soldiers 
with snowshoes to be prepared in case of a winter attack by the United Colonies.94 
As the winter set in, the troops and the habitants began intermingling on a social 
level.  Much to the surprise of the Hessian and Brunswick troops, from the richest 
inhabitants down to the poorest that the Canadians living in that region became friends 
with the soldiers wintering in their communities.  In fact, the greatest obstacles to 
friendly relationships between the habitants and the Germans were not based around 
religion, economics, or seeing the soldiers as an invading force like during the invasion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Pausch, Journal of Captain Pausch, 66. 
94 C.E. Bennett, A.M., Advance and Retreat to Saratoga: Burgoyne Campaign, (Saratoga, NY: 
Robson & Adee, 1927), 5.  
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of Canada in 1775 in La Beauce, but rather it was the language barrier.  Captain Pausch 
noted that “by reason of this circumstance, we are among this people like a Pelican in 
the wilderness.”95 His reflection regarding the German soldiers as seabirds being lost in 
a wilderness landscape not only shows the level of difficulty in communicating with the 
French residents but also hints at the overall mental burden for the Germans in an 
unfamiliar colony.96 
In an effort to promote good relations with the local people and to give his 
officers a form of entertainment, General Riedesel held public dinners and dancing balls 
each week.  He felt that this would keep them out of the public houses and other 
corrupting influences.97 However, it seems despite the General’s best efforts that many 
of the Canadien women—and possibly men—were far too tempting for the German 
soldiers and sexual relationships blossomed.  Captain Pausch noted that these 
relationships had a positive overall effect on the men, as the company of a sexual 
partner often gave them “comfort” and “solace” in an unknown land. Overall, those 
engaged in relationships with local inhabitants remained “happy and contented.”98 
As we will see in the next chapter, the German troops fared much better when 
stationed in the Canadien communities than they would during the march to Saratoga in 
the campaign to come.  In addition to procuring both supplies and friendships from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Pausch, Journal of Captain Pausch, 67. 
96	  For a rich discussion of German ideas regarding the environment and society of 
Canada, Charlotte Roi Epping, Journal of du Roi the Elder (New York, D. Apppleton & 
Co., Agents, 1911).  
97 General Frederich von Riedesel to Friedericke von Riedesel, Three Rivers, April 16, 
1777, in Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 64. 
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French inhabitants of the region, many German soldiers developed relationships with 
the indigenous peoples living in the region.  At first these acquaintances began with 
Germans trading specie and consumer goods for fresh meat, including mutton and beef.  
In fact, one officer noted that due to the trading relationships with the Canadians and the 
indigenous populace that neither officers nor enlisted man wanted for anything except 
the luxury of coffee, tea, and fine wine.  However, as Captain Pausch humorously 
recorded, they substituted for these items by drinking “rum and water together—
officers as well as men; and for a change, water and rum!”99  
Many women and their families followed German officers to North American.  
The Brunswickers alone had seventy-seven camp followers who were the wives of 
commissioned officers.100 Despite being in “a strange land among unknown people” 
these women and children also fostered relationships and became part of the Canadien 
communities where they were living.101  Women dined with one another and exchanged 
both pleasantries and good conversations over tea.  Frederike von Riedesel often dined 
in the convent at Three Rivers after learning that her husband sent them food and drink 
as tokens of good faith.  While visiting the nunnery, they would dress themselves in 
costume as a nun and perform dances and sing to pass the time.102   As the winter turned 
to spring they tended and walked in ornamental and kitchen gardens.  Children found 
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Holly Mayer, Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and the Community during the 
American Revolution (Charleston: University of South Carolina Press, 1996). 
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activities and education at nunneries where there were often seminaries for young 
women.103 
Desertion was a major issue throughout 1777.  Interestingly, despite being over 
5,500 kilometers from their homeland, German mercenaries also defected in large 
numbers. Captain Pausch appreciated that he and his men wintered in Montreal where 
he could keep track of all of his soldiers and officers on a daily basis instead of having 
them scattered throughout the Canadian countryside like some of his fellow 
commanders. He noted, “with my men scattered singly among the inhabitants of the 
shanties, I should have lost half of my young men.”104  Clearly, for some soldiers the 
relationships fostered in rural Canada were worth risking their lives for at a court-
martial for leaving their posts.105  Thus, in the borderlands of Northeastern North 
America, German mercenaries soldiers, fighting for neither King nor country, often had 
more in common with—and more attachment to—the residents of rural Quebec than 
they did with the British soldiers and officers with whom they served.  These 
relationships seem unique to the German soldiers, as there were far fewer situations of 
British soldiers or Continental soldiers defecting to these communities during or after 
the war.  In fact, as described in Chapter 2, quite often the opposite happened with men 
like John Marsh being ostracized La Beauce as the Northern Campaign of the American 
War for Independence subsided.   
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The Expedition Delayed  
While his British, Hessian, and Brunswicker troops wintered in Canada, 
Burgoyne returned across the Atlantic to winter in much more comfortable quarters in 
London. While there, he sowed doubt in the mind of Secretary of State George German 
about the ability for Carleton to lead the British troops through the Northeastern 
Borderlands during the campaign season of 1777.  As his second-in-command, 
Burgoyne felt that driving the Continental army out of Quebec was not bold enough, 
and that Carleton should have taken more decisive action to dislodge the American-
held borderland fortification of Fort Ticonderoga, especially after defeating Benedict 
Arnold’s ragtag navy at the Battle of Valcour Island on Lake Champlain on October 11, 
1776.  Both Germain and King George III became convinced that Burgoyne should lead 
an expedition from the north into New York in an attempt to sever the connections 
between New England with the rest of the United Colonies.   
Burgoyne’s design for the expedition was to traverse Lake Champlain and 
capture Ticonderoga.  From there, he would maneuver his fighting force through the 
wilderness to Albany, where they would meet with another army under the 
Commander-in-Chief of the British army in North America, Lieutenant-General 
William Howe, marching northward from New York City.  A third prong of the attack 
would be led by Barry St. Leger, who would rout the rebels living along the Mohawk 
River, rouse loyalist and Iroquoian support for the British war effort, and rendezvous 
with Burgoyne and Howe in Albany.  If all went as planned, Burgoyne’s campaign of 
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1777 would isolate the radical insurgents from New England and force them to fight for 
themselves against the might of the British Empire.     
Burgoyne arrived in Canada in May, but he and Governor Carleton were unable 
to procure enough supplies to support the large expedition. Their inability to convince 
local people to supply the war effort was made more critical as a result of the scorched 
earth retreat by the Continental army from Quebec.  Thus, even before the expedition 
from Montreal to Albany commenced in June 1777, delays due to a lack of logistical 
support plagued the enterprise.  The British army needed to obtain over 400 horses for 
the transportation of the artillery train and 1,000 horses with 500 carts to transport 
provision and baggage from local residents.  Complicating the matters of finding these 
nearly 1,500 animals, their drivers, and the respective equipment for carts and 
harnesses, plans also had to be made for the management and orderly transportation of 
such a force.	  	  It already being June, each day without horses and without transporting 
the army through the wilderness was one less day that military action could be taken 
during the campaign season.  Indeed, if an expedition was going to take place during 
this year, horses would have to be acquired locally. Writing to England for the animals, 
waiting for 1,500 horses to be gathered, and finally for them to be transported across the 
Atlantic would consume most of the summer. Finally, on June 7, corvee laborers with 
their carriages, carts, and horse teams were procured to transport the baggage for the 
army.   
However, as the army was delayed for approximately one week after setting out 
from their winter quarters, it meant that one week’s worth of provisions was drawn by 
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the troops.  This included flour, bread, and alcohol for over 20,000 individuals removed 
from the stores of the quartermaster.  Further, many of these supplies could not be 
procured locally by the British army.  Much of the food, supplies, tents, and uniforms 
had been sent from Europe and could not be replaced except by trans-Atlantic journey.  
This delay—combined with several others throughout the duration of this expedition—
would be detrimental to the overall success of the mission as Burgoyne’s European-
style war machine, in the face of the unforgiving landscape of the Northeast 
Borderlands, broke down.
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Chapter 5  
“I myself felt humiliation until I considered that those advantages  
proceeded from the nature of the country”: 
Wilderness’ Victory at Saratoga1 
In 1780 General John Burgoyne set out on a public relations campaign in London 
to clear his reputation from the disastrous campaign that he had led in North America 
in 1777.  Largely as a result of his surrender, France had joined the war as public allies 
with the American cause, which transformed an obnoxious civil war within the thirteen 
United Colonies into an international struggle against a leading European super power.  
Burgoyne desperately sought to restore his honor before the public and among his 
peers in Parliament.  He sought to convince his countrymen that the local people, local 
environments, and local circumstances were to blame for his failure in the Northeastern 
Borderlands.  He cast the blame for the expedition’s failure upon the unwillingness of 
Canadiens to support British armed forces (either as militiamen or as corvee laborers), 
the tendency for indigenous allies (as well as Canadiens and other provincial soldiers) to 
desert the army and retreat to their homes, and the scarcity of provisions for his large 
army in crossing the wilderness.2  Further exacerbating matters were terrible weather, 
contrary winds, the challenges of the poorly-charted landscape, and dangerous and 
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eroded roads.3  For Burgoyne, these problems proved insurmountable. They occurred 
even before the expedition began its long march to Albany as the refusal of local 
support was compounded by what famed military theorist Carl von Clauswitz later 
identified as the chances of war.   
Similar to Burgoyne himself, the scholarly literature on the British invasion of 
New York in summer 1777 has been primarily interested in explaining the British 
failure. Some historians blame Governor Carleton’s lack of control over the subjects of 
his colony to provide essential war material for Burgoyne’s expedition. Others argue 
that it was the amount and type of artillery carried, especially when combined with the 
superfluous baggage transported by the officer corps that that slowed his advance and 
caused the failure.4 However, recent scholarship has focused more criticism on Lord 
George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who helped to design the North 
American strategy in 1777 with Burgoyne.  Germain also played an instrumental role in 
replacing Carleton as the expedition’s commander with Burgoyne after consulting with 
him in London in the winter of 1776 – 1777.  Of course, the US literature on the topic has 
traditionally sought a hero who stymied the British once the Battle of Saratoga was 
underway.  Most have praised, as with the invasion of Canada in 1775, Benedict 
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Arnold’s leadership on the battlefield as well as his reckless abandon and 
contumaciousness in the face of General Horatio Gates’ orders.5  
What the standard histories of the conflict consistently fail to recognize is the 
agency of local people, whether they be Canadien, indigenous, or United Colonists.  
Furthermore, the role of the environment, something that Burgoyne recognized as a key 
determinant in the failure of his expedition, is obscured in military histories that treat 
the landscape as merely a backdrop on which events take place.  This chapter argues, as 
did Burgoyne in his defense before Parliament in 1780, that local people, local 
environments, and local circumstances were the major causal forces shaping the 
outcome of Burgoyne’s expedition from Montreal to Albany in 1777. 
Burgoyne Courts Indigenous Allies 
On June 21, 1777, after varied logistical delays, General Burgoyne encamped at 
the Bouquet River to hold a conference with the Iroquois in an attempt to garner their 
friendship. He asked them to support his expedition to Albany, and, especially, to assist 
in the campaign against the United Colonies.  Governor-General Carleton had already 
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made inroads with several indigenous tribes in Canada and obtained pledges from a 
total of 500 warriors from the tribes of St. Regis, Sault St. Louis, Lake of the Two 
Mountains, and St. Francis.6   
In addition to gaining warriors, scouts, and guides for his expedition, in his 
oration to the Iroquois, Burgoyne also laid out the rules for what he considered to be 
civilized and gentlemanly warfare.  In battle, Burgoyne forbade the killing of women, 
children, and the elderly.  He also regulated the collection of war trophies and scalps.  
He stated that no person shall be scalped that was not killed by an indigenous person in 
a fair military engagement.  The wounded were not to be scalped nor to be dispatched 
in order to be scalped.  Additionally, Burgoyne demanded that no violence be 
perpetrated by his indigenous allies outside of standard European-style military 
encounters.7  
One Iroquois chief rose and noted the nature of the diplomatic and military 
struggle in the Northeast Borderlands, stating that the Continental Congress had 
attempted to sway their allegiance from their “British father” with orations and trade 
goods.  However, due to the “love” of King George III and their long-standing alliance 
with the British, his people were ready to make war against the American army and 
those residing in the region that supported the rebel cause.  He noted that the Iroquoian 
“hatchets have been sharped upon [their] affections” to the Crown.8   
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Upon gaining the allegiance of these warriors General Burgoyne issued a 
proclamation to those in the United Colonies that he would unleash a ferocious war 
upon their army, their militias, and their communities.  He exclaimed that his soldiers 
had set forth from Montreal with the intent of restoring the British constitution to the 
colonies and preventing the “arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, [and] 
persecution and torture” that British colonists suffered at the tyrannous hands of the 
Continental Congress and their agents.  He then issued a veiled threat to the provincials 
living in the region: 
[To] the domestick, the industrious, the infirm, and even the timid 
inhabitants I am desirous to protect provided they remained quietly in 
their houses, that they do not suffer their Cattle to be removed, not their 
Corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed, that they do not break up their 
Bridges and Roads; nor by any other acts directly or indirectly endeavor to 
obstruct the operations of the Kings Troops, or supply or assist those of 
the Enemy. 
 
He went on to promise that “every species of Provision brought to my Camp will be 
paid for at an equitable rate in solid Coin.”9 
Burgoyne threatened that provincial colonists who failed to follow such conduct 
would force him to,  
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give stretch to the Indian Forces under my direction, and they amount to 
Thousands, to overtake the harden’d Enemies of Great Britain and 
America…wherever they may lurk.  If notwithstanding these endeavours, 
and sincere inclinations to effect them, the phrenzy of hostility shou’d 
remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted in the Eyes of God & Men in 
denouncing and executing the vengeance of the state against the wilful 
outcasts.10 
 
Several of Burgoyne’s motivations emerge in this proclamation.  The first, and most 
obvious, is that Burgoyne realized the power of employing indigenous people in a 
colonial war.  Drawing on the long history of borderlands conflict over the duration of 
the colonial period, Burgoyne understood that colonists feared indigenous warfare.   
 Less obvious is Burgoyne’s understanding that he would likely need to rely on 
the agricultural production of local people to provide his army with livestock, forage, 
and other foodstuffs during the campaign.  Trying to draw a contrast with the 
Continental army, which, at times, offered paper currency of questionable value for 
supplies, Burgoyne appealed to material self-interest by offering hard money as well as 
lawful allegiance. Further understanding the agency that local people could wield in an 
arduous expedition, Burgoyne appealed to provincials in the area to keep the roads and 
bridges intact.  Knowing that local people understood the landscape best, as well as the 
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best routes to traverse the terrain, he feared the consequences of the destruction of 
strategic infrastructure in the borderlands between Montreal and Albany.   
In England, there were mixed reactions to Burgoyne’s use of the Iroquois to 
coerce colonists into submission.  Edmund Burke poked fun at Burgoyne’s oratory to 
the indigenous leaders at Bouquet, lampooning him as a lion keeper during a riot at a 
London zoo.  Burke envisaged Burgoyne throwing “the dens of wilds beasts” wide 
open to appeal to the “gentle lions,” “humane bears,” and “tender-hearted hyenas” to 
“go forth” on a mission against the Americans.  Burgoyne then naively reminded the 
beasts that they were “Christians, and member[s] of a civilized society,” and it was of 
the utmost of importance that they “take care not to hurt any man, woman, or child!”11  
In essence, Burke felt that Burgoyne’s reliance on indigenous people was a dangerous 
game that, in the end, would prove to be a liability to his expedition.  
In the United Colonies, however, the response to Burgoyne’s use of indigenous 
allies mixed fear and anger.  Burgoyne, who understood the power that indigenous 
people held over colonial frontiers, devised a scheme to wage psychological warfare 
against the Continental army, the militia charged with defending the Northeastern 
Borderlands, and the provincials who lived there.  In an open letter to the United 
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Colonies he offered his protection to the provincials of the region as long as they hid 
quietly in their homesteads and did not allow the Continental army to obtain or destroy 
their livestock, vegetables, or forage. However, those who assisted the Continental 
army, either directly or indirectly, would feel his wrath.  He took special note to address 
those who felt they were out of his reach due to “their distance from the immediate 
situation of [his] camp.”  He threatened that he “have but to give stretch to the Indian 
forces under [his] direction” numbering in the “thousands” and any “Enemies of Great 
Britain and America, [which he] consider[s] the same” would be overrun.12   The British 
soldiers and officers serving under Burgoyne, however, understood his point and the 
usefulness of indigenous peoples quite clearly.  Lieutenant William Digby noted that 
the indigenous “custom of scalping” appeared “cruel and barbarous” as well as 
“shocking” to Europeans and Euro-Americans.13 
In fact, to those living in the United Colonies, Burgoyne’s use of indigenous 
people, Canadiens, and German mercenaries made the British army seem like a foreign 
invading force rather than merely a parent disciplining an errant child, as British and 
loyalist propaganda portrayed.  The disdain and perceived immorality of waging this 
type of warfare against the United Colonies is seen in the Declaration of Independence 
where Jefferson complained of the King of England “transporting large Armies of 
foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny” and 
setting loose “on the inhabitants of [American] frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, 
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whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 
conditions.”14 Here, in 1776, the Continental Congress repudiated military tactics similar 
to those utilized by Burgoyne in 1777, to justify to the rest of Western society the 
necessity of becoming an independent nation to free itself from British tyranny.   
Those with an ardent resolve against Burgoyne made fun of his use of 
indigenous peoples as well as his bombastic warning to the colonists of the region.  In a 
letter addressed to the general, one colonist wrote that “the mountains shook before 
thee, and the trees of the forest bowed their leafy heads.  The vast Lakes of the north 
were chilled at thy presence, and the mighty cataracts stopped their tremendous career 
and were suspended in awe at thy approach.”  Here, the author satirically proclaims 
that even the natural environment quivered at the thought of the great John Burgoyne 
advancing into the colony of New York.  The author continued, reasserting Burgoyne’s 
claim that his goal was to restore “the rights of the Constitution to a forward, stubborn 
generation. And it is for this, oh! Sublime, Lieut Genl! That you have given yourself the 
trouble to cross the wide Atlantic, and with incredible fatigue traversed uncultivated 
wilds; and we ungratefully refused the profered blessing?”  Finally, the author shames 
Burgoyne’s use of indigenous allies, stating that “to restore the rights of the 
Constitution you have called together an amiable host of savages and turned them loose 
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to scalp our women and children and lay our country waste.”15  Rather than cause the 
colonists to cower in their homes, Burgoyne hardened their resolve against what was 
perceived as further British tyranny.   
 ‘The Country Being but Little Altered since its First State of Nature’: Learning to 
Soldier in the Borderlands16 
 
 Burgoyne carefully assessed how best to command troops in the specific 
environmental and military conditions of North America, and from the beginning of his 
tenure in the colony of Canada he stressed mobility and flexibility to overcome the 
obstacles that fighting in the Northeastern Borderlands presented.  He asserted that the 
light infantry should be increased dramatically for agile maneuvering and that these 
troops should become the standard military unit that the British army organized itself 
around.17  When attacking strongpoints, artillery would be utilized to dislodge the rebels 
from their defensive positions, and then the light infantry would combine firepower 
and shock tactics to execute the final decisive blow.18  Seeing the British army struggle in 
the unsettled landscapes of North America, Burgoyne drew upon his successful 
experience as a light cavalry commander in Portugal during the Seven Years’ War and 
postulated how cavalry tactics could be adapted to the situation in the Northeast.   
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Carleton and Burgoyne, from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby, of 
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16 Digby Journal, 165. 
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  Light infantry units during the eighteenth century were comprised of smaller more 
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and utilized irregular ranks to fight independently and ahead of the main line. 
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 The soldiers and officers on the expedition from Montreal to Albany also thought 
about the unique terrains and climes of the Northeast Borderlands.  Having to serve in 
often adverse conditions against an unforgiving environment they knew best the 
travails and drudgery in wilderness landscapes. Lieutenant Digby noted,  
the idea of service to those who have not had an opportunity of seeing 
any, may induce them to believe the only hardship a soldier endures on a 
campaign is the danger attending an action, but there are many others, 
perhaps not so dangerous, yet, in my opinion, very near disagreeable,—
remaining out whole nights under rain and almost frozen with cold, with 
very little covering, perhaps without being able to light a fire; [due to] 
fearing the enemy’s discovering the post.19 
 
In this passage Digby explains that battle was relatively rare in military service, 
and that altercations against a natural enemy were most prevalent for soldiers in 
the American War for Independence.20  Harsh weather, inclement temperatures, a 
lack of supplies, and fear of ambuscade by the enemy in the howling wilderness 
remained omnipresent in soldiers’ daily perceptions.  
 One officer noted that in open-field combat British military training and 
tactics reigned supreme over the ragtag fighting force of the rebels.  However, in 
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  For more on the rarity of battle during the American Revolution, see James Kirby 
Martin ed. Ordinary Courage: The Revolutionary War Adventures of Joseph Plumb Martin 
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the wilderness, American soldiers and militiamen had the advantage because 
they were “fitted by Disposition, and practiced for the stratagems, and 
Enterprises of little War.”21  Thus, the British had to adapt their style of warfare to 
the borderland landscape.  The officer continued stating that on their march, 
“detachments are constantly to fortify in the best manner the circumstances of 
the place, and the implements at hand will permit felling Trees with their points 
outward” and “breast works of Earth and Timber are generally to be effected in 
short time.”  He went on to warn that “neither the Distance of Camps nor the 
interference of Forests and Rivers are to be looked upon as securities against 
their attempts” and that supreme caution must be exercised “in, or near Woods 
to place advanced Centinels, where they may have a tree, or some other defense 
to prevent their being taken off by signal [single] Marksmen.”22  Clearly, the 
physical setting demanded martial adjustments, especially in response to the 
unique and rigorous demands of the Northeast Borderlands. 
 Many European and American soldiers learned about survival in the wilderness 
from indigenous guides.  Lieutenant Digby noted one remedy for scurvy he learned 
during the borderlands expedition, “the tree spruce, which grows there in great plenty, 
as indeed in most parts of America, is an excellent antiscorbutic, and when made into 
beer is far from a disagreeable flavour.”23  Soldiers also learned new techniques for how 
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to navigate through an unsettled landscape and to track individuals and armies through 
the woods. One officer expressed amazement at indigenous peoples’ ability to traverse 
the wilderness: 
they carefully observe the trees, especially the tall pines, which are for the 
most part void of foliage, on the branches that are exposed to the north 
wind, the trunk on that side having the bark extremely rugged, by which 
they ascertain the direction to be taken; and for the more easy discovery of 
their way back again, their tomahawks are continually blazing the trees, 
which is cutting off a small piece of the bark, and as they march along 
they break down the underwood.  
  
Further, “they are possessed of a sagacity equally astonishing, for they will discern by 
the footsteps, that to use [you?] would appear extremely confused, nearly the number 
of men” that passed through.”24  Travelling alongside indigenous guides, the soldiers on 
the expedition clearly learned valuable skills to navigate and survive in the wilderness 
of the Northeast.   
 Burgoyne’s march through the borderlands from Montreal, although not 
completely isolated due to being broken up by forts and small frontier settlements or 
trading posts, posed dire challenges.  The rudimentary roads and communications that 
had been used by the rebels in their own journey north from Fort Ticonderoga and Fort 
George were in great disrepair—often due to purposeful destruction by the rebels 
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during their retreat—and in many cases, Burgoyne’s expedition had to cut and build 
roads through dense forests.  The soldiers were assailed by swamps, fallen trees, 
thickets of brush, and steep ravines, all which required intense labor to overcome.  In 
the portion of the expedition from Fort Ticonderoga to Fort Edward alone (about 50 
miles), the soldiers, corvee laborers, and contractors built over forty bridges and created 
corduroy roads to traverse, even over swamps, the largest of which was over two miles 
in length.  Burgoyne noted that “it was attended with great labour” and that the 
creation of such a military infrastructure in the wilderness meant that the “troops were 
improved in the very essential point of wood service.”25 
 Despite learning all that they could about soldiering in the cultural and 
environmental landscapes of the Northeast and adapting their methods of waging war 
against both human and natural enemies, British and German troops still largely 
viewed the environments that they traversed as impenetrable.  In fact, while travelling 
through the colony of Canada into the Lake Champlain region of Vermont, Captain 
Georg Pausch, the head of the Hanau Artillery stationed in North America, noted that 
each boat in the combined British forces used a Canadien pilot at the helm.26  In fact, 
without the aid of a local guide that understood how to navigate the Northeast 
Borderlands, one unit became entirely lost on the Richelieu River. Unable to find their 
winter encampment, the officers ordered the craft to drift from island to island looking 
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for a sign to help them recover.  Despair and terror set in as one of the commanding 
officers died from dysentery while encamped on one of these small islands.  After they 
had lost all hope, several Canadiens with bateaux and canoes found the men and guided 
them to the Isle aux Noix.  From there, with the assistance of local guides, they found 
their way to St. Johns and then rendezvoused with Captain Pausch at Longueil for their 
wintering assignment.27 
 Indeed, for most of the soldiers the forested landscapes were unnavigable 
without indigenous guides.  One soldier noted that “it is surprising with what a degree 
of certainty an Indian will make his way from one country to another through the 
thickest of woods allowing the sun to be constantly hid from his sight.” Europeans who 
were “not used to such a country would soon be lost, and the more attempts made to 
extricate himself, perhaps, would only serve to entangle him the deeper.”28 British 
officers relied heavily on indigenous peoples, convinced that  it’s the forested landscape 
was impenetrable without this assistance.  
The Murder of Jane McCrea: Identity and Insecurity in the Borderlands 
 
As the combined Anglo-German force made its way through the wilderness 
between Montreal and Albany, the indigenous allies on the expedition made scouting 
advances into local communities to ascertain the activities of militias, to assess the 
provisions and supplies available, and, in some cases, to bring loyalists into the 
encampment of the British army to assist the expedition.  During one of these 
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excursions, things went terribly wrong for one young woman and also, by extension, 
for General Burgoyne’s entire campaign. 
The accounts of Jane McCrea’s life, death, and family are as varied as the diaries, 
letters, and memorials written about her. [See Appendix F for a sensationalistic painting 
of her death, much later copied as a popular engraving] One British officer described 
McCrea as being eighteen years of age with an amicable personality. Her parents were 
rebels, but she was engaged to marry a provincial officer in the British army. These 
accounts state that she was staying with a loyalist neighbor awaiting an indigenous 
escort to the British lines where she would marry David Jones, a member of the loyalist 
militia.29  
McCrea lived with her brother John in a small community near Saratgoa when 
she fell in love with Jones.  At the outbreak of the war her brother joined the American 
cause and volunteered to serve for the United Colonies.  Her fiancée, along with other 
loyalists in the community, fled to the Canada to assist the British in quelling the 
opposition.  Much like the location of her home, McCrea’s life was caught in the 
crossroads of the Northeastern Borderlands.  This was a place where allegiances and 
identities remained fluid, and a place where local peoples and local environments 
played instrumental roles in the unfolding drama among empire, colonies, and nation.  
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Jane decided that her best life would be lived alongside her fiancée Lieutenant Jones, so 
she took it upon herself to find him at the garrison at Fort Ticonderoga.30   
McCrea reached as far as Fort Edward and was staying at the residence of 
another loyalist by the name of Sara McNeill. By this time, Burgoyne had given the 
indigenous forces under his direction freer reign to police borderland communities.31 A 
party of indigenous men under the leadership of a Wyandot named Le Loup made a 
sortie against the small village of Argyle on July 26, 1777. Around midday, John Allen 
prepared to eat dinner with his wife, three children, his sister, and three enslaved 
people in his household. The scouting party arrived at Allen’s home and asked for some 
food.  Allen refused their appeal, and all of the household was murdered.  Several other 
townspeople, namely the Bames family and John White, fled towards the American-
held Fort Edward, but were killed on the roadside.32   The scouting party then 
ambushed American Lieutenant Tobias van Vechten and four other soldiers.33  Next, 
Jane McCrea, as well as her host, Sara McNeill, were captured and separated from one 
another.34 
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Her life, according to Digby’s account, was taken when she “fell a sacrifice to the 
savage passions of these blood thirsty monsters.”35  Another officer noted that it was by 
chance that McCrea fell in with an indigenous scouting party, and that they were going 
to usher her safely back to camp.  However, “a dispute arose between…two Indians, 
whose prisoner she was, and words growing very high, one of them, who was fearful of 
losing the reward for bringing her safe into camp, most inhumanly struck his 
tomahawk into her skull and she instantly expired.”36  
It is likely that Jones recognized McCrea’s scalp being transported through camp 
by an indigenous warrior.  Despite the lack of clarity surrounding her murder and the 
discovery of her scalp in camp, responses to it are well documented. A messenger 
relayed the news to General Burgoyne while he was encamped at Fort Anne. He sprung 
immediately from his lodgings and, along with another senior officer, General Simon 
Fraser, rode to where the indigenous allies were quartered and called their leadership 
into council.  He demanded that McCrea’s murderer be brought forward, so that he 
could be executed for his crime.37  However, the indigenous leadership refused to allow 
their warrior to be killed for waging war against frontier villages in ways that, in the 
past, Burgoyne himself had encouraged as tactics to keep his enemies at bay.  Informed 
by his French interpreter, Luc de la Corne, that he would have a massive mutiny on his 
hands, and that he would lose the invaluable assistance of the indigenous guides and 
scouts if he pushed the issue further, Burgoyne pardoned the culprit fearing “the 
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36 Thomas Anburey, Travels, 106. 
37	  Graymont, The Iroquois, 151. 
	  	  
	  
188	  
weight they would have thrown into the opposite scale, had they gone over to the 
enemy.”38  Instead of acquiescing to Burgoyne’s insistence on corporal punishment, 
indigenous leaders compelled the general to begrudgingly pardon the man for his 
crime.  In a region and in a conflict where allegiances could be fluid, the British army 
had much to lose and much to fear if the Iroquois were to fight against the crown as 
rebel allies. The patriots’ propaganda campaign against General Burgoyne noted that 
McCrea was engaged to a loyalist; however, her family were patriots and had fled the 
region in preparation of being mistreated at the hands of the British army after hearing 
of Burgoyne’s proclamation. 
 The patriots made McCrae’s death a symbol of the ferociousness of warfare in 
the borderlands.  More importantly, her death became a symbol of General Burgoyne’s 
barbarity in employing indigenous people as allies against colonists in the region.  
Burgoyne’s inability to keep his allies from murdering and scalping civilians, especially 
civilians who remained loyal to King George III, caused soldiers, subjects, and citizens 
in New York to become deeply disturbed.  If one loyal to the crown could be struck 
down in cold blood, anyone—whether patriots minding their own business, neutral 
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the Northeastern Borderlands during the eighteenth century.  St. Luc served as the 
interpreter for Louis-Joseph de Montcalm.  Due to a series of events preventing his 
return to France he settled in Montreal in 1761.  This is likely where Burgoyne found 
him and enlisted him into his service as an interpreter between him and the indigenous 
allies accompanying the journey. 
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parties in the face of the war, or even loyalists providing supplies for Burgoyne’s 
army—was at risk. 
 Provincials living in the Northeast Borderlands were sharply polarized by the 
death of Jane McCrea. Those who wished to remain neutral had a difficult choice to 
make between remaining disinterested in the face of atrocity, supporting the British as 
loyalists by throwing their lot in with the perpetrators of what was viewed as a deeply 
disturbing and barbaric action, or siding with the patriots, who seemed to be on the 
principled side of this issue. Historian Barbara Graymont notes that after the McCrea 
incident “volunteers came to Gates’s army in droves.”39  Loyalists had an even harder 
choice to make.  Should they remain loyal to the crown, in some ways condoning the 
actions taken by Burgoyne’s indigenous allies against a member of their community, or 
should they change sides and abandon their principles, despite their misgivings about 
independence and join the cause of the United Colonies against what was perceived as 
British tyranny.  The death of Jane McCrea increased support for the rebel cause and 
hardened the resolve of ardent patriots living in the region while converting many 
neutrals and loyalists to the American cause.40 
Woods Rebels and a Militarized Landscape 
Unlike most British generals, Burgoyne did not dismiss the effectiveness of the 
fighting forces of the United Colonies, including both the Continental army and the 
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  Graymont, The Iroquois, 151. In The Common Cause, Parkinson notes that played a role 
in the resurgence of the militia in the Northeast. Pancake argues that this incident 
caused the Continental regulars to turn out for Schuyler, 1777, 154. 
40	  Graymont, The Iroquois, 151; Parkinson, The Common Cause, 345. 
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rebel militias.  Tactically, he felt these soldiers utilized the natural environments in 
which they served to their highest advantage.  In wilderness landscapes, Burgoyne 
noted that “every private man was his own general, who will turn every tree and bush 
into a temporary fortress.”  Behind the cover provided by the natural landscape, rebel 
soldiers could fire their weapons with “deliberation, coolness, and certainty which 
hidden safety inspires.”  After making the shot, they then seized personal initiative and 
familiarity with the environment to stealthily move from one firing position to the 
next.41 
 By contrast, even when traversing wooded swampland on murky rutted roads, 
the British army “marched in the greatest regularity, as from intelligence received, the 
general [Burgoyne] had no doubt [that] he should be attacked on his march, our road 
leading thro. thick woods.”42 Burgoyne remained very cautious on his expedition, 
having learned during the prior year, as second-in-command under Carleton, the 
Continental army stationed scouts in the woods to fire shots at the pursuing British 
army to cover their retreat to Fort Ticonderoga. 
 Many British officers and soldiers commented on the militarization of the 
landscape by rebel fighting techniques that included “lurking parties” of Continental 
soldiers “hovering about the woods,” which gave nature a pernicious character.  One 
officer contrasted his time serving in North America during the American War for 
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Independence to fighting in the Seven Years’ War in Germany.  He noted that “this war 
is very different to the last… in this the life of an individual is sought with as much 
avidity as the obtaining a victory over an army of thousands.”43 The United Colonists’s 
adroit execution of petite guerre tactics weighed heavily on the minds of the British.  For 
the British soldiers, who were already full of consternation about an expedition into the 
howling wilderness, fear of being killed while laboring in the forests to cut trees or fix 
roads caused fear and paranoia.44 
 Once the wilderness became militarized, the British eyes began to fear the enemy 
discovering their position.  Often times they would not light a fire for cooking or for 
warmth due to “not knowing the moment of an attack; but always in expectation of 
one.” Lieutenant Digby exemplified this palpable fear of the wilderness, “we had about 
30 miles to march and for the first six, we every minute expected to be attacked, and 
which I must say we were not so well provided for.” This paranoia limited their ability 
to garner provisions from the natural environment.  Encamped a few miles from Fort 
Anne, British solders refused to drink water from a natural spring as rumors swirled 
that the rebels had somehow poisoned its source.  Only after the surgeon, Dr. Sangrado, 
tried an experiment on the water to prove it was potable, did the soldiers quench their 
thirst.45 
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In addition to fearing the militarized landscape, the British were disgusted by 
“such a cowardly and cruel manner of carrying on the war.”46  British officers ordered 
that rebels guilty of shooting officers from behind the cover of the wilderness should be 
taken alive and “spared for the hands of the hangman,” as a “soldier’s death” was “far 
too honourable for such a wretch.”47  
The rebels’ weaponization of nature slowed Burgoyne’s expedition through the 
Northeastern borderlands.  General Riedesel noted that all of the army’s marches “were 
attended with exceeding hardship, as all the roads and bridges had to be repaired, and 
we were obliged to make very cautious reconnaissances.”48  Lieutenant Digby more 
specifically highlighted the effectiveness of the Continental army in turning nature into 
an enemy.  He wrote, “we marched from Skeensborough, and tho but 15 miles to Fort 
Anne, were two days going it; as the enemy had felled large trees over the river which 
there turned so narrow as not to allow more than one battow abreast.”  On land, the 
situation was similar. With the trees felled by the retreating American soldiers, the 
British were “obliged to cut a road through the wood, which was attended with great 
fatigue and labour, for our wagons and artillery.”49 In fact, the roads were so poor and 
the paranoia about likely ambuscades so great that Burgoyne complained to Parliament 
in 1780 that the poor “situation of the transport service” meant that “the army could 
barely be victualed from day to day.”50 
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The British army seemed to work non-stop in their efforts to repair the bridges, 
destroyed roads, and ditches that the Continental army left for them during their 
retreat.  One officer noted that the army came upon a “swampy ditch” that was in need 
of repair before the army continued on its march.  The soldiers toiled expeditiously, and 
soon thereafter the army continued on its way.  However, after marching a short 
distance they “encountered another demolished bridge” that needed to be rebuilt.  
Thus, the march from Fort Ticonderoga to Saratoga commenced.   
The Continental army shrewdly delayed the advance of the British force by 
transforming an ordered landscape with roads and communications into a disordered 
and chaotic terrain that needed repair for a large army to pass.  Due to the fear that 
woods rebels lurked behind every tree in this newly militarized landscape, the British 
officers proceeded with caution.  Delays due to anxiety and delays due to the time it 
took to physically repair and reorder the landscape depleted provisions for the British 
army.  Throughout the expedition General Burgoyne expressed his misgivings about 
this situation.  The inability to build a sufficient store of provisions caused the army to 
become delayed for days at a time.  In the worst instance, the expedition halted from 
August 16 until September 13 as Burgoyne decided to sever his communication with the 
colony of Canada and bring all of his supplies to the Hudson River.51 
Despite these challenges, the British army adapted to the local landscape in ways 
similar to the Arnold expedition through the Eastern Country wilderness during its 
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invasion of Canada in 1775.  Daily rations were supplemented with local flora and 
fauna.  One officer noted that “there were many deer in the woods about, some of 
which we shot, also great flocks of wild pigeons, which, as our provisions . . . were 
almost finished, helped out his majesties allowance of beef and pork very well.”52  
Another noted that the lakes and rivers abounded “with great quantities of a variety of 
fish; sturgeon, black bass, masquenongez, pike of an incredible size, and many others, 
among which is a cat-fish” whose “flesh is fat and luscious, greatly resembling the 
flavor of an eel.”53  Though the British soldiers were unable to replace all of their daily 
allowance from local wildlife, it softened the blow of the long and difficult march.   
 ‘The Ever Prevalent Diarreah:’ Disease Cosmology and the Wilderness 
Environment54 
 
The landscape of the Northeastern Americas contained larger threats—perceived 
and real—than those of ‘woods rebels’ lurking behind every tree and crevice.  The 
climate, environs, and weather posed unique health concerns for those marching 
through the wilderness.  Sometimes these health concerns manifested themselves 
physically in the form of fevers, discharges, and diarrhea, and other times they 
manifested themselves in the form of mania and even madness. European ideas 
revolving around types of landscapes and climates played a crucial role in the everyday 
lives of soldiers during the Burgoyne expedition. 
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Frequently, the officers and soldiers complained about the heat and humidity 
during the summer and autumn march.  Camp life, with several soldiers packed in each 
tent and hundreds of tents and cooking fires crowded around one another exacerbated 
the temperature, leaving no escape from the torridity of the local climate.55  Although as 
thinly clothed as possible, the soldiers wore large baggy pants and long sleeve shirts “to 
prevent the bite of the moscheto, a small fly which was then very troublesome.”56  The 
sweltering temperatures and humidity caused fear of “fevers and fluxes,” which were 
“so common when encamped in a warm climate, and lying nights on the ground under 
heavy dew.”57  General Frederich von Riedesel additionally blamed the temperature 
and humidity for spreading eye disease.58  Further, officers noted that drills and 
rigorous and laborious tasks were “detrimental to the health of the men.”59 
Though the soldiers often blamed the dampen environment and warm humid 
climate for the fevers, such complaints generally appeared alongside comments about 
mosquitoes.  Historian J.R. McNeill argues that “where and when people congregated 
in the presence of anophelines, malaria was likely to break out.”60 Indeed, the brackish 
swamps the soldiers labored in to repair the bridges and roads destroyed by the 
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Continental army bred the insect vectors of malaria.  Mosquitoes injected the 
plasmodium parasite into the human bloodstream where it spread through the body 
causing a variety of non-descript symptoms such as fevers, chills, sweats, body aches 
and pains, general malaise, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea until the immune system 
wages its war against the assailants.  If the immune system loses the initial battle, the 
“sortie by a few dozen parasites becomes a few trillion invaders and in severe cases 
organ failure and death occurs.61  
Whether or not they realized the linkages between their ailments and the 
mosquitoes feasting upon them, one way the soldiers dealt with biting insects was to 
burn cedar.  Fredericke von Riedesel exclaimed that this practice to keep the “midges” 
away as insects cannot stand the odor of cedar as it is being burned.  However, doing so 
had its own risks as “its smoke was very injurious to the nerves, so much so, indeed, as 
to cause women with child to bring forth prematurely.”62 Thus, the Hessians were 
forced to weigh the consequences and consider their understanding of insect-borne 
illnesses and those involving cedar as a preventative. 
If the hot and humid summer was a burden, autumn brought no reprieve.  One 
evening Lieutenant Digby was “seized with a violent shivering and lightness in my 
head, which was attributed to cold, I must have got the preceeding night on guard.  
About 10 o clock I was quite delireous and out of my sense, after which I cannot tell 
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what happened.  I was blistered on my back, and all the next day continued in the same 
distracted situation.”63 It was not until “a good physician…had [him] removed into his 
tent which had a stove” that Digby recovered.64 Planning for cold weather to set in 
during the autumn evenings, the officers provided “warm clothing, such as under 
waistcoats, leggings, socks &c. &c., and smoking tobacco” as a “preservative of the 
health against dews, which arose from the many swamps and marshy, drowned lands 
that surrounded” the expedition.65 In addition to changing the clothing of the soldiers 
and having them smoke tobacco, it was felt that an exercise regimen promoted health 
and prevented sickness in the colder months.66  Further, Frederike von Riedesel 
expressed great concern to King George III regarding the cold climate of America and 
her husband’s ability to stay healthy in it.  Riedesel responded that “he was born in a 
cold clime, the cold would not trouble him.” The King agreed and added that the North 
American air remains “very healthy and clear” promoting an excellent constitution.67 
However, this proved not to be the case. General Riedesel noted in a letter to his wife 
that he “committed the blunder of leaving open the window of my sleeping room, in 
consequence of which I drew into my system a rheumatic fever.”68  
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The prevalence of disease on the expedition was remarkable.  Captain Pausch 
noted that he often had up to 30 men suffering from scurvy.69 Additionally, Fredericke 
von Riedesel, who often shared living quarters with the officers of the hospital, noted 
that all of the other rooms in the house, as well as the adjacent entry ways and hall 
ways, were filled with soldiers suffering from “camp sickness,” which she related to a 
“type of dysentery.”70  In another incident, she bunked in the cellar of a house with 
several camp followers, the servants of officers, and wounded soldiers.  Due to the 
unwillingness to leave the cellar from fear of exacerbating their sickness by further 
expose to nature, throughout the night individuals evacuated bodily fluids where they 
stood.  This, combined with the pungent odor of festering wounds, created “a 
horrendous stench” that overwhelmed von Riedesel and disrupted her sleep.  The next 
day she ousted everyone from the cellar and organized a cleaning crew to remove the 
effluent that she feared would cause sickness.  She then “fumigated” the basement by 
“sprinkling vinegar on burning coals.”71 For Europeans such as Riedesel, getting rid of 
odors and smoking out miasmas promoted good health.  Although their technical 
understanding of sickness was rudimentary, their approach to disease management 
was often effective. 
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For example, one officer, an adjutant of General Phillips, was shot through both 
cheeks with a small musket ball which shattered his teeth and grazed his tongue.  
Unable to eat solid food, he was forced to subsist on broth and other liquids.  Fredericke 
Reidesel, thinking that acidity would clean out the wound and prevent infection, gave 
him a bottle of wine.  He held some in the bottom of his mouth to soak his wounds, and, 
according to Riedesel, this remedy led to a full recovery.72     
In addition, many army hospitals were filled with patients being treated for 
mental illness.  According to the European disease cosmology of the eighteenth century, 
spending time in swampy, humid environments could cause a variety of illnesses.73  The 
mental stress of being overwhelmed by a militarized natural landscape could cause 
physical sickness.  Fredericke von Riedesel noted on at least one occasion that her 
husband became sick due to distress.74   However, much of the time, the inability for 
soldiers to cope with the rigors of military service and their disease cosmology of the 
landscape manifested in mental illness. 
Captain Pausch noted that doctors in the military hospitals informed him that 
patients “talked day and night of fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, cousins, and 
aunts—besides, also talking over and repeating all kinds of…deviltry—calling now this 
one, and now that one by his baptismal name until they had to stop for actual want of 
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breath!”  They also relayed to Pausch that the only cure for this mental disease was 
“peace” and “comfort,” and accordingly the Captain attempted to soothe the sick 
soldiers of his company daily.75  He went on to say that those soldiers who are “alive 
and well” formed close relationships with the Canadien girls and women and found 
“plenty of solace” in this companionship.76  Here, relationships between the nurses of 
the military hospitals and the soldiers suffering from mania and madness, seemed to 
heal their ailments, at least long enough for them to be discharged and brought back 
into the service.  The presentation of these forms of mental illness, combined with the 
relief brought by a trigger-free environment, suggests the stress brought on by the 
militarized landscape, where woods rebels, sickness, climate, weather, and military 
combat could all be lethal.   
St. Leger’s Expedition 
 
Much like the invasion of Canada by the Continental army in 1775, the British 
attack on New York from Canada was designed to be a three-pronged invasion.  
General Burgoyne would enter through Lake Champlain while a force commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Barrimore “Barry” St. Leger would sweep further to the southwest 
through Oswego. St. Leger’s expedition aimed to bolster loyalist and indigenous 
support—as well as to provide cover for Burgoyne’s eventual march to Albany.   
The St. Leger expedition was unique in that the preponderance of its soldiers 
were not British regulars, but were local people from Canada and, New York and 
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indigenous people primarily from Iroquoia.  On July 25, a mixed army of 300 British 
regulars, 80 Hessians, 650 Canadien and loyalist militiamen, and 1,000 indigenous 
warriors marched towards the American-held garrison of Fort Stanwix.  Included in the 
party was John Butler, a prominent loyalist who knew several Iroquoian languages and 
built a relationship with the Haudenosaunee in the fur trade, Mohawk military and 
political leader Thayendanegea (Joseph Brant), Kaiiontw’kon (Cornplanter), a Seneca 
war chief and diplomat, and Sayenqueraghta (Old Smoke), a Seneca war chief and 
veteran of Pontiac’s War (1763-1766) that defeated the British at the Battle of Devil’s 
Hole. 
 Much like Burgoyne’s expedition, St. Leger’s found that the rebel army had 
militarized the landscape by felling trees across water passages to prevent easy 
mobility.77  The lieutenant-colonel sent a small party to harass the American forces 
situated nearby while the preponderance of his force cleared the trees to transport his 
artillery. Due to this delay, and intelligence received from the Oneida, the rebel 
commander at Fort Stanwix, Colonel Peter Gansevoort, received reinforcements as well 
as a bateaux full of provisions, giving him 6-weeks worth of supplies to ride out a 
British siege.78  
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On August 2, St. Leger engaged Fort Stanwix without his artillery or the 
preponderance of his regulars or militiamen, as they were ensnared by the militarized 
landscape.79  Thus, 250 of the combined British forces along with the nearly 1,000 
Iroquoian warriors encircled the fort.  On August 5, several Mohawk messengers 
arrived in the British camp and relayed an urgent message from Konwatsi’tsiaenni 
(Molly Brant), a Mohawk leader and sister to Thayendanegea, that the rebel militia and 
a group of Oneida warriors under the command of Nicholas Herkimer from Tyron 
County, New York, was enroute to relieve the garrison at Fort Stanwix.80 
Aware of the impending perilous condition if Herkimer were to arrive while 
most of his infantry and all of his artillery were entangled in the brush and trees of 
Gansevoort’s abbatises, St. Leger dispatched most of the Iroquois and a small number of 
loyalist rangers to ambush the rebel militia. On August 6, near Oriskany Creek, the 
loyalist, Mohawk, and Seneca forces decimated the 700 militiamen and 100 Oneida 
under Herkimer.  The patriots rallied and hand-to-hand fighting with hatchets, 
tomahawks, bayonets, and other weapons raged on for several hours. Neighbors often 
recognized one another in the storm of bullets and blades, increasing the personal 
nature of the conflict and raising the level of brutality as individuals punched, clubbed, 
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stabbed, and maimed one another.  In the end the mixed British force inflicted nearly 
500 casualties while suffering approximately 90 of their own. 
 Weeks later, a Continental army relief column led by now General Benedict 
Arnold marched through the area and was assailed by a grisly scene, as none of the 
fallen soldiers had been buried.81  Using counter-intelligence measures Arnold was able 
to relay to St. Leger’s camp an exaggerated figure of the troops he was bringing to Fort 
Stanwix with.  Upon hearing this, the British and Iroquois, who were at extremely low 
morale after the casualties suffered at Oriskany, abandoned their siege of the fort and 
fled to Quebec.82 
The battles at Fort Stanwix and Oriskany epitomize the breakdown of 
accommodation in the Northeast Borderlands as loyalist and patriot neighbors engaged 
one another in a brutal bloodbath of hand-to-hand combat.  Further, these battles 
marked a distinct divide in the Iroquois Confederacy with the Onedia allying with the 
patriot militia and the Mohawk and Seneca warriors waiting in ambush in friendship 
with the loyalists.  This shows that both Euro-Americans and indigenous people made 
choices in the face of a military conflict that transcended their identities as residents of 
New York, Tyron County, or as members of the Iroquois Confederacy.  
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The European War Machine Breaks Down: The Battle of Bennington 
 From its commencement, a foreshadowing of doom loomed over Burgoyne’s 
expedition due to logistical issues. Despite his calls to increase the amount of light 
cavalry to make the army more agile and his understanding of the need to be flexible 
and mobile, Burgoyne did not lighten the army’s load.  The artillery train itself, 
consisting of 138 pieces of cannon with the accompanying equipment to besiege a 
fortress, required 1,500 horses and hundreds of carriages and drivers.  These field 
pieces, Burgoyne argued, were necessary to rout the rebels from their fortifications and 
to defend these assets once they were acquired.  After one month of trying to gather 
horses and drivers under contract for his expedition, Burgoyne only secured 400 horses 
and 500 wagons—just of 25% of the amount required for the artillery alone.  It is likely 
Burgoyne estimated that any remaining horses, drivers, and other things needed would 
be provided through corvee labor.  In addition to the cumbersome task of transporting 
the provisions, tents, gear, and armaments for the soldiers, the official reports for the 
Burgoyne expedition stated that 225 women and 500 children followed the army from 
Canada to Saratoga.  In fact, one report claimed the number of camp followers as high 
as 2,000.83  With the addition of camp followers, laborers, and indigenous allies, 
Burgoyne’s expedition at times neared 20,000 individuals.  
 Such large numbers traversing through the militarized wilderness, oftentimes 
the expedition stalled as it waited for the arrival of essential supplies.  In retrospect, 
Burgoyne noted that for every hour that a general spent pondering and planning the 
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military stratagems that his force would use in battle, he devoted twenty other hours  to 
evaluating how the army would eat.84  Burgoyne’s travails about feeding his men 
started almost as soon as the expedition commenced.  As early as July 10, one officer of 
the 47th British Regiment noted that his “corps (under Brigadier General Fraser) has the 
further merit of having supported fatigue, and Bad weather without Bread and without 
murmur.”85  As the expedition crossed into New York, Burgoyne’s supply lines 
extended further away from its resource base, and at times the general was only able to 
muster enough food forward each day to allow the soldiers to draw their daily rations.  
Thus, his quartermaster was unable to stockpile provisions nor was the British army 
able to advance.86 
Exacerbating matters, Burgoyne eschewed a strategy of establishing fortifications 
along the Hudson River to keep in communication with Fort George, Fort Ticonderoga, 
and Canada.  He feared that by taking the time and resources to establish these 
fortifications and to garrison them that his main force would be too depleted.  In the 
most extreme example, army was delayed from August 16 until September 13 as 
Burgoyne waited for communications and supply lines to be dissolved and supplies 
brought to the main guard of the army.  Afterwards, Burgoyne crossed the Hudson 
River with forty days’ provisions for his soldiers and artillery.87 
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  From nearly the beginning of the American Revolution, the United Colonies 
stored military supplies at various places where they could be easily accessed by the 
Continental army or local militias.88 As the action throughout New England and New 
York intensified, these outposts moved further towards the Northeastern Borderlands, 
both to meet the threat of an invasion from the colony of Canada and to prevent these 
depots of war material from falling into the hands of the British.  Bennington, Vermont, 
situated to the east of Albany and Saratoga, became one of these important supply posts 
in the borderlands.   
 Thus, while short on provisions and in need of war material to support a major 
engagement in or near Albany, General Burgoyne cast his eye on Bennington.  Though 
there were many things that he desperately needed from the raid, the most pressing 
was horses and forage to support them.  Further, provisions were running short as the 
many delays effected by the militarization of the wilderness landscape.  The amount of 
time Burgoyne spent repairing roads, clearing trees, and building bridges did not allow 
a stockpile of food, as soldiers consuming it as it arrived.  He needed to procure 
provisions from local people to mount a successful attack against the American army.  
Burgoyne ordered a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Baum to encourage loyalists 
to join his ranks and also to overwhelm them and destroy the enemy’s supply lines.89   
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 The first enemy encountered by Baum was not the local militia protecting the 
supply depot at Bennington.  Instead, the British detachment faced a natural enemy on 
August 15, 1777, as a severe storm delayed their advance and required entrenchment in 
a defensive position until the weather cleared up.  This delay allowed John Stark, a 
brigadier-general in the New Hampshire militia, to return from an expedition near 
Albany to reinforce Bennington and prepare for the assault.  That evening, a militia 
regiment from the Berkshires further bolstered Starks numbers.90 
 By the morning of August 16, Stark’s force had swelled to 1,600.  Wishing to take 
Baum by surprise after the storm delayed his advance on Bennington, Stark used the 
cover of the forested landscape to encircle the British forces in a three-pronged attack 
with two detachments flanking to the left and right of Baum’s position on a hill while 
Stark led the frontal assault to distract the British from the flanking maneuvers.  
Although the operation began in the morning, the sodden ground caused the flanking 
maneuver to take several hours.  
 During this time, another detachment from the British force under  
Colonel Heinrich von Breyman was dispatched to assist Baum with his assault.  
However, lack of food and forage finally caught up with Burgoyne’s army.  While 
transporting two field pieces through the swampy and rolling terrain between Fort 
Edward and Bennington, Breyman’s horses collapsed.  Breyman himself claimed, in his 
defense for not arriving at Bennington in a timely fashion, that lack of forage had 
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caused the horses to give out.  Further exacerbating matters, his unfamiliarity with the 
terrain and lack of indigenous guides caused his detachment to become lost for several 
hours.91 
 By the end of the day’s fighting, the American militia reigned victorious over the 
British at Bennington.  Breyman’s force made it to Bennington, but as Burgoyne later 
explained, “the succor arrived too late.”92 It was poor intelligence combined with an 
environment that proved to be more of a natural enemy than a natural ally that caused 
Baum’s defeat.  During Baum’s delay Bennington was reinforced.  Local people and the 
local environment were instrumental in shaping the battle of Bennington and the 
patriot victory.   
The victories at Bennington and Fort Stanwix combined with the outbreak of 
civil war at Oriskany to demoralize Burgoyne’s troops.  After these defeats, the Canadien 
militia, as well as the indigenous guides and allies decided that the risks were too great 
and the rewards were too little, and they began to desert the British army at alarming 
rates.  On August 22, a scalp bounty was issued by Burgoyne offering “20 Dollars for 
ev’ry Deserter, they shall bring in and in case any Deserters should be killed in the 
pursuit, their scalps are to be brought off.”93 In the state of near desperation after the 
losses at Stanwix and Bennington, Burgoyne had two options: to turn around and 
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regroup his fighting force in Canada for an expedition the following season or to press 
forward in an attempt to reach Albany with a decisive military action against the 
Continental army.  He chose the latter. 
Saratoga and its Aftermath 
 The disruption of Burgoyne’s war machine by the wilderness was compounded 
by the failures to secure provisions at Bennington and the inability of St. Leger to siege 
Fort Stanwix. These incidences, combined with the massacre of Jane McCrea, became 
rallying cries for the United Colonies and bolstered the patriots’ cause.  Militiamen and 
Continental soldiers alike poured in from the communities surrounding the 
Northeastern Borderlands to aid the Continental army.94 
 Knowing that Burgoyne’s army was approaching her home in Schuylerville, 
New York, Catherine Schuyler, wife of Continental army General Philip Schuyler, raced 
from Albany to gather family valuables that would likely be looted or destroyed by 
British forces.  When she arrived at home she prioritized what needed to be saved and 
loaded her carriage with these keepsakes.  While executing this difficult task, she 
received an express letter from her husband requesting that she raze the crops and burn 
the wheat on their farm to prevent it from falling into the quartermaster stores of the 
British army.  General Schuyler also noted in his express that the Continental army 
lacked horses.  Catherine Schuyler burned the wheat field, dispersed their horses, and 
transported the family valuables in a cart drawn by a team of oxen.95   
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 After the failure to secure supplies at Bennington, the British army approached 
Saratoga with severely diminished provisions. Mrs. Schuyler’s militarization of her 
family’s estate must have further crushed the soldiers’ and officers’ morale t.  Catherine 
Schuyler’s war upon the land denied something far more valuable to the British than 
the goods she carted off in her wagon.  She denied them essential means to subsist for 
the duration during of the campaign season of 1777. 
The first Battle of Saratoga, known as the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, began on 
September 19, 1777.  Captain Daniel Morgan, who had led the first detachment of 
soldiers during the march through the Maine wilderness in 1775, led the patriot 
advance up the Hudson River.  Henry Dearborn, who accompanied Morgan two years 
prior to Quebec, was hand-selected by him as an officer in New York.96  During the 
height of the action, General Burgoyne ordered the Brunswickers under General 
Riedesel to create a diversion by marching under the loud beat of drums and cheering 
to attack the enemy’s right flank. However, the terrain surrounding this section of the 
Continental army’s line prevented Riedesel’s maneuver.  The rebel forces abutted their 
right with dense swampy forested landscape. [For a battle map of the British army’s 
position at Saratoga see Appendix G] 
The German infantry sent scouts through a cornfield under fire from the 
Continental army to attempt to find another route to flank their line.  In an attempt to 
assist Riedesel’s action, Captain Pausch had his artillerymen drag their cannon up a hill 
to get a better vantage point and use their high ground to fire upon the enemy line.  
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Harried by grapeshot, the Continental army retreated into the woods to prevent further 
casualties. In the meantime, the American left wing held strong under the leadership of 
General Benedict Arnold and several of his ablest officers from the 1775 – 1776 
campaign in Canada: Daniel Morgan, Henry Dearborn, and Enoch Poor.  Fifteen 
minutes later, darkness set in and the battlefield became quiet.97 The British achieved 
victory at the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, but it was at a great cost, and they failed to rout 
the rebel army from their superior position.  Indeed, Burgoyne’s troops remained 
unable to reconnoiter the Continental army’s camps or entrenchments due to the dense 
forests and swampland separating the two forces.98 
At daybreak on September 20, Burgoyne ordered a resumption of the fighting. 
To make sure the soldiers took to the field as early as possible, daily rations were given 
out early in the morning as was powder and shot. These preparations were carried out 
amidst a dense morning fog that had blanketed the encampment and battlefield.  
Everything was set in motion, and Burgoyne ordered his men to be ready to commence 
fighting as soon as the fog lifted.  However, the morning fog did not disappear. The 
exhilaration from the prior afternoon’s engagement began to wane, and the soldiers’ 
adrenaline rush turned into fatigue. By Burgoyne decided to delay his attack.  Once 
again the chances of war and the agency of the environment delayed Burgoyne’s army.99 
This was extremely fortuitous for the Continental army.  After the day of action on 
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September 19, the American forces were short on supplies, most importantly gun 
powder. 
During the interlude between the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and the Second Battle 
of Saratoga, the Battle of Bemis Heights, which occurred on October 7, 1777, General 
Burgoyne realized his precarious position as his army’s provisions were running low 
and soldiers as well as camp followers began going beyond the British lines to scour the 
countryside for relief.  One day, several men and women ventured out of camp in the 
morning to gather vegetables from a local farm.  While they were digging for potatoes, 
Continental scouts fired upon them.  Some were killed and others were taken prisoners 
where they were likely pressed for information regarding the status of the British army.  
Burgoyne thus ordered that any person venturing beyond the British lines was to be 
hanged on the spot.  Burgoyne’s order stated, “the General will no longer bear to lose 
Men for the pitiful consideration of Potatoes or Forage—The life of the Soldier is the 
property of the King.” They were much more valuable to the army as living soldiers on 
reduced rations than they were as possible prisoners with full bellies.100 
Burgoyne’s line during the respite between the two battles of Saratoga elucidates 
the precarious position of volunteer soldiers from the Northeast Borderlands.  Though a 
preponderance of the indigenous allies had left the battlefront, those that remained 
along with the English and French Canadian militia were stationed at the front of the 
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line to prevent their retreat in the event of an attack, and, more importantly, to prevent 
their desertion as the situation for the British army began to deteriorate.101   
The German and British officers made several attempts to gather information 
regarding the position of the Continental army.  They tried creating communications 
between their encampments and outposts by cutting roads through the woods; 
however, the American soldiers fired upon the work crews causing them to scatter.  In a 
final attempt, the British drew on the knowledge of local inhabitants and sent fifteen to 
twenty soldiers with several provincials as guides to climb the mountains surrounding 
Saratoga to determine the enemy’s position.  This effort, according to one officer “was 
fruitless, because the woods prevented their seeing across the Hudson [River]; and thus, 
without discovering or seeing anything, they returned.”102 With the retreat of his 
indigenous allies in September, Burgoyne’s army remained blind to the maneuvers, 
fortifications, and numbers of the Continental army.  Further, during this inter-battle 
period, without the protection of a large force of Iroquois scouts, Burgoyne’s provision 
storage was attacked by the Oneida allied with the American forces.  One diarist noted 
that the British force was “Sadly reduced and weakened” by the “battle and skirmishes 
Continually [taking] place between The two armies.”103 
At Bemis Heights, the forces of the United Colonies under the command of 
General Horatio Gates utilized the natural contours of the landscape in their 
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encampment.  The Continental army’s right flank received protection from the Hudson 
River, while the front of the right side was insulated from attack by a large area of 
marshland.  Further utilizing the natural resources at hand, the officers directed the 
soldiers to cut down trees and construct an abattis to protect the rear of the army. Gates 
positioned the left side of his army atop a hill and secured the flank with an abattis on 
the uphill slope protecting it from attack.104 
Provisions ran extremely low for Burgoyne’s forces as September faded into 
October.  On October 3 the soldiers were placed on reduced rations.105 Several officers 
noted in their diaries that the British army was in constant need of supplies and was 
forced to send out expeditionary parties to obtain forage.106  The Continental army 
slowly began to envelop the British forces, cutting off their communication with their 
supply train.  General Riedesel noted that after this action they were forced to reduce 
their “daily rations to one pound of meat and one of bread.”107  On October 9, seeing 
little hope of success in the current expedition, the remaining indigenous allies departed 
the army.108 
On the morning of October 13, 1777, the Continental army successfully encircled 
Burgoyne’s army.  In doing so, they once again utilized the natural contours of the 
landscape to their advantage.  For the British forces to mount an attack with any success 
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they would have to cross an area of marshy lowlands and then traverse a steep incline.  
In making this maneuver, they would be forced to move away from the river at their 
rear, in which case the Continental troops stationed on their rear flank would be able to 
cross the river and decimate the British forces while they were encumbered by the 
swampy landscape.  Thus, there was little hope for a successful attack and perhaps even 
less confidence in a successful retreat.  With only five days’ rations remaining, even a 
successful attack followed by a quick retreat would see the soldiers and camp followers 
succumbing to starvation as they attempted to withdraw to Fort George.109  Here, 
Burgoyne’s inability to plan for a possible retreat by creating a communication and 
provisioning line between his location at Saratoga and Fort George become critical. 
Burgoyne was forced to call a council of war to determine whether or not there 
was precedent in the history of military affairs for him to surrender to General Gates, to 
determine if an army surrendering under such circumstances could be considered 
honorable, and whether or not the current situation was grounds to surrender. 
Participants and spectators from the United Colonies and Canada to Europe 
almost immediately viewed Burgoyne’s surrender as a watershed moment for the 
patriot movement.  France, seeing that the American forces had the ability to possibly 
win their independence, entered the war against Britain, providing not only necessary 
supplies and support but also reinforcement to General Washington’s dwindling 
Continental army.  However, the ramifications of Saratoga were no less important in the 
Northeastern Borderlands.  With France entering the war, the situation for the habitants 
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became more complicated as the possibility of French control in the colony swirled 
about local coffee houses and parish pews. The nations with living and hunting 
territory along the St. John River sent a clear message to the British officers and to the 
royalists living in the area.  In August of 1778 they wrote: 
The chiefs, sachems, and young men belonging to the River St. 
John’s have duly considered the nature of this great war between Old 
England and America.  They are unanimous that America is right and Old 
England is wrong.    
The river, on which you are with your soldiers, beings from most 
ancient times to our ancestors, consequently is ours now, and which we 
are bound to keep for our posterity.  
You know we are Americans; that is our native country.  You know 
the King of England with his evil counsellors has been trying to take away 
the lands and liberties of our country, but God the King of Heaven, our 
King, fights for us and says America shall be free.  It is so now in spite of 
all Old England his comrades can do.  
The great men of Old England in this country told us that the 
Americans would not let us enjoy our religion.  This is false not true, for 
America allows everybody to pray to God as they please.  You know Old 
England never would allow that but says you must all pray like the King 
and the great men at his court.  We believe America now is right.  We find 
all is true that they told us, for our old father the King of France takes their 
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part.  He is their friend, he has taken the sword and will defend 
them.  Americans is our friends, our brothers and country-men; what they 
do we do, what they say we say, for we are all one and the same family.  
Now as the King of England has no business nor ever had // any 
on this river, we desire you to go away with your men in peace and to 
take all those men that has been fighting and talking against America.  If 
you don’t go directly, you must take [care] of yourself, your men, and all 
your subjects on this river, for if all or any of you are killed it is not our 
faults, for we give you warning time enough to escape.  Adieu for ever! 110 
 
 
 The Burgoyne campaign into New York failed for several reasons. The 
Continental army created a chaotic wilderness of an otherwise ordered landscape 
causing prolonged delays. European disease cosmology, as well as the material reality 
of suffering from disease during a wilderness war, decreased the British ranks. Finally, 
the shrewd use of natural resources and the contours of the natural environment by the 
American forces caused Burgoyne to surrender.  
It is impossible to know if the Saratoga campaign in 1777 could have turned out 
differently had General William Howe sent his army up the Hudson River to 
communicate and rendezvous with Burgoyne instead of opting for an invasion and 
occupation of Philadelphia, or if Barry St. Leger would have met Burgoyne near 
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Saratoga if he had not called off his advance to retreat to Quebec. What is clear, 
however, is that the Continental army’s better understanding and utilization of the 
natural environment and local people was instrumental in Burgoyne’s failure.  With the 
death of Jane McCrea the allegiance of many local people turned.  Many in the 
Northeast Borderlands who were undecided or neutrals and even many with loyalist 
leanings became supporters of the patriot cause in the wake of Burgoyne’s surrender.  
Indeed, despite indications of loyalist allies in the region, the British expeditionary force 
dispatched to Bennington for provisions, supplies, and forage was repulsed by locals 
who flocked to the town to protect the military stores held there.   
Local people also undermined Barry St. Leger’s siege of Fort Stanwix after the 
retreat of his Iroquois allies.  Further, many indigenous peoples refused to continue past 
the Hudson River with the Burgoyne expedition, and the army became blind due to 
their inability to perform effective reconnaissance through the forests surrounding 
Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights.   
After the loss at Oriskany, the failure of the siege of Fort Stanwix, and 
Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga, the morale of the Seneca and Mohawk reached 
its nadir as warriors travelled back to their communities to mourn their dead and 
debate their future in the conflict between the British and the rebellious colonists 
in America. The British further exacerbated this crisis in Iroquoia by shifting the 
war effort southward along the eastern seaboard. There, with their supremacy of 
the seas, the British would no longer have to launch large-scale land operations 
through the wilderness of the Northeast Borderlands. 
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Chapter 6 
Pay Them in Their Own Coin’:  
The Destruction of Environment and Culture in the Northeast Borderlands 
 
 On September 14, 1779, Captain Henry Dearborn entered Genessee Castle, the 
stronghold of the Seneca living in the Finger Lakes region of Iroquoia. Here, much to 
his horror, he discovered the body of a fellow officer whom the British captured in 1775 
during the New Year’s Eve raid against Quebec City. Since being released from British 
custody in November 1777, Thomas Boyd of the Pennsylvania Rifles served as the first 
lieutenant for the 1st Pennsylvania regiment. Boyd and a group of nearly thirty scouts 
were captured several nights before Dearborn’s gruesome discovery, while attempting 
a reconnaissance mission of a Seneca village during Major General John Sullivan’s 
campaign of environmental destruction against Iroquoia in the summer of 1779.1  
The Continental army under Sullivan conducted these military operations not 
only against the Seneca living in the Northeast Borderlands but also against their crops, 
orchards, homes, and villages methodically destroying forty towns throughout the 
Finger Lakes region of Iroquoia. George Washington and the Continental Congress 
hoped that the successful execution of this scorched earth campaign would thrust the 
Iroquois onto the British as dependents for food and shelter. This in turn would put an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army during the War 
of the Revolution, April, 1775, to December, 1783 (Washington D.C.: W.H. Lowdermile & 
Co. 1893), 114. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, Revolutionary War Journals of 
Henry Dearborn, 1775-1783 (Westminster, Maryland:  Heritage Books, 2007), 186. 
 
	  	  
	  
220	  
end to the back-and-forth frontier violence in New York that peaked with the loyalist 
and Iroquoian raids of during the 1778 campaign season.  
The scene before Dearborn’s eyes was “was the most horrid spectacle” he 
witnessed throughout his career in the Continental army.  
Lt. Boyd & one other man [were] Mangled in a most horred manner. From 
appeerences it seems they ware tyed to two trees near which they lay, & 
first severely whip’d, then their tongues ware cut out, their finger nails 
pluck’d off, their eyes pluck’d out, then speer’d & cut in many places & 
after [the Iroquois] had vented their hellish spite and rage, cut off their 
heads and left them.2  
Continuing further, Dearborn and his fellow soldiers discovered the remainder of 
Boyd’s scouting party, all scalped. An Oneida named Thaosagwat Hanjost, who was of 
“considerable note” militarily and politically to the Iroquois nation was among the 
desecrated and completely dismembered.3 The Continental army also discovered two 
“dogs [tortured and] hung up on poles about 12 or 15 feet high.” Their indigenous 
guides informed them that this ritualized sacrifice was intended to provide an offering 
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of a jacket and a tobacco pouch to their deity. A captive female colonist the Seneca left 
behind at Genessee explained that the dogs were “hung up…immediately after the 
Battle at Newtown,” when the Continental army achieved victory over an Iroquoian 
and loyalist militia ambuscade during Sullivan’s expedition.4 
Dearborn was not alone in his revulsion and fear of the ritualized violence 
performed on the soldiers and animals before him. The soldiers of the expedition 
intensely feared the wilderness and built environment of Iroquoia. Even before the 
Battle of Newtown, while traversing the wilderness and agroecosystems of the region, 
the soldiers remained on high against the “savages of the wood” and “skettering 
Indians skulking about.” They often lived in fear of being ambushed and were 
frequently commanded “for their greater security” to “st[and] under arms from 3 
o’clock, A.M., until daylight…with orders to hold themselves in readiness at a 
moment’s warning.”5  This fear of the wilderness and the possibility of the Mohawk and 
Seneca lurking about became so intense that the expedition began shooting blindly into 
the wilderness. Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Hubley noted that his commander “fixed 
several six pounders on the opposite shore in order to scour the woods and thickets, 
and prevent any ambuscade from taking place.”6 Fear of the militarized landscape of 
Iroquoia became paranoia as the soldiers literally attacked the wilderness that 
surrounded them.  
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 The discovery of the ritualized violence performed against Boyd, combined with 
the terror of the Iroquoian wilderness prompting General John Sullivan to end his 
expedition against the Seneca prematurely and return to Pennsylvania, declaring 
himself victorious.  Originally, the architects of the expedition, General George 
Washington and General Philip Schuyler, aimed to attack Fort Niagara during the 
autumn of 1779. During July of that year, Schuyler interrogated Nathan Kingsly, an 
escaped captive of the Iroquois. After determining that he was a man of sound mind 
and intellect, Schuyler asked him to relay any information he remembered regarding 
British or indigenous military maneuvers towards Niagara.  Schuyler reported to John 
Sullivan that a mere four companies of British regulars had traveled via bateaux to 
Niagara.  Further, Sir John Johnson dispatched approximately 120 troops for the fort 
and that forty indigenous people joined them.7 Henry Dearborn confirmed this 
expectation, noting that his troops and several other brigades “ware order’d to 
march…under the Command of the Honbe. Majr. Genl. Sullivan, on an Expedition 
against the Savages between Wyoming & at Niagara.”8 The scope of Sullivan’s mission 
was clearly defined: to destroy the villages of the Iroquois from Wyoming to Niagara.   
 Even as late as September, mere days before the discovery of Boyd’s tortured 
remains, General Washington cautioned Sullivan to execute the mission “as conclusive 
as the state of your provisions and the safety of your” men allowed.  He specifically 
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reminded Sullivan of the two-fold expectations of the campaign into Iroquoia.  The first 
was “the necessity of pushing the Indians to the greatest practicable distance from their 
own settlements, and our frontiers, to the throwing them wholly on the British enemy.” 
The second measure was “the making of the destruction of their settlements so final and 
complete, as to put it out of their power to derive the smallest succor from them, in case 
they Should attempt to return this Season.”9  Sullivan, feeling great distress at the 
pressures of executing warfare in the wilderness and within a borderlands where 
negotiation was implemented through extreme violence, decided that the army’s 
provisions were too low to continue forward to Niagara and retreated to Easton, 
Pennsylvania. The ritualized violence of the Seneca, alongside the environment of the 
Northeast Borderlands, were major forces repelling the Continental army. [For a map of 
the Sullivan expedition see Appendix H] 
Saratoga and the Breaking Down of the Borderlands 
The Seneca and Mohawk, having suffered many casualties during the Battle of 
Oriskany during the summer of 1777, after expecting to only be utilized as a 
psychological weapon against the rebels at the Battle of Fort Stanwix, returned to their 
communities to mourn loved ones and determine their next course of action. 
Enthusiasm for the war effort reached its nadir in Iroquoia as then Mohawk and Seneca 
faced off against their Six Nations’ brethren, the Oneida, in an intimate and brutal 
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battlefield that escalated the conflict in Indian Country into a civil war.10  As historian 
Barbara Graymont argues, “the unity of the Iroquois Confederacy had been sundered 
by the campaign of 1777.”11 Further hindering Iroquoian support of the British war 
effort was the first major defeat of the British regulars at Saratoga.  This raised the 
question of who the victors of the conflict between the Americans and the British would 
be and incited doubt as to British supremacy of the Northeast Borderlands, especially if 
the Americans garnered the support of the French crown.12 
 The consequences of wilderness warfare conducted in the Northeast Borderlands 
had major implications for Euro-American military priorities and thus allegiances and 
friendship with the local populace. Even before the failure at Saratoga, the British began 
focusing its war effort against the Mid-Atlantic colonies and shifting the theatre of the 
War for American Independence southward and eastward.  General William Howe 
decided that the best chance for British martial success in 1777 was to take Philadelphia 
by sailing his army from New York to Pennsylvania instead of attempting an overland 
expedition to Albany to reinforce Burgoyne. Here, the British relied on its supremacy of 
the seas instead of engaging in military campaigns through what they considered the 
impenetrable wilds of the Northeast. Once the French entered the war on behalf of the 
Americans, the British focused primarily on occupying the cities of the eastern seaboard 
and defending their colonial holdings in the Caribbean. They began pulling troops out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 156. 
11 Ibid., 157. 
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of inland fortifications, including their garrison at Fort Ontario. The large amount of 
resources needed to fight an inland war and the inability for the British to sufficiently 
negotiate resources from the local populace inevitably led to war fatigue among the 
military command and in Parliament.13 The Iroquois felt abandoned by their European 
ally after the defeat and capture of Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga and the shifting of 
British interests to the south.  
 In the wake of Saratoga, Konwatsi’tslalenni, (Molly Brant), a prestigious 
Iroquoian diplomat and an instrumental figure in the American and Oneida defeat at 
Oriskany, sought asylum in Cayuga after American colonists and Oneida warriors 
attacked her home in Canajoharie.14 Alongside many Seneca and Mohawk refugees, 
Konwatsi’tslalenni debated whether the Iroqouis should withdraw from the conflict 
between the Americans and the British and to take up their traditional stance as a 
neutral party.  Personal and tribal losses during the wilderness campaign of 1777 
weighed heavily on the Iroquois’ minds. However, with the victor of the contest for 
America unclear, they also conceived of situations where it would be beneficial to the 
Six Nations to join into an open alliance with the Continental army rather than continue 
the Covenant Chain with the British.15 Their decision and her influence in the matter 
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held great consequences for not only the Euro-American belligerents in the conflict, but 
for the fractured longhouse as well. 
A council was called and the great leaders of the Six Nations made their appeals. 
Many desired neutrality. Konwatsi’tslalenni, having decided that allegiance to the 
British remained the best path forward for the Iroquois, utilized her status as the head 
of the Six Nations’ Matrons to rebuke her male counterparts.  She made an impassioned 
speech, reminding her colleagues of the promises of fidelity and allegiance to both the 
King of England and to her late husband, Sir William Johnson. Because leaders of the 
Six Nations often sought out her advice as a leading clan mother, her words carried 
great weight. Konwatsi’tslalenni’s zealous appeal for continued friendship with the 
British persuaded the council to continue its loyalty to the Crown. After much debate 
during the autumn and winter of 1777, the Covenant Chain was tempered. The British 
quickly learned of her continued stature and influence among the nations of the 
Iroquois and recruited her to relocate to Niagara to rally the warriors against the 
American communities of the Northeast Borderlands.16 
In a letter to the Continental Congress dated January 10, 1778, Philip Schuyler 
relayed the palpable tensions between American colonists living in New York and the 
Iroquois. He explained that the borderlands were breaking down and despite the fact 
that “the Oneida and Tuscaroaras are still very friendly” they remained “under 
guarded Apprehensions of falling Victims to the Rage of their savage Neighbors” 
themselves. With the inability to rely on these two nations of the now fractured Iroquois 
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Confederacy, Schuyler argued that “there can be no safety for the Defenceless 
Inhabitants” living on the frontier. The best course of action for the common defense 
and the support of their Iroquoian allies was “carrying the War If possible into their 
country.”17  
Schuyler was not alone in his appeal. New York politician Robert Yates wrote to 
the President of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens, regarding the erosion of 
accommodation between New Yorkers and their Iroquoian neighbors. He relayed a 
message from the colonial congress that they were “of the opinion that we should not 
only in the most peremptory Terms command them to bury the hatchet they have taken 
against us to evince their contraction for past misconduct” but also demand that they 
atone for their violence by “joining our Arms and immediate committing hostilities on 
the” British.  Yates knew this appeal would be unacceptable to the Iroquois. He closed 
his letter with the hope that Congress would allow the colony of New York to address 
their indigenous neighbors in this way and that the Iroquoian refusal would be 
countered by the Continental army “mak[ing] the attempt on Niagara.”18  
By January of 1778, less than three months after the British defeat at Saratoga, 
American and Iroquoian politicians, military leaders, and diplomats had abandoned 
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any genuine gestures towards rapprochement and accommodation with one another. 
Though there was opportunity for peace in the Northeast Borderlands following the 
campaign of 1777, after almost four years of warfare in the region, the outbreak of 
violence in the small communities of New York and Iroquoia was eminent.  
Escalating Violence and the Changing Nature of Warfare in the Northeastern 
Borderlands 
 Patriot and loyalist forces fought one another in this region since the outbreak of 
the war, raiding each other’s communities and committing acts of brutal justice. The 
frustrations and fractures within the Iroquois Confederacy in the wake of Burgoyne’s 
defeat at Saratoga escalated this conflict into “a larger war of conquest” by the 
Continental and British Armies and a “ferocious war of anticolonialism” by the 
indigenous residents of the Northeast Borderlands.19  
 Beginning in the spring of 1778, the Seneca, Mohawk, and loyalist Rangers 
executed a series of raids on the New York frontier. The patriot militias of the region 
were no match for the combined arms of these raiders. In May, Mohawk warriors under 
the command of Thayendanegea (Joeseph Brant) attacked the community of Cobleskill. 
In July, 1,000 Seneca warriors under Ki-on-twog-ky (Cornplanter) and loyalist rangers 
commanded by John Butler descended on the communities of the Wyoming Valley.  
This force killed 340 inhabitants and captured approximately a dozen more. Over 70 
militiamen, women, and children were scalped by the invading force. In September, a 
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force of 450 Mohawk and loyalist Rangers under Thayendangea and William Caldwell 
destroyed 63 houses, 57 barns and 4 mills. Afterwards, they raided other communities 
in the region, attacking infrastructure and killing any who tried to defend their homes.  
 Realizing that their safety relied on their offense, the Continental army executed 
their own raids against the Iroquoian villages of Unadilla and Onquaga, the base of 
Thayendangea’s military operations during 1778. Arriving at Unadilla on October 6, a 
force of 214 Continental soldiers and 53 militiamen found the community abandoned. 
Capturing one individual, they learned that the villagers had fled to Onquaga hearing 
of the American advance.20  On October 8, the Americans found the town of Onquaga 
abandoned as well and spent the next two days destroying the two villages. The 
commander of the expedition, William Butler, described the village as “the finest Indian 
town I ever saw; on both sides of the River there was about 40 good houses, Square 
logs, Shingles & stone Chimneys, good Floors, glass windows &c.” In addition to 
burning the infrastructure, Butler and his soldiers reported removing of 49 horses, 52 
head of cattle, and burning 4,000 bushels of corn.21 Here the frontier warfare moved 
from a battle against an enemy to a battle of conquest with the objective of removing the 
Seneca and Mohawk from Iroquoia. 
Reeling from the destruction of Unadilla and Onaquaga in November, 
Thayendangea, Ki-on-twog-ky, and Butler’s son, William, executed a raid on Cherry 
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Valley with a combined force of over 500. The attack quickly spiraled out of the control 
of the Mohawk and loyalist commanders as many of the warriors and soldiers began 
spreading out over the settlement instead of focusing their attack on the garrison in the 
community. The properties and lives of both patriot and loyalist were destroyed by the 
combatants as Thayendangea and Butler attempted to cool the fury of the warriors and 
help other inhabitants escape. Despite their inability to successfully siege the fort, the 
forces destroyed the entirety of the town. The raiding party killed sixteen soldiers and 
thirty-two inhabitants. A preponderance of the dead were women and children. 
Seventy individuals were taken as captives.  Barbara Graymont notes that until this 
series of, the combined military actions by the loyalists and Iroquois “had been fairly 
human, as wars go.”22 The nature of these attacks changed in the wake of the defeat of 
the British at Saratoga.  There was no longer space for negotiated power – space enough 
for colonists and indigenous people to live fairly amiably as neighbors, or for the 
protection of non-combatants in the warfare in the Northeast Borderlands.  The 
escalation of violence and changing nature of warfare in the borderlands during 1778 
prompted the colony of New York to appeal to the Continental Congress to invade 
Iroquoia.  
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 ‘The Country May not be Merely Overrun but Destroyed’: A War of Conquest against 
the Environment and Culture of Iroquoia23 
 The destruction of Wyoming, Cherry Valley, and the neighboring communities 
in 1778 became a thorn in the side of George Washington. The British war effort had 
largely shifted to the eastern seaboard; however, with aggression on the western 
frontier, the American colonies were being squeezed in the pincer of their two most 
formidable enemies: the British army and the Iroquois. Further, the settlements in 
western New York held valuable resources for the Continental army. When the army 
failed to seize the granary of Quebec in 1775 and 1776, it relied heavily on the 
provisions raised by the local people living in this borderland region. Due to the 
destruction of infrastructure and crops, New York often failed to meet its quota to 
support the military. The control of the New York frontier by the Iroquois pushed 
American civilization eastward and expanded the wilderness margin in the region, 
mentally and geopolitically. This changing dynamic increased levels of fear and created 
a sense of urgency. 
 In one of the most dynamic and complex operations of the war, General 
Washington devised a three-prong expedition that would sweep Iroquoian resistance 
out of New York and achieve one of two goals. By bringing large-scale warfare into the 
communities of Iroquoia, Washington and Congress hoped that the indigenous 
populace would be humbled in the face of the American war machine and either change 
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allegiances or become neutral. If the Iroquois resisted this first scheme, then 
Washington surmised that executing total war against the agroecosystems, 
infrastructure, and populace of the region that the Continental army would thrust the 
Iroquois on the British, straining their provisions and consuming valuable resources. 
Further, the conquest of Iroquoia would open up the resource-rich region for settlement 
particularly in the fertile Finger Lakes region. 
By 1779 it became clear to Washington that conducting warfare through the 
wilderness required a change from standard European-style campaigns. General John 
Burgoyne’s campaign failed in part due to their luxurious baggage train. General 
Washington warned General John Sullivan against such extravagances, writing that 
“you will disencumber yourself of every article of baggage and Stores which is not 
necessary to the expedition. Not only its Success but its execution at all depends on 
this.” He noted that wilderness campaigns were “a kind of Service in which both 
officers and men must expect to dispense with conveniences and endure hardships—
They must not and I trust will not expect to carry the Same apparties which is 
customary in other operations.” To do so would not only court defeat but also prevent 
him from penetrating “any distance into” the wilderness of “Indian Country.”24 
 Given the trials and tribulations suffered by the Arnold expedition, Washington 
became obsessed with learning every possible detail he could concerning the route to be 
taken.  In preparing for the invasion of Canada in 1775, Washington himself collected 
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little intelligence about the howling wilderness beyond the Eastern Country of 
Massachusetts.  It seems, by and large, he outsourced his intelligence gathering to local 
individuals such as Reuben Colburn, the contractor who built the bateaux, andJohn 
Getchell, one of the expedition’s guides. Both relied on the map and journal of British 
engineer John Montresor. [See Appendix C] Though these sources provided Arnold 
with valuable information, the contextual information required to execute a European 
style campaign through the wilderness was not effectively conveyed.   
This time, Washington decided that taking ownership of intelligence gathering 
and relaying that information to his subordinates firsthand was the most effective mean 
to execute wilderness warfare in the Northeast.  Beginning in the summer of 1778, he 
made general inquiries regarding how to accomplish the mission.  In a letter to Major 
Horatio Gates he queried “what Troops you had in contemplation for the Expedition 
into the Country of the Seneca’s.  What number you conceive adequate to the Service. 
What were your prospects of supplying them with Provisions, Stores, and other 
Necessaries.  And with what convenience and readiness the means of transportation 
can be provided.”25  He became interested in “the face of the Country, whether wet or 
dry, level or broken, and how furnished with herbage.”26  Washington fixated on details 
at the micro-level including the “rapidity and depth of water” and the presence of 
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“fallen trees in the rivers.”27  In letter after letter, Washington inquired about the state of 
the wilderness landscape between Easton, Pennsylvania and Iroquoia. After careful 
analysis Washington identified the Susquehanna River as the chosen means to march 
between Easton and Iroquoia. Sullivan insisted the the Mohawk River was the best 
route; however Philip Schuyler and Washington deduced from their intelligence that 
the landscape of the Mohawk would make supplying the army with adequate 
provisions impossible.28 
 The military methods for executing the conquest and removal of the Iroqouis 
from the Northeast Borderlands involved extreme violence against the landscape and 
people of the region. As historian Liam Riordan argues, “Washington required a 
ferocious effort of unabated destruction.”29 This expedition was Washington’s first 
major offensive since the attack on Trenton in 1776. The stakes were high as he 
committed over 5,000 soldiers as well as the necessary armament, foodstuffs, and other 
provisions required to send a large fighting force into the wilderness. Washington did 
not want to simply effect a temporary evacuation of Iroquoia or execute “the 
destruction of a few settlements which they might speedily reestablish.”30 For 
Washington, success meant the “capture of as many prisoners of every age as possible” 
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since “hostages are the only kind of security to be depended upon.” He hoped that 
Sullivan’s “attacks [would] distract and terrify the Indians,” and “in their confusion, 
they may neglect in some places to remove the old men women and Children and that 
these will fall into our hands.” Washington also commanded Sullivan to “destress them 
as much as possible, by destroying their villages, and this years crops.”31 
 Washington’s orders to Sullivan were quite clear. He wanted Indian “country 
[to] not be merely overrun but destroyed.” For him, the future of America relied upon 
“their inability to injure us; the distance to wch they are driven and in the terror with 
which the severity of the chastisement they receive will inspire them.”32 Alerted of the 
expedition in advance, the Seneca abandoned the communities which Sullivan’s 
regiments attacked. In many places, the fires remained warm, the corn and apples 
ripened in the fields, and the remainer of the vegetable lay in wait of harvest. According 
to Sullivan’s tabulation, in total the Continental army destroyed 40 towns and 160,000 
bushels of corn with countless numbers of other foodstuffs consumed, brought into the 
quartermaster’s stores, and destroyed.33  
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The soldiers of the expedition were covetous of the agroecosystems and curious 
about the culture artifacts of Iroquoia. Lieutenant Erkuries Beatty noted that “Our 
Brigade Destroyed about 150 Acres of the best corn that Ever I saw (some of the Stalks 
grew 16 feet high) besides great Quantities of Beans, Potatoes, Pumpkins, Cucumbers, 
Squashes & Watermellons.”34 However, they did not destroy all of the indigenous 
agriculture they came in contact with. The foodstuffs consumed in Iroquoia provided 
the expedition with much needed nutrition and allowed General Sullivan to place the 
army on half provisions without complaint. William Batron noted in his diary that the 
expedition “feasted sumptuously” on beans, squashes, potatoes and other vegetables, 
“it being a good substitute for bread.” Further, the quartermaster ordered the army to 
gather as much corn as he could haul, and to destroy the rest.35 
Soldiers clearly recognized the fecundity of the landscape and the promise of 
future settlement. Adam Hubley described “the situation of this village was beautiful; it 
contained fifty or sixty houses, built of logs and frames, and situate on the banks of 
Tiago branch, and on a most fertile, beautiful, and extensive plain. He “chiefly 
calculated” the rich soil as perfect for meadow grass.36 Here, while removing the 
habitations of indigenous people in a war of conquest, the Continental army began 
reimagining Iroquoia in terms of European-style settlement. 
While destroying buildings, burning corn, cutting down fruit trees, and pillaging 
furniture, the soldiers also engaged in the desecration of Iroquoian burial sites. 
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Lieutenant Beatty exclaimed that “there was about 100 graves…which our men had 
Dug up” The Iroquois, he continued, “bury their Dead very curiously.”37 While 
engaging in this cultural despoliation the soldiers belittled the dead and burial practices 
of the Six Nations. Major James Norris recorded in his diary that “whether through 
principle of Avarice or Curiosity, our Soldiers dug up several of their graves and found 
a good many laughable relicts.” The men kept souvenirs of their graveside pillaging 
including pipes, tomahawks, and beads.38  Here, the violence against Iroquoia extended 
beyond their agroecosystems and community infrastructure and targeted their greater 
society, history, and culture. The Continental army saw no place for the Iroqouis in the 
nascent United States of America. In disinterring bodies, burning villages and mills, and 
destroying and consuming crops, the Continental army abandoned the practice of 
navigating the borderlands and wilderness of the Northeast. Rather, they aimed to 
remove the Iroquois, conquer both the borderlands, and develop the wilderness into a 
civilized pastoral world. 
The Battle of Newtown and the Torture of Boyd: Military and Ritualized Violence to 
Protect Iroquoia 
On August 29, 1779 Thayendangea and John Butler executed an ambuscade on 
the Sullivan expedition in an effort to increase the soldiers’ fear of the landscape and to 
keep the campaign from moving further into Iroquoia. It was the only major military 
engagement of the campaign. Informed of the expedition’s arrival, the Butler and 
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Theyendangea erected earthworks at musket’s range on the side of the hill running 
along the Chemung River. Despite their best efforts at camouflaging their fortifications, 
the advanced guard under Daniel Morgan discovered their strongpoint. The 
Continental army opened fire on the defenders and the force of about 1,200 individuals 
lost the element of surprise. The ambush failed. The Iroquois and loyalist forces killed 
11 and wounded 32, but lost 33 of their own. Though the Battle of Newtown was not 
significant in terms of casualties, the inability for the Iroquois and loyalists to 
successfully execute a surprise attack broke the morale of the Iroquois Confederacy and 
they abandoned hope for derailing the Sullivan expedition through military means.39 
The violence against the bodies of the Iroquois in the wake of the Battle of 
Newtown was especially notable. Wilderness warfare in the Northeast Borderlands 
took on a frightful brutality as the theatre shifted into a war of conquest. Following the 
action at Newtown the Continental soldiers scalped the loyalist and Iroquoian dead. 
Though no soldier explicitly stated it, they imply that the female dead were also 
scalped. In fact, Pennsylvania had placed a scalp bounty on the heads of any Seneca, 
regardless of sex, as a means to bolster enlistments and pay during the Sullivan 
expedition.40 The desecration of Iroquoian corpses did not end there. Sergeant Thomas 
Roberts and his soldiers went looking for scalps and plunder from the conflict on 
August 30.  They “found 4 Indians and Sculpd them and Brought them into camp.” The 
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next morning, they took “2 Indians and Skin thear Legs & Drest them for Leggins,” 
crafting two pairs of breeches for their officers.41  Lieutenant William Barton was 
pleased to receive this gift from his men and wore them throughout the campaign. The 
other pair was given to an unidentified Major. 42 Lieutenant Rudolphus Van 
Hovenburgh felt shame after this incident. He disguised it from his posterity but 
recorded it for himself in his diary writing, “Sm. Skn. By our S. fr. Bts.” This was 
shorthand for “some skinned by our own soldiers for boots.”43  
In other instances, however, soldiers’ official reports and diaries lamented the 
campaign’s brutality. At least two officers, Henry Dearborn and General Edward Hand, 
ignored Sullivan’s orders to destroy mature fruit bearing trees. The officers “would see 
no apple or peach tree” destroyed, “so that they were left to blossom and bear.” One 
officer noted in his diary that this showed the great character and morality of the two 
men.44  
The endorsement and celebration of atrocity in this campaign—the literal 
crafting of clothing from the bodies of the enemy—combined with land speculation and 
the moral lament at the destruction of fruit trees highlights the ways Iroquoia was 
sought out as, and turned into a, commodity by the Continental army. This 
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commodification elucidates the changing nature of warfare in the wake of Saratoga 
from a war of self-preservation to a mission of conquest against the cultural and 
environmental landscapes of the Northeast Borderlands.45 
 It was after Newtown that the Iroquois performed the ritual sacrifice of two dogs 
to their god of war and tortured Lieutenant Boyd and Sergeant Michael Parker as an 
extension of their offerings. The treatment of Boyd and Parker was as well as a ritual of 
vengeance against the Continental army for the atrocities of the Sullivan expedition. 
According to Graymont, through “their pain and their sufferings they removed the pain 
and torment from the spirit of those who had been slain by the rebel army.”46 Indeed, 
Boyd himself captured, interrogated, and scalped the Iroquois he had encountered 
during his travels.47  
The Iroquois desired to send a message to the Continental army through the 
ritualized violence against Boyd and Parker. Si-gwa-ah-doh-gwih (Little Beard), the 
Seneca leader who performed the ritual, used each act of violence against the 
Continental soldiers as a means of communication.48  When he was finished, the bodies 
were left in a prominent location in the middle of Genessee Castle to be discovered. 
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Though soldiers feared dying on the battlefield or in the wilderness as part of their 
military service, no soldier wanted to risk the despoliation of their body nor the pain 
and suffering endured by Boyd and Parker before they died. For General Sullivan, Si-
gwa-ah-doh-gwih’s message was clear. Any further incursion into Iroquoia would 
result in the torture of captives. Despite explicit orders to continue to Niagara, Sullivan 
declared the mission a success at Genessee Castle and, despite being surrounded in a 
world of plenty where foodstuffs were destroyed as part of the mission, turned around, 
citing a lack of provision. Sullivan and Washington declared the mission a success; 
however, the Iroquois were victorious in turning back the Continental army through 
ritualized violence when the standard violence of military conflict failed. 
The Sundering of the Six Nations and the Rise of Reservations 
Hearing of the successes of the Sullivan expedition, George Washington noted in 
his general orders of October 17, 1779 that Iroquoia “has been over-run & lain to waste, 
and they themselves compelled to place their Security in a precipitate Flight to the 
British Fortress at Niagara.”49 Here the Iroquois received warm clothing, foodstuffs, and 
shelter. Within two weeks of the end of Sullivan’s expedition there were over 5,000 
Iroquois expecting assistance from the British at Niagara. A humanitarian crisis ensued 
until provisions arrived from Canada. To protect their own supply lines, the British 
counseled the Iroquois to seek shelter in one of the communities that were spared by 
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Continental army after Sullivan returned to Easton. By the end of November, the 
number of refugees dropped to under 2,900.50 
The brutality of the winter of 1779 - 1780 exacerbated the conditions for the 
Iroquois who, despite receiving provision from Fort Niagara remained destitute. Five 
feet of snow fell quickly and remained for most of the season. The temperatures 
plummeted, and the biting cold and wind became dangerous for humans and non-
humans alike. Deer and other game animals were frozen to the ground in large 
quantities. The lack of animals to hunt, combined with the loss of harvests due to the 
Sullivan expedition meant that many Iroquois died from starvation or hypothermia. 
According to Mary Jemison, the winter “was the most severe that I have witnessed,” 
and the death of animals with which the Iroquois subsisted “reduced them almost to a 
state of starvation through [1779] and three or four succeeding years.”51 
Though General Sullivan did not achieve the primary objectives of the mission, 
he did severely disrupt life for the Iroquois. They became increasingly dependent on the 
British, which ended any possibility for negotiating an accommodation with the 
Continental army. Though they conducted raids on the frontier in the subsequent years, 
irreparable damage had been done to their homeland and to their League. A region 
previously unmapped and unexplored came under the covetous eyes of colonists, who 
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were impressed by the richness of the soil, the fecundity of the fruit trees, and the 
ability for the region to grow large amounts of grain and meadow grass.  
 Though the civil war that divided the League of the Iroquois began with the 
fighting at Oriskany, the friendship of the Oneida and Tuscarora with the patriot forces 
who desecrated the villages, agroecosystems, burial grounds, and bodies of the Seneca 
solidified this divide. Fearing reprisals from the loyalist militia and the other nations of 
the Iroquois Confederacy, the Oneida abandoned their villages and fled to the safety of 
the American garrison at Schenectady.52 
At war’s end, the erection of the international boundary saw the Mohawk, 
Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga choosing land for themselves in Upper Canada near 
Lake Ontario after the British had ignored them during peace negotiations. The Oneida 
and Tuscarora remained in New York, but land-hungry colonists steadily encroached 
on their territory.53 Due to the loss of the borderlands environment, the Iroquois' were 
no longer able to to play the British off against the Americans and vice versa. 
Indigenous people on both sides of the border adopted Western-style agricultural 
practices. Their loss of land and autonomy cause greater dependence on the American 
or British government as they increasingly were relegated into reservations. 
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Chapter 7 
 Conclusion: Navigating the Cultural and  
Environmental Landscape of the  
Northeastern Borderlands 
 
 Decades after the War for American Independence ended, President James 
Madison appointed Henry Dearborn as commanding general of the northeastern 
theatre during the War of 1812. This region extended across the Northeastern 
Borderlands from Niagara in the west to northern New England in the east and made 
Dearborn the architect of military expeditions into Canada. He, of course, could draw 
on his extensive experiences navigating the cultural and natural landscapes in this 
bioregion, since he had served as a captain in the Continental army under General 
Arnold during the invasion of Canada in 1775, was at the American victory at Saratoga 
in 1777, and joined the expedition under General Sullivan into Iroquoia in 1779. Despite 
his intimate knowledge of the northeast, Dearborn’s army remained plagued by 
logistical delays, provisional shortages, and intense privation in the wilderness that 
rings familiar with the wilderness campaigns of the previous Anglo-American war.1 
Further, Dearborn feared that “a serious & open revolt” by the Federalists of New 
England as he struggled to obtain militia willing to serve in the War of 1812.2 Due to the 
specter of insurrection, Dearborn waivered in his efforts to invade Canada and his 
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attention remained focused on fortifying the New England coast against the British 
navy. These environmental and cultural factors contributed to his halting leadership 
and led to defeat in engagements with the British. Dearborn would be recalled, by 
President Madison on July 6, 1813, after which he resigned his command.3 
  Reeling from his dismissal, Dearborn wrote to Madison appealing this decision 
arguing that an “officer of my grade” should not be removed from his command 
without the “sentence of a court martial or the opinion of a Court of Inquiry” which he 
demanded. He went on to note that only the “most obvious unequivocal and 
outrageous conduct” warranted such drastic action.4  Clearly, Dearborn believed that 
the extenuating circumstances of conducting warfare in the Northeastern Borderlands 
were to blame for his litany of failures. Indeed, during February 1813, Dearborn had 
appealed to Madison in defense of his Brigadier-General Alexander Smyth requesting 
“a regular military inquiry into all circumstances that materially effected [sic] his 
military execution & command” to determine if he should be arrested and court 
martialed.5 Dearborn knew that Smyth’s men suffered from inadequate nutrition, 
environmental exposure, and deplorable sanitation, all leading to a war against typhoid 
for the American troops.6 Further exacerbating matters, the American forces were 
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composed of local volunteers and militiamen who often refused to march or take action 
under command.7 The agency of local human and non-human actors reigned supreme 
in this bioregion.  
In the four decades since Dearborn had set out into the Northeastern 
Borderlands as a 24-year-old captain in the Continental army, little had changed for 
American and British military commanders attempting to operate in the region. The 
natural and cultural environments encountered during war often created unanticipated 
circumstances that derailed generals with exceptional military experience and carefully-
constructed geopolitical and martial plans. 
Dearborn’s Experience in the Northeastern Borderlands as Exemplar 
During the invasion of Canada in 1775, Dearborn encountered an ominous 
wilderness in the Northeastern Borderlands. Nature incited fear and trepidation in him 
as he imagined the struggle to survive within the isolation and chaos of this landscape. 
Through discussing and writing about his interfaces with the non-human world, 
Dearborn mentally ordered the environment by sorting the familiar and unfamiliar 
flora, fauna, and non-biota of this bioregion. One way he made sense of his 
surroundings was to keep a keen eye open for places where the landscape could be 
tamed by future colonial expansion. In doing so, wilderness became a place of 
pleasure—alongside privation—where the natural world imparted a sense of wonder, 
awe, and rejuvenation. This ordering also provided the soldiers with valuable 
provisions as they learned how to harvest provisions and supplies. Despite their 
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increased confidence through learning how to soldier in a howling wilderness, a late-
season hurricane deluged the Continental army washing away vital supplies and 
provisions and making game animals and fish scarce. This provoked defection by 
Colonel Roger Enos’ rear division, leaving Dearborn and the rest of the expeditionary 
force with minimal provisions. Due to their dire circumstances, the men of Dearborn’s 
company slaughtered his Newfoundland dog for sustenance and made a simple broth 
from the soles of their shoes, attempting to survive their wilderness condition.  
Staggering towards the agrarian communities of rural Quebec in an emaciated 
state, Dearborn was overjoyed with the warm welcome his men received from Les 
Beaucerons and the Wabanaki population. They provided the expedition with supplies, 
transportation, companionship, and military support. Dearborn himself was nursed 
back to health by a family of habitants after falling ill with a fever. This cultural 
accommodation was mutually beneficial as the local populace used the Continental 
army’s war effort to achieve their own political, economic, and social goals through 
their control of natural resources. For his part, Dearborn was able to marshal his men to 
the gates of Quebec with their valuable assistance. There, the Variola virus exploited the 
deplorable sanitation and crowded camp conditions of the American forces and 
smallpox spread through the ranks.   Fearing the complete depletion of their army, 
General Richard Montgomery and Colonel Benedict Arnold executed a failed assault on 
the British garrison where Dearborn was captured.  
The incarcerated officers, having not been exposed to smallpox earlier in life, 
feared contracting the disease during their imprisonment. Immediately, Dearborn and 
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his compatriots, requested that the British physicians inoculate them, a practice that was 
banned in the Continental army at the time. Throughout the seven-month siege, he 
watched as firewood and food became scarce and the British and Continental armies 
struggled against the brutal cold of the bioregion, skirmishing over precious provisions. 
After breaking the Continental army’s siege, General Guy Carleton released 
Dearborn on parole in May 1776. However, he remained in Quebec until March 1777 
when he was part of a prisoner exchange. Continuing his service in the Northeastern 
Borderlands, Dearborn fought against General John Burgoyne’s expedition into New 
York near Fort Ticonderoga and helped weaponize the wilderness communications 
between the military outposts of the Northeastern Borderlands. Dearborn’s detachment 
joined General Horatio Gates at Saratoga in the autumn of 1777 awaiting Burgoyne’s 
expeditionary force. Here, he noted that deserters, weary of wilderness warfare, flowed 
into the Continental army’s encampment daily. This was exacerbated as weather 
delayed the British provisioning party at Bennington and the provincial militia repelled 
their assault. Frustrated by these failures, and the outbreak of violence amongst fellow 
Iroquoian nations at the Battle of Oriskany, Burgoyne’s indigenous and Canadien allies 
abandoned him at Saratoga. Left blind in an impenetrable wilderness, the British army 
suffered raids against their scouting parties from the Oneida of the Continental army’s 
line providing the American force with supplies and prisoners. Unable to successfully 
navigate the human and environmental landscape of the region, Burgoyne ultimately 
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surrendered his forces. Dearborn exclaimed that this was “the greatest consequence 
ever known” in the history of warfare.8 
Unable to make much progress fighting within the bioregion of the Northeastern 
Borderlands, the British turned their war effort outside of the region and into the mid-
Atlantic and southern United States. Loyalist militias and indigenous residents 
expanded their scorched-earth raids on the frontier, having been largely abandoned by 
the greater geopolitical stratagems of the British leadership. In 1779, Dearborn was 
pleased to be a part of the retaliatory force under the command of General John Sullivan 
to remove the Seneca and Mohawk from Iroquoia. On July 4, Dearborn and his fellow 
officers drank a toast to the United States on its birthday where they wished for 
“civilization or death to all American savages.”9 Here, the war effort changed from 
throwing off the yoke of British oppression to achieving conquest over the cultural and 
environmental landscapes of Indian Country. Indeed, Dearborn’s preoccupation with 
colonial expansionism into the bioregion fueled his decision making during this 
expedition. As he pillaged villages and razed the Seneca’s agroecosystems, Dearborn 
ignored Sullivan’s orders to cut down fruit trees, understanding that it took saplings 
several years to bear fruit. This restraint of violence against the natural environment is a 
striking juxtaposition against the extremities of violence that characterized this 
campaign against the cultural environment including the disinterring of corpses and 
desecration of corpses. 
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Dearborn’s experiences in the Northeastern Borderlands bioregion during the 
American Revolution exemplifies the unique ways that cultural and environmental 
landscapes intersect with military operations and geopolitics. Often, battles hinge on 
the decisions of generals to charge, counterattack, and retreat. However, by looking at 
entirety of the lived experience of soldiers, the causal forces of human ecology to steer 
war efforts are revealed.   
At the Confluence of Human Ecology and Geopolitics: The Northern Campaign of 
the War for American Independence  
During the War of American Independence, both the British and Continental 
armies operating in the Northeastern Borderlands sought to execute large-scale military 
operations in wilderness landscapes, to secure allegiances and assistance from the 
indigenous and provincial population, and to control access to valuable agricultural 
and environmental resources. Despite the best efforts of these opposing Euro-American 
military forces, local inhabitants dictated the terms of survival.  
The dynamic human ecology of the Northeastern Borderlands—the relationships 
between humans and the natural, social, and built environment— reshaped the war 
effort and, in turn, transformed the borderlands. At the beginning of the war, it was a 
place of fluid identities and loyalties where individuals operated autonomously to 
achieve their own political, economic, and social prosperity. Frustrated by the problem 
of moving their war machines in the region, military and political leaders forced fealty 
in the borderlands, exchanging cultural accommodation for coercion.  
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 This dissertation reveals the intertwined relationship between cultural and 
environmental landscapes on the one hand and the execution of warfare on the other. It 
highlights the distinct human ecology of the Northeastern Borderland as a bioregion 
that helps us to transcend the nationalistic study that dominates traditional political and 
martial narratives that inform our understanding of history. More precisely, it 
delineates how soldiers become immersed in the environments where they served and 
left rich records of observation, interpretation, and interaction with the human and non-
human world. It uncovers the ways in which indigenous and colonial settler 
populations utilized their knowledge of local environments and control of natural 
resources to force negotiation and accommodation to reshape geopolitics to benefit their 
communities. Struggling to gain complete control over the borderland bioregion from a 
social and environmental standpoint, the British and Continental armies—as well as 
their local indigenous and provincial allies—reshaped these natural and cultural 
landscapes of the northeast by weaponizing the wilderness and attempting to change 
the fluidity of the borderlands into more rigid bordered lands. Here, scorched-earth 
campaigns and cultural removal were means to exercise power over the inchoate and 
amorphous environmental, colonial, and indigenous landscapes of the northeast. 
 Soldiers struggled against the wilderness as they labored to transport 
themselves, their provisions, and war material of large field armies through a 
challenging landscape. By sorting out the familiar from the unfamiliar, soldiers gained 
control over their surroundings and made the wilderness less imposing and more 
useful to their expeditions. As they learned to survive in what they initially understood 
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as a landscape of complete isolation, they began to appreciate the visual aesthetic of the 
region that they traversed and developed a sense of wonder. Accepting the wilderness 
as God’s creation provided comfort and rejuvenation despite intense privation through 
the work of soldiering.  
Despite comfort through experience, rigorous military planning, help from 
indigenous and colonial guides, and the most accurate maps of the era, the bioregion 
exerted a causal force of its own that thwarted the British and Continental armies and 
their local allies throughout the war. Extreme weather made moose, deer, fish, and 
other game animals scarce, which the expeditions and local communities depended 
upon. The severe climate of the northeast consistently caused delays in logistical 
operations, ruined provisions and supplies, and impeded the execution of skirmishes 
and major battles alike. The British army’s differential immunity to smallpox—due to 
prior exposure compared to the demography of American-born Continental soldiers—
led Variola to be an unwitting ally of the British that executed sorties of its own against 
the Continental army. Fevers and fluxes, miasmas and malaria, all played essential roles 
in the disease cosmology of European and American soldiers serving in the bioregion of 
the northeast. Causing diarrhea and dehydration, madness and mania, these diseases—
and perceptions of them—relegated soldiers to field hospitals, provoked waves of 
desertion, and induced military leaders to dismiss those who were liabilities to their 
campaigns.    
The dynamic human ecology of the borderlands profoundly shaped military 
operations in the northeast. Indigenous and colonial residents served as purveyors of 
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landscape knowledge and controlled the admittance of interlopers into the region. 
Birch-bark maps, trail blazes, transportation corridors, and on-the-ground guiding 
provided passage through what was perceived outsides to the region as an 
impenetrable wilderness. Colonial and indigenous populations could also provide safe 
harbor for spies and military agents within their communities, preventing their arrest, 
providing them with valuable intelligence, and pointing them in the right direction. 
Food and firewood, labor and livestock were granted – or withheld –  by locals 
depending on which action best served the specific political, economic, social, and 
cultural goals of individuals and their communities. Resource allocation gave local 
actors decisive power in many military endeavors, as who they assisted, how much 
assistance they gave, when they ended their assistance, and the levels of resistance and 
violence they utilized directly contributed to the failure of all three wilderness 
expeditions examined here. 
For their part, the Continental and British armies also sought to weaponize the 
human and non-human actors of the borderlands. The British army employed 
provincials as vectors of disease, transmitting smallpox in and out of the Continental 
army’s encampments. Petite guerre tactics by indigenous warriors, militiamen, and 
soldiers disrupted the semi-ordered forested communications among the military 
leaders and garrisons of the Northeastern Borderlands by taking advantage of 
wilderness conditions. Officers and soldiers alike developed intense fears of the 
bioregion, sometimes firing muskets, rifles, and cannons into the dark and foreboding 
unknown hoping to kill those they suspected of skulking around threatened an 
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ambuscade that would end their expeditions into the howling wilderness. Soldiers and 
officers repeatedly refused to cook their meals by fire and even to drink water from the 
springs and streams when they felt like the wilderness was being used against them. 
The stress of living in a weaponized wilderness led to physical and mental illness 
among both soldiers and officers, costing these expeditions valuable time and often 
with lasting debilitating effects of soldiers. These situations highlight the primacy of 
fighting a natural enemy while engaged in a to defeat a human one. 
When accommodation in the borderlands broke down in 1778 due to the inability 
of either side to gain supremacy over the natural and cultural landscapes of the 
bioregion, the hybrid landscapes of the borderlands increasingly became the target of 
rigorous raids by indigenous warriors and loyalist militias as well as the Continental 
army.  The British architects of the military war effort in the Northeastern Borderlands 
“abdicated control of the war’s behavior and outcome to Indians and backwoods 
Loyalists.”10 General Washington retaliated by ordering General Sullivan to “pay them 
in their own coin.”11 They burned homes, attacked agroecosystems, and committed 
brutal acts of violence against one another in efforts to disrupt the others’ ability to 
provision their militaries and communities and to rid the borderlands of each other. The 
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Continental army even attacked the cultural and historical landscape in Iroquoia by 
disinterring corpses and destroying burial sites.  
Evolving circumstances within the human ecology of this bioregion shaped the 
failures of Arnold, Burgoyne, and Sullivan to successfully execute their missions. This 
accentuates Karl Marx’s famous phrase that “man makes his own history,” yet “he does 
not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at 
hand.”12 In the Northeastern Borderlands the local ecological agents of change—both 
human and non-human—shaped and recast the war and its outcome. 
Bioregionalism as a War and Environment Construct 
Despite the unique characteristics of the Northeastern Borderlands, this case 
study of the northern theatre of the War of American Independence suggests broader 
methodological themes useful to scholars interesting in war and the environment. In 
general, more research is needed in this emerging field so that we might access the 
agency of enlisted soldier, local populations, and the non-human world. Concepts like 
human ecology and bioregional environment privilege the lived experiences of 
indigenous people, common soldiers, borderland subjects, and everyday citizens. The 
dialectical relationship between human actors and the natural world in a shared 
bioregion highlights how they can obfuscate and reshape the best laid geopolitical 
stratagems of distant and powerful military and political leaders. Looking at conflict 
during the eighteenth century in these ways contributes to expanding scholars’ 
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  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. Daniel de Leon (Chicago: 
Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1913), 9. 
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temporal focus of war and environment studies to conflicts prior to the United States 
Civil War (1861- 1865).   
Within the study of the American Revolution, the bioregions of the mid-Atlantic 
and southern theatres of the war contain colonial, indigenous, and enslaved 
populations with fluid loyalties and identities in regards to the British and Continental 
forces. Cornwallis’s extensive campaign through the south, which ended in defeat at 
Yorktown in 1781, for example, was partially executed in the sparsely populated 
backcountry, had extensive provisioning problems, and suffered greatly from diseases. 
This is but one expedition with direct comparisons to the military conflict in the 
Northeastern Borderlands. 
The establishment of a vague and uncertain international boundary at the close 
of the war in 1783 contributed to a gradual process of shifting the Northeastern 
Borderlands into a bordered land. During the peace process, the British completely 
ignored their alliances with indigenous people and delivered all the lands east of the 
Mississippi to the United States.  Officials in British North America and the United 
States sought to contain indigenous people on reservations as a means to pacify and 
manage them. The Mohawk, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Seneca were granted land on the 
Grand River Reserve in Upper Canada in 1784, while the Oneida and Tuscarora were 
settled in upstate New York.  
Despite these geopolitical developments, Mohawk and Seneca persistence in the 
Northeastern Borderlands continued as they sustained their war effort long after 
General John Sullivan departed Genesee Castle. Indeed, as soon as the snow cleared, 
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Thayendanegea and his allies resumed raiding the settlements located in the Mohawk 
and Susquehanna river valleys.13 Settling a score against the Oneida, in mid-July he 
attacked their village of Kanonwalohale slaughtering livestock, burning crops, and 
thrusting the Oneida upon the American-held Fort Stanwix as refugees. Finding his 
hometown of Canajoharie occupied by American colonists, Thayendangea burned it to 
the ground as well. By the end of August, 1780, he had destroyed 150,000 bushels of 
wheat that likely would have supported the Continental army’s war effort.14 After 
feeling betrayed by the British at the war’s end, Thayendangea remade indigenous 
alliances in the Northeast Borderlands. Helping to create the Western Confederacy in 
1786 to resist the United States’ encroachment into the Northwest Territory, he stated 
that, “the English have sold the Indians to Congress.”15   
Indeed, for the indigenous residents of the Northeastern Borderlands, the war 
raged on until at least August 20, 1794, when the final battle for sovereignty in the 
Indian Country occurred between the Western Confederacy and the United States. The 
Battle of Fallen Timbers lasted less than an hour, as the American cavalry routed the 
indigenous forces with a decisive bayonet charge. The warriors, under the command of 
Weyapiersenwah (Blue Jacket), a Shawnee military leader, retreated to the British-held 
Fort Miami but were locked out by Major William Campbell, who refused to assist them 
for fear of inciting open-warfare with the United States. The indigenous people were 
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  James Paxton, Joseph Brant and his World: 18th Century Mohawk Warrior and Statesmen 
(Toronto: James Lormier & Company, 2008), 46.  
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  Daniel O’Connor, Three Centuries of Mission: The United Society for the Propagation of the 
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forced to flee their villages, where the American forces attacked their agroecosystems 
and decimated their cultural landscape.16 The human ecology of the bioregion 
underwent a fundamental transformation as Iroquoia and the Ohio Country were 
increasingly brought under the new ecological regimes of United States society and its 
aggressive expansionism.  
This dissertation offers a starting point to advance the subdisciplines of military 
and environmental history as mutually informed by one another so that we can better 
understand the variegated ways that the agency of the natural world shapes military 
endeavors and the reshaping of shared landscapes of humans and nature.
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APPENDICIES 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
Information	  on	  the	  Diarists	  of	  
Invasion	  of	  Canada	   	   	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Name	   Rank	   Occupation	   Hometown	  
	  
Population	  
in	  1790	  
Age	  in	  
1775	  
Anonymous	   Private	   Unknown	   Unknown	   Unknown	   Unknown	  
Arnold,	  Benedict	   Colonel	   Merchant	   New	  Haven,	  CT	   4,484	   35	  
Barney,	  Samuel	   Private	   Unknown	   New	  Haven,	  CT	   4,484	   22	  
Dearborn,	  Henry	   Captain	   Physician	   Nottingham,	  NH	   1,069	   24	  
Dorr,	  William	   Private	   Unknown	   Dover,	  NH	   1,996	   18	  
Fobes,	  Simon	   Private	   Farmer	   Amherst,	  MA	   1,233	   19	  
Greenman,	  
Jeremiah	   Private	   Shop	  Keeper	   Providence,	  RI	  
6,380	  
18	  
Haskell,	  Caleb	   Private	   Unknown	   Newburyport,	  MA	   4,837	   21	  
Henry,	  John	   Private	   Gunsmith	   Lancaster,	  PA	   297	   19	  
Humphrey,	  William	   Lieutenant	   	  Unknown	   Providence,	  RI	   6,380	   28	  
Kimball,	  Moses	   Private	   Blacksmith	   Hampstead,	  NH	   725	   19	  
Meigs,	  Return	   Major	   Surveyor	   Middletown,	  CT	   5,375	   40	  
Melvin,	  James	   Private	   Apprentice	   Hubbardston,	  MA	   933	   22	  
Morison,	  George	   Private	   Farmer	   Sherman	  Valley,	  PA	   Unknown	   21	  
Pierce,	  John	   Sergeant	   Surveyor	   Worcester,	  MA	   2,095	   31	  
Quebec	  #3	   Unknown	   Unknown	   Unknown	   Unknown	   Unknown	  
Senter,	  Isaac	   Surgeon	   Physician	   Newport,	  RI	   6,716	   22	  
Squier,	  Ephraim	   Private	   Unknown	   Ashford,	  CT	   2,583	   27	  
Stocking,	  Abner	   Private	   Privateer	   Haddamn,	  CT	   2,195	   23	  
Thayer,	  Simon	   Captain	   Wig	  Maker	   Providence,	  RI	   6,380	   38	  
Topham,	  John	   Captain	   Unknown	   Newport,	  RI	   6,716	   33	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Appendix B 
 
The Map shows the approximate route of the Arnold expedition. Map created by the 
author, based on John Mitchell, Map of the British and French North America, 1775. 
Collections of the Maine Historical Society.  
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Appendix C 
 
John Montresor map of the sources of the Chaudiere, Penobscot, and Kennebec rivers, 
ca. 1761. Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress.  
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Appendix D 
 
 
Map of the Beauce region. Here Beauce-Sartigan is labeled as St. George. Map from 
Justin H. Smith, Arnold’s March from Cambridge to Quebec:  A Critical Study, Together with 
a Reprint of Arnold’s Journal (New York:  The Knickerbocker Press, 1903).  
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Appendix E 
 
Topographical map of the Burgoyne expedition. The mountainous and wooded terrain 
served as an obstacle and point of fear. William Faden, London, 1780. Library of 
Congress Geography and Map Division.  
	  	  
	  
284	  
Appendix F 
 
This painting of Jane McCrea depicts the racial and sexual fears of colonists living in the 
Northeast Borderlands in 1777. The Death of Jane McCrea, by John Vanderlyn. 1804. 
Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.  
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Appendix G
 
Map of Burgoyne’s encampment at Saratoga.  Here he is surrounded by the 
impenetrable forests of the region with the Hudson River on his flank and streams to 
his rear making retreat difficult. Map by William Cumberland Wilkinson. 1777 Library 
of Congress Geography and Map Division.   
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Appendix H 
 
Map of Gen. Sullivan’s march from Easton to the Seneca and Cayuga countries. 1779. Library 
of Congress Geography and Map Division.  
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